HAving with much delight, satis∣faction, and content perused this Treatise, entituled, The Philosophicall Touch-stone, I allow it to be printed and published, and commend it to the learned and judicious Reader, as a work sound and solid, and eminently acute and accurate.
Iohn Downame.
THE PHILOSOPHICALL TOUCH-STONE: OR OBSERVATIONS UPON Sir Kenelm Digbie's Discourses of the nature of BODIES, and of the rea∣sonable SOULE.
In which his erroneous Paradoxes are refuted, the Truth, and Aristotelian Philosophy vindicated, the immortality of mans Soule briefly, but sufficiently proved.
And the weak Fortifications of a late Amsterdam Ingeneer, patronizing The Soules mortality, briefly slighted.
By ALEXANDER ROSS.
Pers. Sat. 5.
Non equidem hoc studeo, bullatis ut mihi nugis Pagina turgescat, dare pondus idonea fumo.
LONDON, Printed for Iames Young, and are to be sold by Charles Green, at the signe of the Gun in Ivie-lane. 1645.
TO THE Right honourable, IOHN, Earle of RUTLAND, Lord Ross, &c.
My Lord,
WIth the same boldnesse that I have adventured to lap up in the folds of a few paper sheets the rich Jewells of Philosophicall truths, with the same have I presumed to present them to your Lordships view; not that you can receive from them any addition of honour, but that they, from your Name and Protection, may partake a farther degree of irradiation and lustre. Here you may see what odds there are between naturall gems, and counterfeit stones; between solid wholsome meats, and a dish of Frogs or Mushroms, though made savoury with French sauce, to which that ingenious rather then (in this Discourse) judicious Knight doth invite us: who, breathing now in a hotter cli∣mate, cannot digest the solid meats of Peripatetick verities, which hitherto have been the proper and wholsome food of our Universities; and therefore
entertaines us with a French dinner of his owne dressing, or with an airie feast of Philosophicall quelque choses: a banquet fitter for Grashoppers and Camelions, who feed on dew and aire, then for men, who rise from his Table as little satisfied, as when they sate downe. We that have eat plenti∣fully of the sound and wholsome viands which are dressed in Aristotle's kitchin, are loth now to be fed, as the Indian gods are, with the steem or smoak of meats; or, as those
—Umbrae tenues, simulachra{que} luce carentum,
those pale ghosts in Proserpine's Court, to champ Leeks and Mallowes.
My Lord, in this Dedication, I onely aime at an expression of my gratefulness and observance, which I owe to your goodnesse; and of those re∣all sentiments I have of your favours and opini∣on, which your self, and your truly noble and reli∣gious Countesse have been pleased to conceive of mee. I heartily pray for an accumulation of all happinesse on you both, as likewise on the fruit of your bodies, especially the tender plant, and hope∣full pledge of your mutuall loves, my Lord Ross; which is the wish of
Your Honours humble servant, ALEXANDER ROSS.
The CONTENTS of the first part, containing 68. Sections.
WOrds expresse things as they are in their owne na∣ture. sect. 1.
Divisibility the effect of extension; this is not the essence of quantity. sect. 2.
Rarity the effect, not the cause of heat: rarified bodies not the hottest. sec. 3.
The essence of locall motion consisteth not in divisibility. sec. 4.
Place is not a body, but the superficies of a body. sec. 5.
Not density, but gravity is the cause of activity; and frigi∣dity cause of both. sec. 6.
Pressure and penetration not parts, but effects of frigidity: heat is more piercing. sec. 7.
Though accidents be reall entities, yet they exist not by them∣selves. sec. 8.
Heat is not the substance of the fire. sec. 9.
Light no body, but a quality, proved by twelve reasons: Nor can it be fire. sec. 10.
Of the qualities of light, and how it heats, and how it pe∣risheth. sec. 11, 12.
The dilatatio• and motion of the light, and how seen by us. sec. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
...
The greatest bodies have not the greatest vertue. sec. 21.
How naturall bodies move themselves. sec. 22.
How the Sun causeth motion. sec. 23.
If the light beares up the atomes, and if it be a part of them. sec. 24.
There is in nature positive gravity and levity, by which she works. sec. 25.
Light descends thorow dense bodies. sec. 26.
Atomes doe not presse. sec. 27.
Egyptian earth, why heavie upon change of weather. How a vessell with snow and salt in it freezeth by the fire. The vanity of atomes. sec. 28.
Water is not actually heavie in its owne sphere. The sea moves naturally to the centre. Water can divide water. sec. 29
Heavie bodies tend naturally to the centre. Gravity is not the cause of violent motion. The effect sometimes exceeds the cause. Inanimate things, without understanding, affect and dis-affect what's good or bad for them. sec. 30.
The true cause of the motion of projection, and its proper∣ties. sec. 31.
The heavens void of generation, corruption, alteration: they are naturall bodies. sec. 32.
Atomes are not the causes of heat, nor ofre-action. sec. 33.
How elementary formes remaine in mixed bodies. sec. 34.
There are in nature foure simple bodies. sec. 35.
Wind is not the motion of atomes, but an exhalation. sec. 36.
Naturall, Mathematicall, and Diabolicall magick. sec. 37.
The weapon-salve a meere imposture. sec. 38.
The true causes of the temperament under the line. sec. 39.
The load-stone is not begot of atomes drawne from the North-Pole. sec. 40.
Without qualities no operation in nature. sec. 41.
...
Atomes pierce not the earth. Odors decay by time. Salt how it growes heavie. sec. 42.
Naturall agents at the same time work diversly. sec. 43.
The heat of the marrow is not the cause of the hardnesse of the bones, but the heat of the bones themselves. sec. 44.
God is not dishonoured, by calling him the Creatour of the meanest things. sec. 45.
The formative power of generation in the seed. sec. 46.
Whether the heart or the liver first generated. sec. 47.
Thin bodies, as well as thick, the objects of touch. Rarity and density what kind of entities. sec. 48.
Objects work not materially, but intentionally on the sense. sec. 49.
Sound is not motion, proved. How perceived by deafe men. It shakes not houses. sec. 50.
Colours are not quantities nor substances, but qualities. s. 51.
How living creatures can move themselves. Of nature and properties. Of life: And how the life of God differs from the life of the creature. sec. 52.
Of sense and sensation. How the sense worketh and suffe∣reth. sec. 53.
Vision is not caused by materiall atomes. Seven things re∣quired in sensation. sec. 54.
Words are not motion, nor are they the chiefe object of me∣mory. sec. 55.
The organ of the memory. How the intellect and memory differ. sec. 56.
Purging consisteth not in liquefaction, but in attracting and expelling. sec. 57.
Pleasure is not the motion of a fume about the heart, but the apprehension of a convenient object. sec. 58.
Paine and pleasure move not the heart. Of systole and dia∣stole. sec. 59.
...
Paine is not compression, but the effect of it. All hard things breed not paine, nor soft things pleasure. The heart is more active then passive, because hot. Feare, sorrow, and stu∣pidity how they differ. Passion is not the motion of the bloud and spirits, but of the sensible appetite. Every passion is not mo∣tion. The division of passions. Why birds more musicall then other creatures. sec. 60.
There are sympathies and antipathies in nature, of which we can give no reason, which is the punishment of Adams pride. sec. 61.
Of impressions made in the embryo, and of the formative power. sec. 62.
Substances could not be knowne, were it not for qualities. No action, passion, and motion without qualities. Alterations from them. sec. 63.
All bodies are not meerly passive. Rare and dense not the primary division of bodies. sec. 64.
Aristotle not the author of atomes, but Democritus. sec. 65.
The necessity of metaphysicall knowledge. Privations and negations conceived as positive entities by Aristotelians, how. sec. 66.
Qualities are not dispositions of parts. Beauty is neither composition nor proportion. Health is not temper. Agility is not proportion nor strength. Science is not ordered phantasmes. sec. 67.
Sir Kenelme modestly reproved for mocking at Aristote∣lians. sec. 68.
How, and why accidents are in their subjects. Accidents are entities. Aristotelians vindicated from tautologies. Nature aimes at unity, why. Of similitudes, and the ground thereof. How man is like to God, not God to man. sec. 69.
The CONTENTS of the second part, containing 28. Sections.
ARistotelians make not heat and cold indivisible quali∣ties. Not they, but the Masse-Priests turne bodies into spirits. sec. 1.
Not the nature, but the similitude of the thing appre∣hended, is in the man apprehending; and therefore the under∣standing is not the same with the thing understood, proved by ten reasons. sec. 2.
All relations are not notions, but reall entities, proved by ten reasons. sec. 3.
Existence is not the property of man, but of entity, or ra∣ther its formality; in God onely it is one with essence. sec. 4.
The soule is more then an active force. She sleepeth not in the grave, &c. sec. 5.
Being hath no great affinity with the soule: it is neither the end, nor the Idea of the soule. sec. 6.
Things are understood rather by way of similitude, then of respect or relation. sec. 7.
Mans knowledge how finite and infinite. God onely absolute∣ly infinite. How he is knowne by us here and hereafter. How infinity can be knowne. sec. 8.
Things lose not their being, by reason of quantity, but by the privation of the forme. sec. 9.
Mathematicians consider not the natures of things, but bare accidents abstracted from sensible matter. sec. 10.
...
All life consisteth not in motion. Life is not an action, but the act. How motions come from without, how not. sec. 11.
How the soule is perfect. In her no privative, but negative imperfections. There are accidents in the soule. sec. 12.
Place is not a body: it is neither forme nor matter. What∣soever hath existence hath ubiety, even Angels and soules. How soules are in their bodies. They are not no-where, nor are they every-where. sec. 13.
How time is the measure of motion. Time and motion dif∣ferent things. When the heavenly motions shall cease, there will be time, how understood. Things below would move, though the heavens stood still. sec. 14.
What things are in time chiefly and primarily. How spirits are not in time, and how in time. Tempus, aevum, eternitie. God onely exempted from time. Discrete time. sec. 15.
The soule is no accident. She knoweth not all things. There is no exteriour and interiour soule. Phantasmes are not bodies. All soules have not the same amplitude of knowledge. Life is not motion. Neither the soule nor the life becomes to be a spi∣rit. sec. 16.
Both Angels and soules stand in need of externall and in∣ternall helps of knowledge. Memory remaines in separated soules. How the species depend from the phantasie. Divers habits left in the soule separated. The soules in their under∣standing differ from the Angels. What things they know not. God is not understood by species. sec. 17.
The phantasie worketh not upon the soule, but the active intellect upon the passive. How the phantasie helps the un∣derstanding. The phantasie workes in sleep. How the soule worketh upon her selfe, by meanes of her divers faculties. sec. 18.
...
In Angels and departed soules there are actions and per∣fective passions. The want of action argues death rather then life. Some actions cease after death, not all. All actions not corruptive. Sir Kenelm contradicts himselfe. sec. 19.
The soule the subject of memory, recordation, reminiscence, and of oblivion too. What habits are left actually and poten∣tially in the soule. 'Tis a happinesse to be forgetfull of some things. sec. 20.
Rhetoricall flourishes uselesse, and hurtfull in Philosophicall disputes. sec. 21.
Perfection of knowledge makes not the substance of the soule more perfect. The soule ceaseth not to be a soule, though shee brings knowledge with her. False judgements and erroneous opinions are a part of the punishment of damned soules in hell. sec. 22.
All effects doe not immediately follow upon the working of the efficient. Opus and Operatio. The act of entity and of causality are to be distinguished. The effect, which is the pro∣perty of the cause, followeth immediately. God an eternall en∣tity, not an eternall cause. sec. 23.
That the soule is not a materiall, but a spirituall substance, infused, not traduced, proved by twenty arguments. Of the operations, knowledge, and liberty of the soule in willing. Of her excellency above the senses and corporeall substances: this is proved by Scripture. In what sense the soule is called cor∣poreall by some Fathers. She is no part of the divine essence, as some hereticks thought. sec. 24.
The specificall perfection or excellency of soules is alike in all. There may be some difference in accidentall perfections, in respect of the organs and phantasie. sec. 25.
The neerer the Intelligences are to God, the more they know. The superiour have a greater similitude with God then
the inferiour, and stand in need of fewer intelligible species.
All behold Gods essence, but not in the same measure. Neither is their knowledge equall, nor infinitely unequall. sec. 26.
The soule is not made complete in or by the body, but rather incomplete, because she is then a part of the whole. sec. 27.
Nature, reason, and knowledge are but blind guides to heaven, without Christ, proved by Scripture and reason. What we are by nature. How Christ may be called nature, reason, and knowledge. sec. 28.
The CONTENTS of the Conclusion, containing 17. Sections.
THe immortality of the soule proved by Scripture. sec. 1.
The same proved by six reasons grounded on the Scri∣pture. sec. 2.
That the soule is immortall of her owne nature, proved by foure reasons: and how this phrase is to be understood. sec. 3.
The soules immortality proved by thirteen naturall and morall reasons. The Gentiles, by natures light, were not igno∣rant of this truth. Aristotle in this point cleered and vin∣dicated. sec. 4.
How Angels and mens soules subject to annihilation or dissolution. sec. 5.
The first Objection against our doctrine answered, and is shewed how the soule is immortall, both by grace and nature. sec. 6.
The second Objection answered. Solomon compares not mens soules to beasts, but the death of mens bodies to that of beasts. sec. 7.
The third Objection answered. Job denieth not the resur∣rection, but sheweth it cannot be effected by the power of na∣ture. sec. 8.
The fourth Objection answered. Austin cleered. The way how the soule is infused, and originall sin propagated. sec. 9.
The fifth Objection answered. How the soule in under stand∣ing depends from the senses. sec. 10.
The sixth Objection answered how the soule suffers. sec. 11.
...
The seventh Objection answered. How immateriall grace is corrupted. sec. 12.
The eighth Objection answered. Desire of immortality in man onely. sec. 13.
The ninth Objection answered. The soule understands bet∣ter being separated, then now she doth in the body. sec. 14.
The many mischiefes that Christian Religion suffers by this opinion of the soules corruptibility. sec. 15.
The late printed Pamphlet at Amsterdam, which under∣takes to prove the soules mortality, briefly refuted, and slighted as a frivolous and irreligious rapsodie, having nothing in it but froth. Wherein he abuseth Scripture. He is refuted in foure observations. The soule, after death, subsisteth naturally, not violently, nor miraculously. sec. 16.
A devout and comfortable meditation upon the soules im∣mortality, fit for all afflicted Christians. sec. 17.
Page 1
THE PHILOSOPHICALL TOUCH-STONE.
NOble Sir KENELME, as I reverence your worth, so I admire your paines, who, being a Gentleman of such emi∣nencie, thinks it no disparagement, but an honour, to spend your time in good literature, which giveth true Nobili∣tie: your practice herein is exempla∣ry, which I wish the Gentry of our Nation would imi∣tate, who think they are born meerly for themselves and their pleasures; whose time is spent either idlely, wic∣kedly, or impertinently, as Seneca complaines, Eorum vi∣tam mortemque juxta existimo: but your mind, being of a more noble extraction, semine ab aethereo, you know that you are not borne for your selfe; and therefore, by your indefatigable paines, doe both eternize your fame, and enoble your Countrie: but because this life of ours can∣not challenge the priviledge of perfection, and truth
Page 2
here is accompanied with errour, as the light with shades; therefore I find that this your Work, of the na∣ture of Bodies, and of the Soules immortality, hath some passages in it Heterodoxall, and not consonant to the principles of Divinity and Philosophy, which have drawne from mee these sudden Observations (for I have here neither time, books, nor opportunitie to enlarge my selfe) in which I promise both brevity and mode∣sty, suffering no other language to passe from mee, but such as may beseem both your worth, and my ingenui∣tie; for my end is not to wound your reputation, but to vindicate the truth.
The first mistake I meet with is [That words expresse* 5.1 things only according to the pictures we make of them in our thoughts, and not as the things are in their proper natures.] But if our words expresse not the things which we con∣ceive in our minds, as they are in their owne natures, then our conceptions are erroneous, and our words im∣proper or false: and if there be not an adequation of our conceptions with the things we conceive, there can be no metaphysicall truth in us; which consisteth in the agreement of our thoughts with the things, as ethicall truth doth in the consent of our words to our thoughts. Our conceptions are our internall words which repre∣sent reall things, and our externall words represent these conceptions, and, by consequence, they expresse things as they are in their natures: So Adam in Paradise gave names to the creatures according to their natures, and so have wise men ever since. The Latines call the sea mare, quasi amarum, from its saltnesse or bitternesse, for it is so in its owne nature.
Secondly, [You define quantity to be nothing else but the* 5.2 extension of a thing] and shortly after [that quantity is no∣thing
Page 3
else but divisibility.] Thus you confound extension and divisibility, which differ as much, as in man rationa∣lity differs from risibility, the one being the effect of the other; for therefore things are divisible, because they are extensive: take away extension, divisibility faileth; and therefore numbers are not properly divisible, be∣cause they have no extension, but onely in resemblance. Secondly, extension is not the essence of quantity; for if it were, all that have quantitie must have also extensi∣on: but Angels have discrete quantitie, which wee call number, and yet have no extension. Thirdly, there is a quidditative or entitive extension, by which one part is not another in bodies, though there were no quantita∣tive extension at all: therefore not every extension is the essence of quantitie. There is also the extension of site, which is no quantitie.
Whereas [you make heat a property of rare bodies, and* 5.3 that out of rarity ariseth heat, and that a body is made and constituted a body by quantity] you speak paradoxically; for the rarest bodie is not still the hottest: A burning coale is hotter then the flame, and scalding lead is hotter then scalding water. Secondly, rarity is not the cause of heat, but heat the cause of rarity; that which begets heat, is motion, and the influence and light of the Stars: moti∣on then begets heat, heat begets rarity. 'Tis true, that rare∣faction prepares the matter to receive heat, as heat pre∣pares the matter to receive the forme of the hot ele∣ment; but what prepares, is not the cause. Thirdly, a bodie is not made and constituted by quantitie, for this is posteriour to a bodie, being a substance, and followes the bodie as its accident; and therefore more ignoble. Every accident hath a subjective dependence from the substance; a bodie hath or may have entitie without
Page 4
quantitie, so cannot quantitie without the bodie.
The essence, or, as you call it [the substance of locall mo∣tion,* 5.4 doth not consist in division;] because whatsoever divi∣sion there is in this motion, it is either in respect of the thing moved, or in respect of the space in which it is mo∣ved: but both these are externall to motion, and not be∣longing any waies to its essence; therefore in that divisi∣bility which is in them, cannot consist the essence of lo∣call motion. Besides, divisibility is a propertie of quanti∣tie flowing from its essence, whereas locall motion is quantitative but by accident; and not, but by way of reduction, in the predicament of quantitie: therefore, except you be of Scotus his opinion, who will have mo∣bile and motus all one, division cannot be the essence of locall motion: And if you were a Scotist in this, yet you cannot prevaile; for division, being the accident of the thing moved, it cannot be of its essence; for no accident can constitute the essence of a substance.
You speak not like a Philosopher, when you speak* 5.5 [of uniting a body moved to that other body, which is called its place:] For place is defined to be the superficies of the ambient bodie, but the bodie quantitative is a different species from the superficies: the substantiall bodie is in an∣other predicament; therefore place cannot be a body: for if it were, it could not be equall to the thing contained; for every bodie that containes, is bigger then the bodie contained: as the dish is bigger then the water. The aire then is not the place of our bodies, but the superficies or terminus of the aire, which is the accident of that sub∣ject.
[In regard dense bodies (you say) are dividers, the earth* 5.6 in that respect must be the most active element, since it is the most dense.] The earth is active in dividing, not because
Page 5
it is most dense, but because most heavy; and, indeed, the cause both of density and gravity is frigidity; and there∣fore this is the active quality, not density. Againe, ele∣ments are called active, in respect of the two active qua∣lities, heat and cold; and, of these two, heat is the more active; and consequently, the element of fire is simply and absolutely most active.
[The action of cold is composed of two parts, to wit, pressing,* 5.7 and penetration.] Pressure and penetration are not the parts, but the effects of frigefaction. Pressure but a remote effect, for it is immediately caused by gravity, and this by cold: And for penetration, it is rather the effect of heat then of cold; for hot liquors pierce sooner then cold: and it is rather by reason of the rarity of its substance, then of the coldnesse thereof, that it pierceth; for this cause aire is more penetrating then water, and fire then aire.
[A reall entity necessarily hath an existence of its owne, and* 5.8 so becomes a substance.] By this you inferre, that qualities must needs be substances, seeing they are reall entities di∣stinct from the bodies they accompany. But this conse∣quence▪ is irrationall; for accidents are reall entities, be∣cause they are not bare notions and conceptions of the mind, but things existent, and distinct from their bodies; yet their entity is weake compared with that of sub∣stances, so that sometimes they are called non-entities by Philosophers: but if all reall entities must needs be sub∣stances, then in vaine is it to make above one predica∣ment, or to divide entity into substance and accidents. Then qualities cannot be contrary one to another, as heat to cold, nor can they admit of magis and minus, but are subjects susceptible of contrariety without alteration of themselves, which are the properties of substance: but although accidents be reall entities, yet they have no
Page 6
existence in or by themselves, but in or by their substan∣ces; for Accidentis esse est inesse; and therefore ens is called [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] as respecting principally sub∣stance; but accidents secundariò, as they inhere in their substance: which as they cannot subsist, so they can∣not be defined without their substance. The Papists themselves will not yeeld, that accidents in the Eucharist can subsist without their proper subject, except by mi∣racle, or Divine power: and Scotus is so far from yeeld∣ing* 5.9 any subsistence to accidents without their substance, that he will rather beleeve, that the accidents in the bread, are turned by miracle into a substance: to which opinion it seems you encline. Thomas tels us, that white∣nesse* 5.10 and other accidents have no entity, but as they are in their subjects: And Aristotle, that accidents are entis,* 5.11 rather then entia. You must first prove that accidents have any entity without their subjects, and then, that to have reall entity, and to subsist by it selfe; or, that essence and self-existence is all one: when this is proved, we will be of your opinion.
[Heat is nothing else in the fire, but the very substance of* 5.12 it.] If heat be the substance of the fire, then it is either the matter, or the forme of it; not the matter, for heat is active, the matter passive; not the forme, for the forme is the essence, and therefore incommunicable; but heat is communicated by the fire to the water: Heat is not in the element the principle of motion, but the forme there∣of is. One forme is not contrary to another: but heat is contrary to cold. Heat admits degrees, so doth not the substantiall forme. Heat and cold cannot be contraries,* 5.13 seeing heat is a substance, say you, and cold a quality.
[It cannot be imagined that light is any thing else but fire.]* 5.14 If it be so, then where-ever fire is, there is light: but we
Page 7
reade of a fire without light. 2. Then where-ever light is, there is fire: but there is light in the Stars, in Cats eyes, in Glow-wormes, in Fish scales, yet no fire. 3. The nature of fire is to ascend onely, the nature of the light is to descend also. 4. Water is opposite to fire; but to light, darknesse. 5. Fire heats by degrees, and successively, light illuminates suddenly, and in an instant. 6. Fire containes it selfe in a narrow place, as the chimney, light dilates it selfe over all the roome. 7. If light be fire, then it must be heat, for heat you say is fire; but if light be heat, then it will follow that light is tangible, and heat visible: but ask a blind man, if he can discerne light by touching, and ask him that hath eyes, if by them he can see heat, which he must needs do, if heat and light be the same thing. 8. There is heat in a dark Oven that bakes your bread, when there is no light at all; and there is light in Saturne, but no heat at all. 9. When the fire warmes the water, it makes a change in the water, by expelling a positive quality, but when the Sun illuminates the aire, there is no change made in the aire, because no positive quality is expelled; darknesse being a meere privation. 10. The light of the Sun in the aire and in the Sun, is the same light; but if it be fire in the aire, much more must it be fire in the Sun: No wonder then if Icarus his wa∣xen wings melted, flying so neere the Sun. But the snowie mountaines have the Suns light more then the val∣leys, yet have they not thereby the more heat. Snow en∣lightneth the aire in the night, but warmes it not. The aire is not warmer at the full Moone, then at the change. 11. Iflight be fire, then it must be a body, but a body it cannot be; for then when light is in the aire, two bo∣dies must be at once in one place. 2. It must be the sub∣ject of motion. 3. It must be compounded of matter and
Page 8
forme. 4. It can never be annihilated, for the matter re∣maines still; but what becomes of the candle-light in your chamber, when the candle is put out? doth the matter of it assume some new forme? and is the corru∣ption of light the generation of darknesse? 5. If it were a body, it must enter into the composition of things, and so make up a part of the mixed body; but how absurd is the conceit of these things? 12. If light be fire, then it must be a substance; and so it can subsist by it selfe, and is incapable of degrees; not to speake of the instantaneall motion of light, of which corporeall substances are not capable, nor of the immobility of it in the aire, when the aire is moved with winds.
[You see upon the paper which you held neere the flame of a* 5.15 candle, being a little removed, some part of that which you saw in the candle.] The parts of the candle are, the wieke, the tallow, and the flame; Doe you see any of these on the paper? Indeed, you see no part of the candle on the pa∣per; but only by the light of the candle you see the pa∣per; which will not prove light to be a body, no more then [the dilating of gold:] for though gold dilated, and fire dilated, are gold, and fire; yet this will not prove that light is fire dilated. As for your [blind School-master] you speak of, he might feele the heat of the fire in his brains, but not the light; for light is not the object of touching. [As for the breaking or reflecting of light] these wil prove it no more to be a body, then the breaking or motion of a shadow, can prove a shadow to be a body: Nullum simile est idem. The motions of light and shadowes, are but like the motions of bodies. [The uniting of light in a burning-glasse] proves it no more to be a body, then the uniting or re-inforcing of cold by antiperistasis, proves cold to be a body: And if you'l say that light is fire, be∣cause
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it begets heat in a burning-glasse; you may as well say, that motion is fire, because that begets heat in two hard bodies rubbed together.
[There is no doubt but light heats as well as enlightneth.]* 5.16 All light, as is said, heats not, nor hath all heat light annex∣ed with it. But if all light did heat, yet will it not from thence follow that light is fire; for motion heats as well as light, and the Sun warmes us as well by the one, as by the other; and both are but meanes, and the Suns instruments to procreate heat by in this inferiour world. [As for the flame of the spirit of Wine, which you say will not burne,] I grant it; but yet it will warme, which the light doth not: Nay, I am assured, that no light at all warms, except the celestiall, which it doth (as they speake) effe∣ctivè, not formaliter: But the fire heats by its forme, not by its light: Therefore you are mistaken in all your di∣scourse, confounding the celestiall light, with that of the fire or candle; and attributing heat to the light of the fire, which heat proceeds immediatly from its forme, not from its light. And though the Suns light in a burning-glasse may inflame, yet no other light can do so; and so by calling light fire, you confound the acci∣dent with the substance, as when you call [The sent of odoriferous water, the water it selfe.]
When we ask you, What becomes of the light when* 5.17 the Sun is gone, or is intercepted by a cloud, or the Moons body? You ask again, [What becomes of the flame when it is extinguished?] I answer, the flame, being a sub∣stance begot of smoake, returns again unto smoak, for the smoak being elevated to that height of heat and dri∣nesse, presently becomes flame; which when its nutriment failes, or violently by the wind is separated from its grosser substance, encountring with the cold aire, returns
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unto smoak again: But for the light in the roome, there is no such generation and corruption; for when the flame is extinguished, and resolved into smoak, the light quite perisheth and vanisheth into nothing, as being a bare ac∣cident, and somewhat like to nothing. If it be a sub∣stance, and resolved into some other matter, tell us in∣to what.
[You prove the light to be nothing else but the flame dilated,* 5.18 by bringing similes of a basin of water dilated unto vapours by heat, and of perfumes dilated unto odoriferous smoak.] But these are no proofes at all: Wee sensibly perceive the vapors generated of the water, and the smoak of the per∣fume, and the diminution or totall resolution of these named grosser bodies, into thinner aereall; But wee see no such thing in the light, for there is no resolution at all of the flame into that diffused light, nor any dimi∣nution of the flame, by the encrease of the light; or any totall abolishing of the flame unto that imaginary sub∣stance of the light. When the water and perfume is quite consumed, the steame and smoake remaine a great while after; but doth there remaine any light of the flame in the roome after the flame is wasted and gone? which must needs be, if the light be the flame dilated or resolved. It were strange Philosophy to say, that the light of the Sun is nothing else but the body of the Sun dilated: To how many inconveniences should that ce∣lestiall body be subject? To how many generations and corruptions?
[Light is not in every place of the roome really, which is il∣lightned.]* 5.19 This is a pure cōtradiction; for, what is illight∣ned hath light in it. If there be not light in any part of the roome which is illightned, then some illightned parts are dark: such mysterious Philosophy I understand not. As
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for these Atomes in the Sun, [Which you say hinder not our sight;] if they be but few, 'tis true: but I have seen of∣ten times so many of them, and so thick together neere the ground, that they sensibly hinder the sight. And though there be many Atomes in the aire, yet there is no penetration of dimensions, as there must needs be, if the light be a body. If there be a thousand lights in a Church, so many bodies there must be, besides that of the aire, penetrating one another. What a strange body is the light, that can passe through the solid and dense substance of a glasse, and not breake it?* 5.20
[As for the circumaction of a lighted torch in the dark, and the swift motion of the Sun,] though these may deceive our sight: this, by reason of its vast distance; that, be∣cause the fiery end of it, being the onely object of the eye in the dark, sends the species of it unto the eye, and in the forme of a fiery wheele; because the beames of our eye are dissipated and broken, by the swift motion of the lucid object: Yet these will not prove, that wee are de∣ceived in the instantaneall motion of the light from East to West, or of a candle in the roome where we are; for if the eye be continually deceived in the motion of its proper object, being within a convenient distance, then is the eye given to us in vaine, and so God is made im∣perfect in his worke: And therefore our argument is good, when we say, that the light can be no naturall body, seeing it illuminates the whole Hemisphere in an instant.
You give a reason why the light by its motion doth* 5.21 not shatter the aire, or other bodies in pieces: [Because in light there is only celerity, but no bignesse or density:] This is a strange body, that hath no dimensions; you were bet∣ter call it a spirit, then a body; for if it be a body, it must have matter and forme: by the matter, it hath quantity,
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which is inseparable from it; by the forme, that quanti∣tie hath its determination and limits: therefore if there be in the light celerity, there is motion; if motion, then the principles of motion, which are two, to wit, the active forme, and the passive matter: and these cannot be without quantitie, nor this without dimensions; and what dimensions can be wanting in so vaste a body as the light is, reaching from heaven to earth? You cannot al∣low lesse then the three dimensions of longitude, latitude and profundity, and that (I think) is bignesse: and if it in∣corporate it selfe with the aire, there must needs be a condensation; two bodies, nay perhaps a thousand, in one Church (if there be so many candles) being united in one.
[No light is seen by us, but what is reflected from an opa∣cous* 5.22 body to our eye.] I pray, from what opacous bodie is the light of the Sun, Moon and Stars reflected, when we look upon these luminaries? Doe they not immedi∣atly, without any such help, strike our eyes when we look on them? And wherefore [hath the wind no power to shake the light, which strikes our eye in a straight line?] Is the wind more restrained by a straight then a crooked line? The wind shakes the aire, and yet shakes not the light which is in it. Sure, it is not the straight line that keeps the light from shaking, but because it is an acci∣dent, and not a bodie, as the aire is, and bodies only are the objects and subjects of motion.
[Our arguments (you say) against light being a body, are* 5.23 only negative.] All negative arguments are not to be re∣jected; there be negative demonstrations as well as affir∣mative: and you which hold light to be a body, how will you prove it to be no accident, but by negatives? and yet I have urged already divers affirmative argu∣ments
Page 13
to prove that light is a qualitie, as well as nega∣tive, to prove it is no bodie. And whereas you con∣clude [that if fire be light, then light must needs be fire,]* 5.24 it will not follow; for fire may be light or lucid in the concrete, and yet not so in the abstract: and if it were so, yet light is not therefore fire; for sure, the light of snow, or fish, or glow-wormes is not fire, nor indeed any light, as I have proved.
[By how much the quicker the motion is, by so much the* 5.25 agent is the perfecter.] The quicknesse of the motion ar∣gues not the perfection of the agent, except you will have the Moon, which moves swifter, a perfecter agent then the Sun, whose motion is much slower. Is Mercu∣rie a more perfect agent then his father Iupiter? or is To∣bias lesse perfect then his dogge, because he is not so nim∣ble footed?
[The nature of a body is, that greater quantity of the same* 5.26 thing hath greater vertue then a lesse quantity hath.] You confound the two sorts of quantities, to wit, virtutis and molis; the greatest vertue is not alwaies in the greatest bulk: there was more spirit and courage in little David, then in great Goliah. A little horse hath often∣times more metall then a bigger; and a few drops of chymicall spirit have more vertue then an handfull of herbs: little women, for the most part, are fruitfuller then the tallest. And there is more force in a little gun∣powder within a musket, then in twenty times so much in an open place.
[You can see no principle to perswade you, that any body can* 5.27 move it selfe towards any place.] If your meaning be, that no body can move it selfe totally, that is, that the whole, and every part in the whole be both movers and mo∣ved, I assent to you; for one and the same thing cannot
Page 14
be in the same respect actually and potentially in being, but the mover is still in actu, the thing moved in poten∣tia: nor can the same thing be more noble then it selfe, which it must be, if the bodie thus move it selfe, seeing the mover is more noble then the thing moved; but if your meaning be, that no bodie moves it selfe, that is, that in the same bodie one part doth not move the o∣ther, you are mistaken: for every bodie is compounded of forme and matter; the forme is the mover, the matter is moved: and so every bodie moves it selfe, as having within it selfe the principle of its motion, which is the forme. So heavie bodies move themselves downward, light bodies upward; the one by gravitie, or the forme of gravitie, the other by the forme of levitie: gravitie and levitie being qualities proceeding from the forme of these inanimate bodies; and this power of moving themselves, these bodies had in their generation from their generator, who gave them being and forme, and the consequences of forme; dans formam, dat consequen∣tia ad formam: therefore when a stone falls downward, that motion is not from an externall mover; for then the motion should not be naturall, but violent: now the motion is naturall; for nature is the principle and cause of it, and nature is intrinsecall, and the forme is the chiefe nature, which causeth this motion; therefore the genera∣tor cannot be the cause of this motion, as being gone and separated from it: nor is the removing of the impe∣diment or the impeller the cause of this motion, for these are causes only by accident, which must be reduced to the selfe cause: Doubtlesse then all bodies move them∣selves. Now [if the quality be nothing else, (as you urge out of Thomas) but the modification of the thing whose qua∣lity it is,] then you must exclude all habits, naturall fa∣culties
Page 15
and passions, all colours, sounds, sents, and ma∣ny other qualities, from being reall entities; which is ab∣surd.
[The Sun is a perpetuall and constant cause, working upon* 5.28 inferiour bodies, by his being sometime present, sometime ab∣sent.] You spend much paper in shewing that the Sun is the cause of the motion of inferiour bodies, which wee deny not; but wee are not satisfied with this cause: for the Sun, as all other celestiall bodies, is but an universall and remote cause of inferiour bodies and their moti∣ons; but such a cause begets no scientificall knowledge: the cause, by which we must know scientifically, is par∣ticular and immediate, to wit, the formes of bodies by their properties, gravity and levity; these are the causes of motion, by which we know. The Sun is too remote a cause, and I doubt whether hee be a cause at all why the fire burnes, and of other such like effects. And though the Sun, being present, is the cause of sublunary effects, yet, being absent, he cannot be a cause properly, but accidentally, or causa deficiens, not efficiens.
[The light carrieth up an atome with it,] and shortly af∣ter* 5.29 you tell us [that light is a part of the atome.] Is not the aire strong enough to beare atomes, except you adde this new carrier or porter, light? What becomes of these atomes when the light is gone? Are they not too heavie a burthen for the aire to support, without its fel∣low-helper?
Hercule supposito sidera fulcit Atlas.
This is much like their conceipt, who feared that Atlas was not strong enough to beare up the heavens, if Her∣cules shoulder had not helped him; but how comes the light to be a part of its owne burthen? an atome then, I see, is no atome, but may be cut in parts and anatomized,
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and these parts are light: But is light an integrall, or an essentiall part? Are there any atomes in candle-light? if there be, how shall we know? if there be not, then is the light no part of atomes: And if atomes be opake bo∣dies, how can light be a part of such? is one opposite a part of another? I think, your atomes sustained by the light, are like the dreames in Virgil, supported by an elme; or like the shadowes in the Elysian fields, flying about the green medowes:
—tenues sine corpore vitae
Cernuntur volitare cava sub imagine formae.
You have been too much conversant in the schoole of Democritus, who held the world to be made of atomes. [And to say, that the first and most generall operation of the* 5.30 Sun, is to raise and make atomes,] is to give the Sun a very poore, unworthy, and fruitlesse imployment. Caligula and his souldiers were better imployed, when they ga∣thered shells and pebble-stones; and so was Dioclesian in catching of flies.
[There is no such thing among bodies, as positive gravity* 5.31 and levity, but that their course upwards or downwards hap∣pen to them by the order of nature.] It seems you under∣stand here by nature, the universall nature, which is no∣thing else, but the dependencie of all inferiour causes or∣derly from the supreme cause. If this be your meaning, as it must needs be, you commit a contradiction; for you deny the secondary causes, which you suppose to de∣pend from the supreme. If then I should aske you, why a stone descends, you will answer, Not because of any po∣sitive gravity in it, but because it so happens by the or∣der of nature. But why hath nature ordered a stone to fall downward, & not to move upward, seeing there is no positive gravitie in it? You answer me, [Because it meets
Page 17
with the aire or water, bodies lighter & thinner then the stone.] Then you here acknowledge a comparative gravitie in the stone; for, if the aire be lighter then the stone, the stone must be heavier then the aire, and so comparatively it is heavie: but every comparative includes a positive; for, if you be wiser then another, then you are wise: but in∣deed, universall nature works not without the particular, neither doth God or the heaven move the stone down∣ward, but by the stones gravity; therefore gravitie is the immediate cause of its motion, which if you deny, you may as well deny the fire to be hot; and if you say the fire burnes only, because it happeneth so by the order of nature, you were as good say nothing.
[Any body will descend, if it light among others more* 5.32 rare then it selfe; and will ascend, if it light among bodies more dense then it.] What say you then to your light bodie of light, which you say is nothing else but fire di∣lated? surely, meeting with aire, a bodie heavier and denser, it should never descend to us, who live here on the earth, but ascend rather; how comes it that so light a bodie should descend so many miles from its foun∣taine, the Sun, to us, seeing the aire is much more dense then it? Nay, it descends thorow a denser bodie, the water; for, divers find light in the bottome of the sea. Againe, what say you to a thick plank of timber, which meeting with the water, a rarer bodie, notwithstanding descends not to the bottome, but swims above? This is contrary to your doctrine.
You told us afore, that light hath no bignesse or den∣sitie,* 5.33 that the more dense the bodie is, the more active it is, that the light carries up atomes; [and (now you say) that these atomes, the subtilest divisions of light, doe presse* 5.34 downe a leaden bullet, and penetrates or runs thorow it, as light
Page 18
thorow a glasse, water thorow a spunge, and sand thorow a sieve.] The light then carries up these atomes, which presse downe a leaden bullet, and yet the light hath not densitie. These are riddles which Oedipus cannot unfold: for, how a qualitie should be a body, how that bodie should want dimensions, how it should want density, and yet beare up that which presseth downe with its weight a leaden bullet, how there should be so much weight in atomes, as to presse down such a bullet, how these atomes should pierce so dense a bodie as lead, whereas light cannot doe it; yea, run thorow lead, as water thorow a spunge, or sand thorow a sieve, are (I thinke) some of these second notions which Chimaera did eat. But how doe the atomes presse downe the lead? doe they remain in their expansion dispersed? then they cannot more presse the lead, then the sea-water presseth him downe that dives in it; elementum in suo loco non gravitat. Or doe the atomes meet together in a bodie to help the lead downwards? if all the atomes in the light were in one bodie, how big would that bodie be?
[The clod of earth, which in Egypt is shut up in a close* 5.35 roome, and doth shew the change of weather by the increase of its weight,] receiveth not this weight [from the atomes of salt-peter, piercing the walls, as you say;] but from the aire it selfe, of which it is made up, as other mixed bodies are, which therefore sympathise with the aire, and its changings, as our owne bodies doe, though wee were never so close shut up in a roome. When the aire is in∣clined to raine, bodies grow heavie, and in a close room we see the water in weather-glasses ascend and descend, as the aire changeth abroad, although the water in the glasse hath no commerce with the aire abroad: and so wee feele aches upon change of weather in our bodies,
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and heavinesse of our heads after sun-set, by reason of the heavinesse or gloomy heat of the aire, caused not by your atomes, but by vapors, mists, or fumes in the aire, which we are continually sucking in by the lungs, by which the two principall parts of our bodies are affe∣cted, to wit, the head and the heart, and by them the rest of the bodie. And as for [spirits or atomes of snow and* 5.36 salt-peter, which (you say) passe thorow a glasse-vessell,] I know no such thing. 'Tis true, that the outside of a glasse or pot, being made wet, will freeze to the boord, though neere the fire, if you put snow and salt-peter in the pot, because the cold snow, by antiperistasis, becometh much colder, in having the hot salt joyned with it, and so shunning its enemy, the salt, fortifies it selfe, which causeth the wet bottome to freeze. So in great frosts the fire is most hot and scalding; wells and deep cellars in summer are most cold, without any penetration of atomes at all, which were heretofore bodies, and parts of light, now by you are called spirits. And as there is no concourse of atomes to presse downe the falling bullet in the aire [neither is there of water, to presse down the stone* 5.37 falling in it, as you say] because both the aire and the water meet onely to fill up the place which the bullet and stone had, that there may be no vacuity; for lighter bodies presse not downward the heavier, but support the lighter. But it troubles mee to waste so much time and paper in refelling your Paradoxes of atomes, which are as void of soliditie, as the atomes themselves. Hence wee see how easie it is to deviate from the truth, and to lose our selves in the winding labyrinths and intricate Meanders of errour, when we fall off from these knowne and generally received principles, which have had the approbation of wise men for so many generations. Is it
Page 20
not a shorter way, and more consonant to reason, to say, that cork sinks not, and iron doth, because the one is porous and full of aire, the other dense, and more ear∣thy; because the one and the other are moved diversly, according to their divers formes, and the properties from them, to wit, gravity and levity; then to devise phan∣tomes of atomes, which involve within them so many ab∣surdities?
[The elements doe weigh in their owne spheres; for, a bal∣lone* 5.38 stuffed hard with aire, is heavier then an empty one. Se∣condly, more water would not be heavier then lesse. Thirdly, if a hole were digged in the bottome of the sea, the water would not run into it.] I answer, a stuffed ballone is heavier, because the aire, which is in it, is separated from its own sphere, in which it doth not weigh, according to our principles. Secondly, more water is not in its owne sphere actually heavier then lesse; for a man in the bot∣tome of the sea feels no more weight, then if hee were but halfe a yard from the superficies: but potentially it is, gravida est, sed non gravitat. Thirdly, the sea would run downe, and fill up the hole, because it moves naturally, as it is heavie, towards the centre; which weight ap∣peares not actually in its sphere, till it remove towards the centre. Nature in her actions is not to be seen in all places, and at all times. There is life in seeds, and fruit in trees, though not alwaies actually seen: So there is gravitie in water, though not alwaies felt; as you seeme afterward to confesse, when you say [that water in a* 5.39 pale, because it is thereby hindred from spreading abroad, hath the effect of gravity predominating in it:] So one part of water in its own sphere doth not divide the other; Shall we then say, there is no power in water to divide wa∣ter? Yes, there is; for water powred out of an 〈◊〉 in∣to
Page 21
a bason, wherein is water, will divide the water in the bason.
Your reason, to prove that there is no inclination in* 5.40 heavie bodies to tend to the centre [because the centre is as often changed, as any dust lighteth unequally upon any one side of it,] is a weak one; for let the centre change never so often, every houre if you will, yet a centre there must be still; and to that centre, in what place of the earth soever it be, the heavie bodie hath its inclination. And no lesse weaknesse is it, to confound vis impressa, or a violent motion, with the naturall motion of gravitie, as you do; for gravitie is neither the mediate nor immedi∣ate cause of a violent, but of a naturall motion. [Neither* 5.41 is it impossible for any cause (as you say) to produce an effect greater then it selfe;] for the flame may produce a greater heat in iron, then is in it selfe: May not a little man be∣get a tall man? Oftentimes the effect exceedeth the cause both in quantity and vertue: A blind man begets a son with eyes; the heat of an Egyptian oven hatcheth chic∣kens; and the Suns heat begets many sensitive creatures of putrefied matter. Neither must you inferre [That* 5.42 gravity is no naturall quality of earthy bodies, because a bullet can ascend out of the bottome of the barrell of a gun, being suck't up by ones breath:] for this infers the bullet to be naturally heavie, in that it doth not naturally ascend, but is forced by the violent motion of traction; which traction were needlesse, if the bullet were not naturally heavie. Neither doth this motion shew [That gravity is an intellective entity, as you say;] for though the naturall properties of things have not understanding, yet they have that appetite given to them by the God of nature, to preserve their owne unitie, and the unitie of the uni∣verse, and to shun their owne destruction: and this is no
Page 22
determining of the qualitie by it selfe, which is the act of an intelligent creature, to wit, to determine it selfe; but it is a power given by the God of nature to every thing, to preserve it selfe, and to shun its owne hurt. So the stomack, which hath no understanding, receives and concocts wholsome food: the meseraick veines suck the purest part thereof, prepare and fit it for the second concoction, and send away the excrementitious and su∣perfluous parts to the guts; and the same stomack vo∣mits out that which is hurtfull to it; and all this is na∣ture, not understanding. What understanding will you give to a load-stone, when it drawes iron? or to those senslesse creatures, which by their sympathies and antipa∣thies affect or hate each other?
Though your atomes be but little bodies, yet they* 5.43 are your great servants; for they help you still at a dead lift, and doe you much service in all your actions: they are your light-bearers, they make all things move in their naturall courses, upward and downward; they are also the causes of violent motions: as of projection; for [by their help the arrow flieth out of the bow (as you say) and* 5.44 the ball from the racket:] So these atomes are your arch∣ers, slingers, gunners, or canoneers, and they help you at your sports in the Tennis-courts. Multitudo populorum se∣pidum, as Apuleius calls them, the Ants, did not so much good service to Psyche, in that intricate labour of divi∣ding all sorts of graines, enjoyned her by Venus, as these atomes doe you: By them the arrow flies out of the bow, the stone out of the sling, the bullet out of the gun or canon; and if it were not for them, we could not kill our enemies in the wars: for, the gun-powder could have no force to carry the heavie iron bullet so farre in the aire, and to beat downe stone walls of townes and
Page 23
castles, if these atomes did not put to their shoulders. What Hercules is able to resist such Pigmies? but wee, who have been bred in the peripatetick schooles, at the feet of Aristotle, find the maine cause of projection to be the qualitie or force of the projicient impressed upon the bodie projected; as, the force of the gun-powder-fire impressed in the bullet, carries it thorow the aire: Nei∣ther is it more impossible for this impressed force and adventitious qualitie, to carry a bullet violently, then for the intrinsecall qualities of gravitie and levitie, to carry bodies to their owne places naturally. The generator im∣presseth a qualitie of gravitie in the stone, to move na∣turally to its owne place: the projicient impresseth the qualitie of projection in the same stone, to move violent∣ly from its place. If you aske why the stone returnes at last to its owne motion downward, and continues not flying in the aire; the reason is, because the aire makes resistance, which at length weakens the impressed force; so that this, growing weaker then the resistance, yeelds, and the stone falls downe. Neither is it reasonable, that an extrinsecall qualitie should have that continuance, as a qualitie that is naturall, which cannot receive any muta∣tion, except there be a change in the first qualities, whose commixtion, gravitie and levitie naturally fol∣lowes; but the force of the projicient makes no such change in the first qualities of the bodie projected. Neither doth the stone lose its gravitie whilst it flies up∣ward, but hath it only suspended, while the projicients impression lasts: when this is spent, downe falls the stone againe, shewing the same gravitie it had before. If any say, that this impulse is contrary to the inclination of the bodie impelled, I answer, 'Tis contrary to its in∣clination to locall motion, but not to any inclination
Page 24
the stone might have to the active quality of levity, which is not in the stone; levity then expells gravity, but projection doth not. This impulse then is an acci∣dentall forme, and, in respect of the impression, it is in the third species of Quality; but as this impression inclineth the stone to motion, it is a naturall faculty in the second species of Quality; I say naturall; not as being the na∣turall forme, or the property flowing from thence; but because it moves like the naturall forme, though not to the same place; and because the stone in which the impression is made, is a naturall subject, and the projici∣ent is a naturall agent. You see then that this doctrine of impression is no shift, as you call it; but it is a shift to make Atomes carry a Canon bullet so farre in the aire; for as the aire it selfe is passive, having no other motion in projection, but what it receives from the projicient, even so be your Atomes (if any such were) which are dispersed by the wind and force of the bullet.
[Wheresoever there is variety of bodies, there must be the* 5.45 foure elements:] then belike in the Heavens there must be the foure elements, for there are variety of bodies, one starre differing from another in glory: But indeed, there be no elements, nor generation, nor corruption, nor alteration, but such as belong to light, and locall moti∣on; and therefore the heaven is but a naturall body analogically, which proportion consisteth in this, that as sublunary bodies have a nature, which is the inward principle of motion, so hath the heaven, though in a far different way; and for this cause, we deny that the matter of the celestiall bodies is univocall to that of ele∣mentary, for then there should be mutuall action and passion betweene them. 2 Then the celestiall matter should have an appetite to being or not being. 3. It
Page 25
should have an appetite to divers formes. 4. It should be the subject of corruption, and of transmutation into* 5.46 sublunary bodies; all which are absurd, as I have shew∣ed elsewhere.
Why may we not as well say, that fire warmes the* 5.47 water, or burnes the board, by its quality of heat, as to multiply entities to no purpose, as you do, in your innu∣merable Atomes, which is your salve for all diseases? for, as if these had not done you service enough already, you must make them your Cooks to boile and rost your meat: You will have them to come out of the fire, and pierce the bottome of the kettle, and so up unto the water, and* 5.48 being quickly weary there, ascend in smoake, and then descend in drops. But, if these Atomes be the smallest parts of the substance of the fire, I wonder how they scape drowning, when they are in the water, and that they are not served, as the Persian god was by the Egyptian Priest, and so Canopus prove to be the better god: Nay, you will not have any occult quality in the Load-stone to draw the iron, but these Atomes must doe it; and your reason is, [because otherwise the whole body of* 5.49 the agent must worke, which it cannot do but by locall motion.] But what need is there to say, that the whole body must worke, if the Atomes do not? It is not the whole body that works, or at least not totally; for the fire heats by its forme, not by its matter; and so the Load-stone draws: but if we did yeeld that the whole body did work, must it therefore worke by locall motion? Cannot the fire warme you, being within a fit distance, except the fire come to you? The Load-stone shall keep its distance from the iron, and yet shall draw it without Atomes; but they are little beholding to you, in that after all their good service they have done you, you set them together by
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the eares, and makes all re-actions to be performed by them; you make an irreconcilable warre betweene the firy and watry Atomes; like Homers Batrochomyamachia; or like that battell in Ovids Chaos; where
Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis,
Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus.
When you hold ice in your hand, you will not have the ice by its coldnesse to worke on your hand, nor your hand by its heat to re-worke on the ice, but Atomes to work one against another. When you saw wood, be there any Atomes that come out of the teeth of the saw, which divide the wood? or Atomes out of the wood, which blunt the saw? But, seeing you will not have re-action to consist in qualities, I desire to know, whether in every re-action there is not an alteration: this you cannot deny, for when you put hot iron in cold wa∣ter, you make an alteration from heat to cold, and from cold to heat; but alterations consist in qualities, as aug∣mentation doth in quantity, and generation in substan∣ces; therefore re-action must consist in quality, not in your Atomes which are substances. Besides, substances are not contrary to each other, but in re-actions there be contrarieties, which argues qualitie, in which properly consists contrariety.
I know not what to make of your Atomes, for some∣time* 5.50 you call them substances, and [here you will have them to be qualities:] Againe, you say [these Atomes are the pure parts of the elements▪] and by and by, that [they are accidentall qualities:] It seems then, that accidents are parts of substances, by your Logick. Besides, you say [the elements remaine pure in every compound,] and yet you* 5.51 will not have [their substantiall formes to remaine actual∣ly:] sure the elements remaine not if their formes are
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gone; for it is by their formes that they are elements: and if they remaine pure in the compound, then the compound is not a physicall mixed body. And if your Atomes be qualities, then there is no mixture at all, for mixture is of substances, not of qualities; and the body mixed differs specifically from the elements of which it is mixed. We hold then, that the elementary formes re∣maine in mixture, but refractè, remissè, castigatè, as they speake, and in some degree onely, which degrees the substantiall formes admit, but not as the qualities doe; for these admit degrees, remaining the same they were before; so do not the formes, for as soone as there is any remission of degree in them, the species is changed, and so that which was the forme of the element, be∣comes now the forme of a mixed body, being of ano∣ther species then the element. Take any degree of the substantiall forme from fire, and its no more fire.* 5.52
[It doth not appeare to what purpose nature should place store-houses of simples, seeing mixed bodies can be dissolved into other mixed bodies.] Into what then shall these mixed bodies be dissolved? Into mixed stil? Must there not be a dissolution into simple bodies at last, as well as there was a composition of them? Sure if there were not store-houses of these simples, the world could not be perfect▪ for in this is its perfection, that it consists of all sorts of bodies, to wit, as well simple, as mixed: and if there be foure prime qualities, where shall they have their residence, but in the foure prime simple bodies, which we call elements? hence the elements are eternall in the whole, though they be perishing in their parts, when they enter into composition.
[The motion of Atomes we call a winde:] A winde is a* 5.53 substance, as afterward you confesse, when you say,
Page 28
[winds are made up of bodies:] but motion is an accident, therefore wind cannot be a motion; I think your mean∣ing is, that winds are Atomes moved, or moving; but then you should have told us whether these A∣tomes move themselves, or are they moved by some other: these Atomes are unruly bodies, which if they were not curbed by Aeolus,
—Maria ac terras, caelumque profundum,
Quippe ferent rapidi secum, verrantque per auras.
Who would think there should be such strength in A∣tomes, to over-turne trees and strong houses, to move the Seas from the bottome, to sink ships, and to move the earth it selfe? Was that a motion of Atomes which drove the Sea againe into its own place, and dried the earth from Noahs Flood? Are those Aetesii, which blow continually under the Line, motions of Atomes? or those which blow constantly in Egypt forty daies together, in the summer solstice? 'Tis strange there should be such strength in these bodies, which are so weake, that the light, as you said before, can support them; and that there should be such spite and courage in them, as to encounter in duels, and trouble the world with their quarrels,
Saepe & ventorum concurrere praelia vidi.
Were these Satans souldiers, when he by the winds o∣verthrew the house where Iobs children were? Your best way will be to leave your Atomes, and to acquiesce in the received opinion, that the winde is an exhalation raised by the Sun out of moisture; which exhalation, by reason of its lightnesse mounting upward, is repelled by the cold middle region of the aire, and so moveth not directly downeward, because 'tis light, but athwart and sidlings. As for your Atomes, leave them for Aeo∣lus
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to bind up in a bagge, who were so unruly before the took them to taske, that they turned the sea upon the land, and the land into the sea, dividing Italy from Sici∣ly, and Spaine from Africa.
[Is it not a wrong to God and his instruments, to impute to* 5.54 the Divell the aides, which to some may seem supernaturall?] True, for there is a naturall magick, by which you may doe strange things, and anticipate the time prefixed by nature, in producing of divers effects, by applying acti∣va passivis: So you may produce a Rose in Winter, and raise Parsly out of the ground within a few houres after the seed is sowne. There is also a Mathematicall magick, by which strange things are done; as was that woodden Pigeon, which Architas caused to flie; and that brasen head, which Albertus Magnus made to speak. That wor∣thy man Boëtius was very skilfull in this way. Such things, and many more, may be done without witch∣craft: but withall, there is a Diabolicall magick in work∣ing strange things by the power of Sathan, by a contract which Witches make with them, God permitting, in his secret judgement, the affectors of such evill things to be deluded and abused by the evill Angels. Saith S. Austin,* 5.55 'Tis fit that he, who forsakes the fountaine of living wa∣ters, digge to himselfe fountaines that will hold no wa∣ter: Therefore in all our actions wee ought to aime at Gods glory, at the salvation of our owne and others soules, at the honour of the Church and State, in which we live, and to avoid scandall, to submit our thoughts and actions to Gods Word, and not to practise such things as have no cause or reason in nature: as, to cure diseases by spells or words, characters and knots, which, being artificiall, and quantities, cannot naturally ope∣rate.
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[The weapon-salve must be conserved in an equall temper,* 5.56 and the weapon, which made the wound, must be orderly dres∣sed.] Paracelsus, the inventor of this salve, is ill reported of, to wit, to be a Magician: Baptista Porta, Goclenius, Dr. Floid, & some others have bin too credulous to beleeve him; for, if it be not magicall, it is suspicious, conside∣ring the author, the superstitious ceremonies in gathe∣ring of the mosse from the dead skull, with the other simples used in it, besides the unreasonablenesse of their opinions, who think that a wound can be cured by such a way; whereas nihil agit in distans, naturall agents work not but within a proportionable distance: as the fire will not heat, if the object be not within its reach: neither will the load-stone draw, except the iron be neer: But the patrons of this salve will have it cure the wound, though many miles distant, and though there be an in∣terposition of many dense bodies; as of houses and hills. What medium can carry this vertue so far, & thorow so many impediments, whereas the Sun cannot conveigh his beames to us, if the Moon, or a thick cloud be inter∣posed? And what sympathy can wee conceive to be be∣tween a sword, or a clout, and a wound? except you'l say, It is because the bloud touched it; or, as you say, [Because the steem or spirits entered into the pores of the wea∣pon.] These are piercing spirits indeed, that can passe thorow steele, and stay there so long after the bloud is cold, whereas the bloud, which in phlebotomy is received into a dish, loseth the spirits as soon as the bloud is cold; though many ounces of bloud be there, yet never a spirit left, nor any sympathy at all between the dish and the wound. Sure, by this reason, when the sword that wounds is kept in the same roome with the wounded man, it must cure, whereas it cures so farre off. But no
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such cure is to be found; for I was yet never cured by the knife that cut my finger, though never so often dres∣sed. If any reply, that some cures have been done by this salve; I answer, that I have heard so, and they that write of it, most of them write but upon report: and suppose some cures had been done, yet I will not im∣pute them to the salve, but to the washing and keeping of the wound cleane, in which case nature will help it selfe. The imagination also is sometimes a help to cure; and sometime Sathan may concurre, for his owne ends, videlicet, to confirme superstition and errour. If any say, that there is a sympathy between the pole and the needle touched with the load-stone, which are farther di∣stant then the sword and the wound; I grant it, because the influence of celestiall bodies upon earthy, is not hindred by distance; but we cannot say so of the actions of sub∣lunary bodies, whose matter is farre different from that of the heavens. In a word, the effects of this salve which you speak of, are much like the effects that are said to be caused by images of wax made by Witches. The like credit is to be given to those other reports you speake of, to wit, the curing of the kines swelled soles by a turffe cut from under their sore feet, and hung upon an hedge; the drying of which is the mending of the sore feet: And the running over of the Cowes milk in boiling into the fire, wil cause an inflammation in the Cowes udder; and that this is cured by casting salt into the fi•e upon the milk. I could tell you many such tales as those, which I have partly read, and partly heard; but
—credat Iudaus Apella.
I will stick to that Philosophicall principle, Ominis actio 〈◊〉 per 〈◊〉▪ but here is no contact; and I will as
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soon credit Apuleius his Metamorphosis into an Asse, by the anointing of his body, as the curing of a wound by an ointment, which is not at all applyed to the bodie. If any will say, that such cures are done by the influence of the Stars, let him prove it; wee may so salve all questions, and not trouble our selves to search any fur∣ther into the hidden causes of things: These influences are the sanctuary of ignorance, but Stars are universall agents, whose operations are fruitlesse, if they be not de∣termined by the particular agents. Lastly, I like your supposition wel: [If the steem of bloud and spirits carry with it the balsamick qualities of the powder into the wound, it will better it.] In this I am of your opinion; for if Daedalus did flie in the aire, wings doubtlesse would help him: but there is great odds between the sents which the Deere, or Hare, or Fox leave behind them, and this imaginary vertue of the weapon-salve; this being alto∣gether hid, these other being manifest qualities, quick∣ly apprehended by the sagacious hounds.
[You say, that the heat of the torrid Zone drawes aire to* 5.57 it from the Poles, and rest of the world, otherwise, all would be turned into fire.] The aire about the Poles, you con∣fesse, is very cold, and the aire under the Line very hot. Now, that heat should draw cold to it, is to contradict a sensible maxime; for, what is more plaine and sensi∣ble, then that one contrary drives out another, and like drawes its like? The heat of the fire drawes out the heat of a burned finger, or the heat of the stomack, whereas the cold aire repells it. Hence it is, that we concoct bet∣ter in Winter then in Summer. The heat of the upper and lower region of the aire doth not draw to it the cold of the middle region; but the cold fortifies, and unites it selfe against its enemy. Secondly, the aire un∣der
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the Line, is carried about so fast by the motion of the primum mobile from East to West, that there is a con∣tinuall trade-wind, and a strong tide to the West: So that the aire there will not give leave, by reason of its swift motion, for any other aire to come thither. Thirdly, the torrid Zone needs no refrigeration from the Poles; for there are great lakes, rivers and seas, besides constant gales of wind, which refresh the aire, and make it no lesse temperate then Spain, if you will be∣leeve* 5.58 Acosta. Not to speak of the equalitie of the night there with the day, so that the Sun is not so long above their Horison, as hee is above ours in Summer. And if there were such extreme heat there, as is supposed, there would not be such multitudes of all sorts of herbs, fruits, and trees green all the yeare, as Lerius witnesseth in his* 5.59 navigation.
You have found out a pretty way for generation of* 5.60 the load-stone, [which (you say) is begot of atomes, drawne* 5.61 from the North Pole, by the heat of the torrid Zone, and so sent downe into the bowels of the earth, where meeting with some condensate stuffe, becomes this stone.] This is the summe of your large discourse: But first, wee would know what these atomes are, whether parts of that cold aire, or of the light. Secondly, how the heat of the tor∣rid Zone can draw cold atomes such a great way, ninety degrees at least, whereas wee have shewed, that hot aire expelleth the cold, but draweth it not. Thirdly, how it comes that load-stones are found in Macedonia, Spaine, Bohemia, Germany, and other Northern places. Did the atomes in their Southern progresse stay there, being weary of so long a journie, and plant colonies neer home? Or were they sent back by the heat which brought them thence? Fourthly, how can such weak bodies
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pierce so deep into the earth? Fifthly, when these atomes cast their spawne into the matrix of our great Mother, whether she doth feed upon iron when shee's breeding, seeing the stone, when it's come to maturitie, loveth iron so well? Or did shee not surfeit upon garlick, which is such an enemy to the load-stone? Sixthly, of what a∣tomes is the stone Theamedes made, that so much hates the iron, which the load-stone loves; and the Ada∣mant, that hinders its operation? Though I honour your worth and ingenuitie, in aiming at such abstruse causes, yet both you and I, and all men must confesse, that our science here is but ignorance: and wee see the natures of things, as that blind man, who saw men walk like trees. Who can tell why Rhubarb purgeth choler; Agarick phlegme? How the Torpedo stupefieth the hand thorow the cane, and the Remora stayes the ship?* 5.62
Has nè possimus naturae accedere partes,
Frigidus en obstat circum praecordia sanguis.
[The load-stone (you say) workes by bodies: Ergo, not by* 5.63 quabities.] I deny the consequence; for, bodies doe not work upon bodies, but by their qualities: take these a∣way, and there will be no action in nature; for actions have their originall from qualities, and their properties too: therefore actions are susceptible of contrarieties, of intension and remission, because the qualities, from which they have their being, are capable of these: And, as among substances, only the forme; so among accidents, only the qualitie is operative, because it is the acciden∣tall forme of the subject in which it is. 'Tis true, acci∣dents work not by their owne power, but in and by the power of their substances: The hen by her heat, which is a qualitie, prepares the matter of the egge for introdu∣ction of the forme of a chick; for the same agent that
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disposeth the matter, introduceth the forme: The fire warmes by its heat. What's the reason that you can cut downe a tree with an axe, which a childe cannot doe with a woodden dagger? 'tis because you have the qualities of strength and skill, which the childe wants; and the axe hath the qualities of strength and sharp∣nesse, which are wanting in the woodden dagger. Your reasons, by which you prove your assertion, are weak, viz. [Because a greater load-stone hath more effect then a lesser.] A greater fire heats more then a lesser; is there∣fore heat no qualitie? Or must the same degree of heat be in a little fire that is in a greater? The qualitie encrea∣seth and decreaseth, according to the quantitie of the subject. Secondly, [A load-stone giveth lesse force to a long iron then to a short one.] So the fire warmeth more at a neer, then at a remoter distance: Naturall agents work not in distans. Will you deny your facultie of seeing to be a qualitie, because you can see better neer at hand, then at too remote a distance? Thirdly, [The longer an iron is in touching, the greater vertue it getteth.] Fourthly, [An iron or load-stone may lose their vertue, either by long lying, or by fire.] Will these reasons prove the vertue of the load-stone to be a bodie? then vertue, I see, is a body with you, and in the predicament of Substance. These your reasons prove the load-stone to work by a qualitie, because it hath degrees of more and lesse vertue, and be∣cause it may be lost. Is cold no qualitie, because it may be lost in the water? Or is the blacknesse of a mans haire no qualitie, because it may be lost? Or doth the fire consume nothing but bodies? Is whitenesse an acci∣dent, or a bodie? a qualitie it is, doubtlesse: Cast your paper in the fire; and what becomes of its whitenesse?
Qui color albus erat, nunc est contrarius albo.
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Your arguments are so weak, that they refute them∣selves, and so they will save me a labour.
[Atomes, which pierce iron, may penetrate any other body.]* 5.64 I know the fire can pierce iron, and yet not pierce the dense bodie of the earth; which your atomes must doe, if they will beget a load-stone. And if the fire could pierce the earth, yet this will not prove, that your magneticall atomes can doe the like, except you give them the same* 5.65 vertue. And [though light passe thorow thick glasses,] as you say, yet there is some hinderance; for the thicker the glasse is, the lesse light you shall have: Trie if light can passe thorow a thick unpolished horne, as it doth thorow the thin horn of a lantern. If the thicknesse of a bodie makes no opposition to the light, then you may see the Sun as well thorow a thick cloud, or thorow the bodie of the Moon, as thorow the thin aire. If then there be opposition, though never so little, of the glasse to the light, there must needs be some tardity. As for odorife∣rous bodies, which, you say, [continue many yeares spend∣ing of themselves, and yet keep their odour in vigour,] is a miracle; for, how can the odour be kept in vigour in those bodies that still spend themselves? If odour be a qualitie, it must decay, as the bodie spends in which it is: If odour be a bodie, it cannot continue in its vigour, and be still spending of it selfe; this is a contradiction: Besides, 'its repugnant to sense; for, as the flower de∣cayes, so doth the smell: And though there be a power in roots of vegetables, to change the advenient juice into their nature, yet there is not the like power in load∣stones, or salt, as you will have it, except you will make these also vegetables, and so they must not be called stones and mineralls, but plants rather. Salt doth not change the aire into its substance, by lying in it, as you
Page 37
say, and would prove by the weight of it increased; for, if it change the aire into its substance, it feeds on it, and so some parts of its matter must be still wasting, and there must be still a repairing of the decayed matter by nutrition, and this must be done by natural heat, and a ve∣getative soule; and what is this but to make salt a plant? As for the weight of it, which you say encreaseth, I doubt of it: but if it were so as you say, yet that weight is not encreased, by turning the aire into its substance, but rather by the losse and evaporation of the aire, by its long lying: So paper-books grow much heavier, by beating the aire out of the paper. But whereas you say, [That the nature of the Load-stone proceeds from the Suns ope∣ration* 5.66 on the torrid Zone, which operation is contrary to the Load-stone, as being of a fiery nature, and therefore the torrid lands are not so magneticall as the polar,] is a riddle; for how can the nature of the Load-stone be contrary to that which begets it? and how can the Sun beget magnetick vertue by that heat, which by reason of its fiery nature hinders or destroyes it?* 5.67
You say, ['Tis as impossible for diversity of worke in the seed to proceed at one time, and in the same occasions, from one agent, as it is for multiplicity to proceed immediatly from uni∣ty.] I will not now tell with what arguments Physicians prove, that the seed is the epitome of the whole body, and extracted from every part thereof, and containeth potentially all the parts of the body, which the plastick or formative power of the seed educeth unto act, by de∣grees: but this I must tell you, that naturall agents can, at the same time, produce diversity of works; for, doth not the Sun, at the same time, produce multitudes of di∣vers effects, according to the multitudes of bodies it works upon? doth not the fire, at the same time, rarifie,
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condense, soften, harden? doth not the same liver at the same time by its heat, produce blood, choler, me∣lancholy, and phlegme? even so may the same forma∣tive power of the seed, at the same time, fabricate and distinguish all the parts of the body.
[The marrow being very hot drieth the bones, and yet with* 5.68 its moisture humecteth.] How the same naturall agent can, at the same time, on the same object, worke contrary effects, I know not: Can the fire at the same time both harden and soften the wax? 2. The braine comparative∣ly is colder then any other of the soft parts of the body, and consequently the marrow which groweth from thence. 3. If heat be the cause of the bones drinesse, then the heart which is the hottest part of the body, should have the hardest bone about it. 4. What the bones are in sensitive creatures, that the stones are in vegetables: but the hottest fruits have not the hardest stones; for the stone of a cold Peach is harder then the kernels or stones of the hot Grapes. 5. If marrow were the cause of drinesse, or hardnesse, it would follow, that where there is most marrow, there should be the hardest and driest bones; but Philosophers tell us, that those crea∣tures whose bones are most solid and drie, have least marrow. 6. That drinesse then and hardnesse of the bones proceeds not from the heat of the marrow, which is held to be lesse hot then the braine, but from the innate heat of the bones themselves, wasting the aeriall and oylie substance thereof; which heat is not fiery, but tem∣perate, as the naturall heat should be; yet it causeth this hardnesse and drinesse, because the matter on which it works is grosse and terrestriall, and because of the heats continuall working on the bones.
You will not have us [too irreverently ingage the Al∣mighties* 5.69
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immediate handy-worke in every particular effect of nature.] We offer no irreverence to the Almighty, if we call him the Creator even of the meanest creatures, being no lesse admirable in Creatione vermiculorum, quàm Angelorum, in the creation of wormes, then of Angels, saies S. Austine: and therefore Basil thinks it no irreve∣rence* 5.70 to say, That God in the beginning did not on∣ly create Fishes in the sea, but Frogs also in the pooles, nay Gnats, and vermine. Whose immediate handy∣work were the Lice that were procreated of the Egyptian dust, at the stretching out of Aarons and Moses his Rod? Did not the Sorcerers acknowledge, that the finger of God was there? If it be no disparagement to the Almighty, that the excrementitious haires of our head, are the ob∣jects of his providence; neither can it be any dishonour to him, if we say, the meanest creatures are the effects of his omnipotence.
[The worke of generation (you say) is not effected by the* 5.71 formative power, except we meane by it, the chaine of all the causes, that concurre to produce this effect.] When wee speak of the proximate or immediate cause of things, we exclude not the remote causes; for, Causa causae est causa causati: He that saies that Isaac was begot of Abrahams seed, denies not that Abrahams seed is begot of his blood; and he that saies a man is a reasonable creature, saies also, that he is a sensitive, vegetative, corporeall substance: but what ever the remote causes be, the formative facultie in the spirits of the seed, effects the work of generation; which spirits are derived from all parts of the body, otherwise how could they frame all the distinct parts and members in the seed? but the grosse or materiall part of the seed, is onely from the vessels.
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[You hold the heart to be first generated.] This is pro∣bable,* 5.72 but it may be doubted; because whatsoever li∣veth must be nourished: but nourishment is from the blood, and blood from the liver; therefore Galens opinion was, that the liver is first generated; which he also pro∣veth by the umbelicall veine: But indeed, Hippocrates his opinion is most likely to be true, that all the parts are formed at the same time by the spirits in the seed. How∣ever it be, this is certaine, that fearfully and wonder∣fully are we made.
[The touch converseth with none, but with the most mate∣riall* 5.73 and massie bodies.] What think you of the aire, the winde, the flame? are these masfie bodies? and yet they are the objects of our touch; the instrument of which is not only in the hands and fingers, but diffused also through all the skin: and if the flame touch your skin, you shall as soone feele it, though it be no massie body, as you shall a stone. But whereas you call [heat and cold, wet and drinesse, affections of quantity,] you con∣found entities, and the predicaments, as you use to doe. If by affections you meane properties, then heat and cold are not the properties of quantities, but of elementary bodies, which are substances: If by affections you meane effects, much lesse can these be the affections of quanti∣ty, for quantity is not operative: Neither are rarity and density (out of the degrees of which you will have cold and heat, &c. to arise) quantities, but qualities; for rarity is nothing else but the tenuity of parts, and that is a quality: but if you take rarity for the distance of parts among themselves, as a spunge is called rare or thin, so it is in the predicament of Site; but quantity you cannot make it by Logick.
Your argument by which you prove the object to* 5.74
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worke materially upon the sense, is, [because it works so* 5.75 upon inanimate things, as the heat or cold works alike upon a stone, and upon a mans body:] but indeed these work not alike; for the fire that heats the stone, heats also my bo∣dy, and in that respect it works upon both materially, that is, it produceth the same form (specifically, not nume∣rically) of heat in the matter of the stone, and of my bo∣dy: yet besides this operation, it produceth another, which we call spirituall or intentionall, upon my sense, which it doth not upon the stone, to wit, the Image, Idea, or representation of that heat which my sense appre∣hends, or receives, and, by meanes of the sensitive soul in me, judgeth of it; which a stone, being inanimate, cannot do: The heat then worketh on the stone only material∣ly by heating, it worketh on my body not only material∣ly by heating; but spiritually also, by impressing the spe∣cies of the heat in my sense of feeling, by which the soule in the sense is stirred up to judge of it, and to make use of it, so far as it may be convenient for the body, other∣wise to avoid it; therefore we need not labour much to prove these intentionall species to be in nature, which you deny: for, though their entity be weaker then of materiall formes, because their being is not in the subject; that is, the intentionall heat by which my sense is affected, is in the sense as in a subject; yet in its being and conservati∣on it depends not on the sense, but on the agent, the fire that produced it; whereas the materiall forme of heat is received into the body, and depends onely in fieri from the agent, but in its esse and conservation from the matter in which it is received. Neither is it hard for us to prove, that your materiall actions are not able to performe these effects, that our intentionall can; for if the heat did work materially on your body, it must produce another heat,
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for a materiall accident cannot passe from one subject to another, which it must do, if the same numericall heat of the fire did pass out of the fire into your body▪ & so you having another heat in your body then was in the fire, cannot feel nor judge of that heat which was in the fire. Again, if the hardness of the iron did work materially on your hand when you touch it, your hand must be also hard. Besides, when you see a horse, is the same horse in your eye, that is without? Or hath he the same materiall being in the eye, that he hath without? This must needs be true, if he worke materially on your eye. Moreover, if the object work materially on the sense, the neerer it is to the sense, the better it is perceived: but the contrary is true; for, sensibile positum supra sensorium impedit sensum. Again, no materiall action is in an instant, being it is a mo∣tion, and hath resistance from a contrary quality; but the act of sense is in an instant. Lastly, you must attribute action to quantities, if the object worke materially; for when you see a triangle, that must produce another tri∣angle in your eye, which is absurd; & may be avoided by saying, the species or image of the triangle is in the eye.
[That thing which we call sound, is purely motion.] If* 5.76 sound be motion, which is the mobile? for every mo∣tion is in a subject, and no other subject can be given but a body. The aire is the medium that conveyeth the sound to us, but the subject thereof it is not; for the aire being a light body, its motion is to ascend, but sounds are carried to us by all sorts of motions imaginable: The sound of the bell at the same instant ascends, descends, spreads it selfe abroad through all the parts of the cir∣cumstant aire. Besides, no motion is performed in an instant; but the sound in an instant fi•s thousands of eares, if they be neere. Againe, rest is opposite to motion, but
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it is not opposite to sounds: By the motion of the aire sound is carried to us, but sound is not therefore moti∣on; and so you doe often times in this Chapter distin∣guish sounds from the motion of the aire. And where∣as you say, [Great sounds do shake houses:] It is not the* 5.77 sound, but the wind of the Ordnance or Gun-powder that moveth the aire violently, by which houses or towers may be shaken; and the same aire which is moved by the winde, and shakes the house, carries the sound to our eare; which sound can no more be perceived by the eye (as you averre in this Chapter, thereby con∣founding both the actions of the senses, and their ob∣jects) then colours can be perceived by the eare. He that sees sounds, let him heare colours too. 'Tis true, a blind man will discerne light from darknesse, when a candle or the Sun beame is brought and let in to a room, not that he perceives the light by his eares, but because▪ though the chrystalline humour of his eyes be out, yet, the visive spirits in the optick nerves not being lost, can easi∣ly discerne light their proper object, though they can∣not see visible objects by it, the chrystalline humor which should receive the visible species being gone. [As for a* 5.78 deafe mans perceiving of musick by a stick held in his teeth, whose other end lieth on a Violl:] I deny that he heares any sound at all, if he be deafe: he may perceive a motion or trembling of the aire, by meanes of his stick, but a sound he cannot perceive, as wanting the organ of perception: And though I should yield that he perceives the sound, yet that will not evince sound to be a motion: for there be many motions without any sound; as the motions of the heavens. The shooting of stars, and the light, which you will have a body, move through the aire without any sound: So the clouds move; and you may move
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your hand, or any part of the bodie, without sound. Besides, there is a sympatheticall & an antipatheticall power in sounds, to affect or dis-affect the hearer, which is not in motion. Againe, after the sound of the Ordnance is past, the motion of the aire continueth a while. Lastly, lay any soft cloth or silk upon a bell whilst it's sound∣ing, the sound will be dulled or stayed, but not the mo∣tion: therefore, doubtlesse, sounds and motions are diffe∣rent entities; these being in divers predicaments, and sounds only in the predicament of Qualitie.
You conclude [That colour is nothing else but the power* 5.79 which a body hath of reflecting light into the eye.] Then im∣mediately you say, [Light is nothing else but the superficies of it,] and shortly after, [Colours are not qualities, but tra∣ctable bodies.] With the same breath you contradict your selfe; for you deny colour to be a qualitie, and yet you will have it a power in the bodie, to reflect light. Are not naturall powers or faculties, qualities? Is not the power that water hath to coole, a qualitie? but in this you are also mistaken; for colour is not such a qualitie as you make it, to wit, in the second species, where only those powers are, which can naturally produce their owne acts: As, in the eye there is a power to see, a power, I say, which it can produce into act, when occa∣sion serves; for the eye doth not alwaies actually see: but colour is no such power; for it cannot produce its owne act primarily, as the former power did, but in the second place: For first, it must affect the subject in which the colour is, and secondly, work upon the eye; and so colour is in the third species of Qualitie. Now, if co∣lour be a qualitie, how can it be a superficies, which is a quantitie? The essence of colours is not in extension, though they may be extended according to the exten∣sion
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of the subject in which they are. Extension is the essence only of quantitie. If colour then be not a quan∣titie, but qualitie, how can it be a tactable bodie? Co∣lours cannot subsist of themselves: they admit degrees; therefore cannot be substances.
You are angry [with vulgar Philosophers, who force you* 5.80 to beleeve contradictions, in that they say, life consisteth in this, that the same thing hath power to work upon it selfe.] Aristotle then and his learned Peripateticks are with you but vulgar Philosophers, who teach us, that those which move themselves by an internall principle, have life in them; and so, because quick-silver seemes to move it selfe, and fountaines or springs of water seeme also to move themselves, hence the Latines call the one argen∣tum vivum, the other, aquas vivas. And because these created entities, which wee call living, actuate them∣selves, either by perfecting themselves, or by representing something within themselves by their knowledge, or by enclining themselves to the things which they know by their appetite: hence it is, that we attribute life unto God, in that hee actuates himselfe, at least negatively, so that hee is not actuated by any other; and in that hee un∣derstands and wills himselfe, and all things in himselfe. But here is the difference between the life of the Creator, and of the creature, that our life is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Aristotle sayes, the abode or mansion of the ve∣getive soule in the bodie, or naturall heat: Or, as Sca∣liger, another of these vulgar Philosophers, tells us, unio animae cum corpore, the union of the soule with the bodie. And our life hath a dependance from a higher cause, and our vitall actions depend from a causality, as Understanding and Will from the essence of the soule; but the life that is in God, and his vitall actions, are the
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same identically with his essence, having no dependance, or inhesion, or connexion at all. Tell us then where the contradiction lieth, when wee say, that the living crea∣ture can move it selfe? Doth the Scripture teach contra∣dictions, when it tells us, that Saul killed himselfe, that Iudas hanged himselfe, that we should accuse our selves, condemne our selves, convert our selves, and many such like? Neither doe we say, that life consists in this, that a thing can work upon it selfe, as you would have it; for wee make not the essence of life to consist in this, wee only make this a propertie of life, for the living crea∣ture to move it selfe. Neither doe wee say, that life is action, but that life is the principle of action: therefore we act, because we live; actiones sunt suppositorum. Though the forme work upon the matter, yet the suppositum or compound is the subject of action or motion: The form worketh originally, or as principium Quo; the suppositum worketh subjectively, denominatively, or as principium Quod. The forme is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the suppositum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and so life is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the act, not the action; but the efficient cause of five actions; to wit, of understanding, sense, motion, nutrition, and generation: For, if life were an action, it should be the cause of these actions; but actionis non datur actio. Lastly, life is in the soule origi∣nally, in the bodie by participation, and in the compound subjectively.
You challenge also Philosophers [that they hold sensa∣tion* 5.81 to be a working of the active part of the same sense upon its passive part, and yet will admit no parts in it, but will have the same indivisible power work upon it selfe.] Philosophers distinguish between the organ, the faculty, and action of the sense. The organ is a substance, the faculty a quali∣tie, which is properly called sense, of which ariseth the
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action, which is properly sensation. The forme is the cause of sense, God is the supreme cause of the forme, and consequently of sense too: for, dans formam, dat con∣sequentia ad formam; and sense is the cause of sensation. And so they hold, that there is in the sense an action and a passion, but in a different respect; for the passion is in respect of the object, the species of which is received by the sense; but reception is passion: yet in the sense there is an action too, but that's in respect of the soule, working by the sense, its instrument, which it animates, and by it judgeth of those objects which are convenient or incon∣venient, not only for the bodie, but for the soul too: For the two noblest of the senses were made principally for the soule, that by them she might gaine knowledge; and in the second place for the bodie. Now, out of all that's said, tell us where this indivisible power workes upon it selfe; or who holds any such thing. The power of the soule in actuating the sense, the power of the sense in receiving the species, is not the same power, no more then the power of the soule in moving the hand, and the power of the hand in receiving a blow; the one being an active, the other a passive power; the one being from the soule, the other from the disposition of the matter, whose propertie is to suffer, as the formes is to act: Therefore wee hold not active and passive parts in the sense, but that the whole sense is passive, in respect of the object; & the whole sense is active, in respect of the soul working in it: So the whole water is passive, in regard of the fire which hears it; and it's wholly active, in re∣spect of the hand which is warmed by it. Lastly, I hope you will not deny, but some indivisible powers there are, which work upon themselves, else, how can Angels and soules of men love and know themselves?
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The atomes are your sanctuary, to which you flie up∣on* 5.82 all occasions: [For you will now have these materiall parts of bodies work upon the outward organs of the senses, and passing thorow them, mingle themselves with the spirits, and so to the braine. These little parts must needs get in at the* 5.83 doores of our bodies, and mingle themselves with the spirits in the nerves, and of necessity must make some motion in the braine.] Doubtlesse, if this be true, there must needs be an incredible motion in the braine; for, if the atomes of two armies fighting should rush into your braine by the eye, they will make a greater motion then Minerva did in Iupiters braine: you would call for a Vulcan to cleave your head, and let out those armed men, who would cause a greater strugling in your head, then the twins did in Rebecca's womb: For I doe not think these little Myrmidons would lie so quiet in your braine, as the Gre∣cians did in the Trojan horse. But if the materiall atomes of the object pierce the organ; as for example, of a horse; then tell us how many atomes must meet to make up a little horse: and how can that horse, being brid∣led and sadled, pierce your eye without huring of it, especially, if you should see mounted on his back such a gallant as S. George, armed with a long sharp lance; or Bellerophon upon Pegasus? And if a thousand eyes should look at one time upon that object, will it not be much lessened, by losing so many atomes and parts as enter into so many eyes? Or can the object multiply it selfe by diminution, as the five loaves did in the Gospel? Or sup∣pose, you should see as many horses at a time, as were in Xerxes his army, would there be stable-room enough in your braine to containe them all? Or, if you should see a thousand horses one after another, doth the com∣ing in of the later drive out the former? Which way doe
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they come out? the same they went in? or some other way? or do they stable all together there? or doe they die in the braine? Will not they perish the braine, and poyson your optick spirits, with which, you say, they are mingled? Or suppose you should see in a looking-glasse a horse, doth the atomes of that horse pierce first the glasse to get in, and then break thorow the glasse again, to get into your eye? Sure, if this be your new Philoso∣phy, you are like to have but few sectaries of these de∣ambulatory wise men, whom you call vulgar Philosophers. Is it not easier, and more consonant to reason, that the image or representation of the object be received into the sense, which reception we call sensation; then to say, that the very materiall parts, which you call atomes, should pierce the organ? for then the same object must be both one, and many; and so, if all the inhabitants of either hemisphere should look at once upon the Moon, there must be as many Moons, as there are beholders. Againe, wee distinguish that which you confound, to wit, first, the organ, which is called sensorium: secondly, the sensitive facultie, which resides in the spirits: third∣ly, the act of sensation, which is caused by the object: fourthly, the object it selfe, which causeth sensation, but not the sense or facultie it selfe: fifthly, the species, which is the image of the object: sixthly, the medium, which is aire, water, &c. seventhly, the sensitive soul, actuating the organ, and in it judging and perceiving the object, which diffuses and sends its species, or spirituall & intentionall qualities, both into the medium & the sensorium: & this is no more impossible, then for the wax to receive the im∣pression or figure of the seale, without any of its matter.
[What are words, but motion? and words are the chiefest* 5.84 object of our remembrance.] Words are not motion, but
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by the motion of the tongue words are uttered. I be∣leeve you move your tongue many times when you speak not: but if words were motion, you must still speak when you move your tongue. Words are articulate sounds, but wee have already shewed, that sounds are not motions, but caused by motion, or the collision of solid bodies. And if words be the chiefe object of our memory, we have spent our time ill; for the end why we learne words and languages, is to come by them to the knowledge of things: And if we remember words one∣ly, then our knowledge is verball onely. Doe you re∣member nothing in Divinity but words? or are these the chiefest object of your memorie? If this assertion be true, Christians are of all men most miserable, who spend their time, strength, and meanes, to attaine the knowledge of those things, which when they remem∣ber, prove but words. I have read of a verball, and of a reall memorie: some are apter to remember words then things; others remember things better then words.
[The medium which these bodies move in (that is, the me∣mory)* 5.85 is a liquid vaporous substance, in which they swim at liberty.] These atomes in this Chapter you call some∣times bodies, and sometimes similitudes and species, con∣founding qualities and substances, as you are wont. But if you take memory here for the organ, or hinder-part of the brain, that is not the medium, but the receptacle of the species: the medium are the spirits, which conveigh the spe∣cies from the phantasie to the memorie; which two senses are neere neighbours in the braine: much lesse can these bodies (as you call them) in the memorie, be the me∣morie it selfe, which is a facultie of the intellective soule in man, of the sensitive in beasts: And indeed, the intel∣lect and intellective memorie is one and the same power
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of the soule, onely differing in this, that as it keeps the species, it is called memorie; as it makes use of them in un∣derstanding, it is called intellect: And what need wee multiply faculties to no purpose? for, as the same facul∣tie which apprehends, judgeth also; so the same facul∣tie which understandeth, remembers too. And as these bodies or medium cannot be the memorie, much lesse can they be reminiscence or recordation, which is the motion of the impressed images in the memorie; which remini∣scence is onely in man, because it requires discourse, of which beasts are not capable.
You tell us of two effects of purging: [the one, to* 5.86 make the humour more liquid; the other, to make the stomack or belly suck or vent it.] But indeed, the effect of purging is not the liquefaction of the humour, which is liquid enough of it selfe, saving the melancholy humour, which is somewhat thicker then the rest, by reason 'tis more earthy; but the pituita and choler are liquid enough of themselves: therefore 'tis not the work of the purge to liquefie the humour, but, by reason of its innate simili∣tude it hath with the humour, to draw it, as the load-stone doth iron: which similitude consisteth in their essentiall forms, and in the properties flowing thence. And, as the load-stone draweth iron, & is not drawn by it; so doth the medicament, being the more active, draw the humor, but is not drawne by the humour. Neither doe I think, that the stomack or belly sucks the humor, which is so offensive to it; for, simile trahit simile: but the expulsive facultie of these parts, wherein the humour lay, being partly op∣pressed by the humor, & partly irritated by the medica∣ment, sends it away to the stomack or belly; & these al∣so, being quickly wearied with such troublesome guests, send away the humour by vomit, or by the stoole.
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[There riseth a motion of a certaine fume about the heart,* 5.87 which motion is called pleasure.] Apuleius makes pleasure to be the childe of Cupid and Psyche: you say, that it is the motion of a fume about the heart; of which Psyche cannot be the mother, nor Cupid the father. There are oftentimes fumes about the heart, which beget more pain then pleasure; and there are pleasures, where are no fumes at all. What fumes are there in beautifull objects of the eye, with which it is delighted? Musick affords pleasure to the eare, but no fume at all: and so the other senses have their pleasures in their objects without fumes; for pleasure is nothing else, but the apprehension of a convenient object, or its species rather, which object is the efficient cause of pleasure. The forme or esience of pleasure consisteth in the fruition of that convenient ob∣ject, either by judging of it, if present; or by remembring it, if absent. If from this pleasure there proceed an ela∣tion of the mind, by diffusing of the spirits, this wee call joy. Againe, if pleasure consist in fruition, it is rather a rest then a motion. Besides, if pleasure be the motion of a fume, what think you of the soule? Sure, there are no fumes, and yet there is pleasure in the soule. And Angels have their pleasures too without fumes; for, I beleeve the fumes in Popish Churches doe as much please the Angels, as they affright Divels. Did Paradise, the garden of pleasure, called therefore Eden, beget many fumes about Adams heart? Or, are there greatest pleasures, where there be most of these cordiall fumes? I think, that where is most heat, there are most fumes; but so a lion should have more pleasure then a man: for, the li∣ons heart is hotter; and so our hearts are hotter in burn∣ing fevers, then in health. Moreover, when at the first sounding of musick we take pleasure, that pleasure quite
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vanisheth, if we grow weary of the musick; do the fumes then vanish also? Lastly, if beatitude consists in pleasure, as many think, then it is within our selves, having these fumes; and so we need not goe farre to be blessed. But why should the fumes about the heart be pleasures, ra∣ther then the fumes about the braine, seeing in the brain is the phantasie and apprehension, as also the originall of the senses? Now, pleasure consists in feeling and ap∣prehension, so that pleasure encreaseth as the sense and apprehension doe. I beleeve, Tobacco-suckers and Wine∣bibbers will hardly admit of your Philosophy, who de∣fine their pleasure by the motion of fumes in the braine, rather then about the heart.
[All that moveth the heart is either paine or pleasure.]* 5.88 Physicians tell us, that the heart is moved by the vitall spirits; the Aristotelians by the heat, which is the soules instrument: the heat moves it upward, the hearts owne weight moves it downward, and this is that they call systole and diastole; not a compounded motion, but two severall motions, proceeding from divers principles; for, no naturall motion can be compounded, nor can two contrary motions make up one, nor is motion made of motions: and not only are these two motions opposite in the heart, but also different in respect of time. Se∣condly, paine and pleasure are passions of the appetite; for every motion in the sensitive appetite is passion, cau∣sed by externall objects, being apprehended as good or evill: but passions are not agents. Thirdly, what paine or pleasure moves the childes heart in the mothers bel∣ly, or our hearts when we sleep, or a heart after it's ta∣ken out of the bodie? We see it moves, so long as any heat or spirits remaine in it: but you will hardly be∣leeve, that paine or pleasure moves it. Fourthly, if pain
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and pleasure move not the senses, but the species of such objects (which are convenient or inconvenient for us) cause this motion, and of this ariseth paine or pleasure; how can these move the heart, which never moved the sense?
[The effect, which we call paine, is nothing else but a com∣pression.]* 5.89 Paine is not a compression, but the effect of compression, and not of this neither; for some pleasing compressions there are, but of compression, as it is of∣fensive or hurtfull to our nature: Neither [are they gene∣rally* 5.90 hard things which breed paine in us, and those which breed pleasure oily and soft,] as you say; for there are divers soft and oily things, which, being touched, would not cause any pleasure in us. A Toad is soft, gold is hard; but as the touching of this breeds no paine, so the touch of that begets no pleasure. [Neither is the heart* 5.91 extremely passive, by reason of its tendernesse and heat,] but rather active; for heat is an active qualitie, and where is most heat, there is most activity: therefore is the fire the most active of the elements, and the heart the most active of all our members, because of heat. And how the heart is exceeding tender, I know not; the flesh of it is not so tender as of other parts. [Feare in its height con∣tracteth* 5.92 the spirits, and thence 'tis called Stupor.] Sorrow contracteth also the spirits; what difference then do you put between sorrow and stupiditie? You should have said, a sudden contracting; for stupor suddenly contracts those spirits, which sorrow doth leasurely, and by de∣grees. Secondly, you should have distinguished stupi∣ditie; for there is one that comes of feare, another of ad∣miration. Thirdly, feare and stupiditie are not the same thing; for in feare there is an inordinate motion of the spirits, in stupiditie there is an immobility of the same
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spirits. [Passion is nothing else but a motion of the bloud and* 5.93 spirits about the heart.] There is a continuall motion of the spirits and bloud about the heart, even when wee sleep; is there then also a continuall passion? I think, in sleep men are seldome troubled with passions. Second∣ly, if passion be continually in us, then passions and pati∣ble qualities are ill distinguished by Logicians, which make the one transient, the other permanent. Thirdly, passion is the motion of the sensitive appetite, which is moved by the object, and from it receives its specificati∣on, as from its forme; how then can it be solely the mo∣tion of the spirits and bloud? I grant, that in every pas∣sion there is some alteration of the naturall motion of the heart; that is, the systole and diastole is more or lesse: but this alteration is caused by the passion, which is, as I say, the motion of the sensitive appetite, not of the bloud and spirits, but secondarily and accidentally. Fourth∣ly, every passion in us is either morally good or evill: but the motion of the spirits and bloud about the heart is meerly naturall; and therefore cannot be good or bad morally. Fifthly, every passion is not a motion; for joy, which is one of the six passions of the concupiscible appe∣tite, is a rest or acquiescence in the fruition of that good, which we desired, but now possesse. The other five in∣deed consist in motion, to wit, love and hatred, desire and flight, and sorrow; and so doe the other five which are in the irascible appetite, to wit, hope and despaire, feare and audacity, and anger: but these are the motions of the sen∣sitive appetite, not of the spirits and bloud, as is said. [Birds are more musicall then other creatures, because they are* 5.94 of a hotter complexion.] If this were true, then Ostriches, Eagles, and Hawkes, should be more musicall then Larks and Nightingales; for, they are farre hotter: And birds
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are hotter in the dog-dayes, then in the spring; and yet in the dog-dayes they are mute, and vocall in the spring: neither do they sing as you say, [because they require more aire to coole them,] for their singing, being a strong moti∣on, (as some birds by too much and too eagerly singing, have killed themselves) should rather heat then coole them: it is not therefore heat, but emulation which is stirred up in them by some sharp and sympathising sound; or else the delight and pleasure which they take in the weather or aire, in which they are most conver∣sant, and by it the spirits are cheered.
The agreement and disagreement of the creatures [you* 5.95 will not have to be caused by instincts, antipathies, and sym∣pathies, but by downe-right materiall qualities.] This is pe∣tere principium; for, if I ask you, What it is that makes these materiall qualities affect or disaffect one another, you must be forced to flye to secret instincts, and occult principles. Are they materiall and manifest qualities, that in the Torpedo stupefie the fishers hand, and in the Load-stone draw the iron, whereas other stones and fi∣shes have the same manifest qualities, that the Load∣stone and Torpedo have? Why do not other stones and fishes produce the same effects? If by these materiall qualities you understand your Atomes, you must be for∣ced to flye to occult qualities; for what cause can you give of the emanation of these Atomes from the Load∣stone to the iron, more then to any other thing, but the sympathie it or they have with the iron? Would you have me tell you the causes of sympathies and antipathies? I will tell you, when you can tell me the cause of the con∣trarieties that are betweene manifest qualities. Tell me why heat is contrary to cold. 'Tis modesty and inge∣nuity to confesse our ignorance in those secrets which
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God hath purposely concealed from us, to teach us hu∣mility, for the pride of our first Parents, in affecting the forbidden fruit of knowledge; and that we should ac∣count all knowledge here but ignorance, in respect of the excellent knowledge of Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdome and knowledge. This we know, there are divers contrary, and also sympathising principles in nature, which are the causes not only of occult, but likewise of manifest qualities: but to demand the reason of these, is to search into those secrets of God, the knowledge of which is reserved for us in a happier life, then this we now enjoy. And to flye upon every occasi∣on to Democritus his Atomes, is a poore asylum. Why cannot qualities produce the same effects which your Atomes do? Do not you see how the sound of Musick, or the words of an eloquent Orator, which are but qualities, worke forcibly upon the affections?
You say, [the impression which the mothers imagination* 5.96 makes upon the child, is by meanes of the spirits conveyed from the head unto the seed.] If you will assigne us the prime cause, you must ascend higher, to wit, to the soule it self, which is both the mover, the forme, and finall cause of the body: which soule sendeth not only the spirits from the head of the parent, but from all parts of the body, as it doth the seed; for therefore the seed containes po∣tentially all the parts of the body that shall be, because it is derived from all parts of the parents body actually in being: and as the soule conveyes the spirits unto the seed, so doth it likewise the formative power, by which the impression is made; not in the seed, which is not ca∣pable of such impressions, whilst it is seed, but after∣wards in the Embrio; which formative power doth not all its worke at one time, but successively; first, trans∣forming
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the seed, then distinguishing and articulating the parts and members, and then making the impression on the childe, being now capable to receive it.
In the conclusion of your first Treatise, [You call quali∣ties* 5.97 unknowne entities, and you will have us prove, if in na∣ture there be such.] If qualities be unknowne, then tell me what it is we know; for substances we know not, but as they are cloathed with their accidents or quali∣ties. Take away heat, colour, light, levity, and other qualities from the fire in your kitchen, and how shall you know there is fire there? and what will your Cooke say, if you bid him dresse your supper with fire, wanting these qualities? We have no knowledge but by the sen∣ses, to which, neither the forme, nor the matter of things are obvious, but by their qualities, therefore if substan∣ces be known to us by their qualities, much more known must the qualities be; according to the old rule, Propter quod unumquodque est tale, &c. 2. To bid us prove quali∣ties, is to bid us prove that fire is hot, and water cold; or to prove that you are a learned Gentleman, a good Phi∣losopher, a wise States-man: and I pray you, are not lear∣ning, wisedome, goodnesse, qualities? from whence pro∣ceed all alterations in the world? do they not from qua∣lities? the substance is still the same. When water which before was cold, is now hot, hath lost neither its matter, nor forme, it is the same water still, onely altered in its quality. Are not you sometimes angry, sometimes plea∣sed, sometimes fearefull, sometimes bold, sometimes sick, sometimes healthie? you are not still glad, but sometimes sad; what is it in you that is thus altered? not your bo∣dy, nor your soule, which are still the same subjects of all these passions: the alterations then are in the passi∣ons, or qualities themselves. I beleeve these entities
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are not unknowne to you as you are a man: Homo es, hu∣mani à te nihil alienum puto. Lastly, if qualities must be proved, then I must prove that there is motion, action, and passion in the world; but you'l say these need no proofe: so say I, and consequently, neither need we prove, that there are qualities; for if there were not heat in the fire, there could be no calefaction in the water. The perfection of substances consisteth in their operati∣ons, but take away qualities, you take away all operati∣on, and by consequence, the perfection of substance; nay, you must deny all generation and corruption in nature, if you deny qualities, for by their service the matter is prepared to receive the form, or lose it; and they are in∣separable hand-maids, waiting on the formes as their mi∣stresses, and ready to performe their commands.
[The body is a meere passive thing.] What think you of* 5.98 the celestiall bodies? are they meerly passive? if they be, what is it that works upon this inferiour globe? Are the Sun and Moone meere passive bodies, by which all things here have light, life, motion, and vegetation? But perhaps you meane not celestiall bodies: Then come lower; Are not the animall and vitall spirits bodies? and yet they are active, not meerely passive: and if they were not a∣ctive, they could not unite the soule with the body, as they do; but, unire est agere: nay, what say you to your little Pages, the Atomes? they are bodies you confesse, and yet not meerly passive; for in this Treatise of yours, they have done you Knights-service. Neither am I of your opinon when you say, [that rare and dense is the* 5.99 primary and adequat division of bodies.] For there is in bo∣dies a division more prime then of dense and rare; to wit, of hot and cold; for rarity is but the effect of heat, and density of cold; now the effect is not the
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prime but posterior to its cause.
Though we have not sworne to defend Aristotle in all* 5.100 his Dictats, yet, till we know better, we will adhere to his: If you can informe us of principles more consonant to truth, wee will follow you, and leave him; for nei∣ther Plato, nor Aristotle, but Truth is it we fight for. But indeed, wee doe not find your Philosophy answerable to your paines, or our expectations. I will not dispraise your endeavours, nor will I promise to follow them. I honour your worth, I admire your paines, but I dislike your tenets. Your good parts deserve my love, but your principles convince not my judgement: therefore af∣ford me the same libertie in dissenting from you, which you assume to your selfe in deviating from Aristotle, whom notwithstanding you thinke you have exactly followed in your opinion of Atomes. But if my judge∣ment faile me not, in this you are mistaken: for, though hee denies not minima naturalia, or atomes in bodies, which are parts of the whole; yet hee never affirmed, that all actions, passions, motions, mutations are performed by them: much lesse was he of your opinion, that light, heat, cold, and other qualities were atomes or corporieties, but through all his workes, when hee hath occasion to speak of them, he makes them distinct entities, and pla∣ceth them in distinct predicaments: Therefore father not these your Atomes upon Aristotle, but set the right saddle on the right horse; and let Democritus enjoy his owne conceipts, to whom by right these atomes belong, and not to Aristotle.
Though Metaphysicall principles be of a higher straine* 5.101 then Physicall, yet we must not [set them apart, and make no use of them in the compositions, resolutions, and motions of things,] as you would have us; for, both the subject of
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Physick is subordinate to Metaphysick, and the principles of that demonstrable by the principles of this. How can you know exactly a naturall bodie, and its affections and principles, if you know not what is entity, essence, ex∣istence, act, possibility, &c? The thing defined, cannot be knowne but by the definition, nor this without the genus and difference. If you know not what is animal, you know not what is man. How shall wee know without Metaphysick what your active atomes are? whether they be bodies or spirits, corruptible or incorruptible, sub∣stances or accidents, perfect or imperfect, &c? By the touch-stone of Metaphysick we must try the goodnesse of your new coined opinions: but you wrong the learned* 5.102 Aristotelians, when you say [that they imagine positive enti∣ties to the negatives of things, as to the names of points, lines, instants:] for they never called names and negatives po∣sitive entities; nor are the names of points, lines, instants, negatives with them: and though they did imagine such to be positive entities, yet they doe not hold them to be so indeed; for, you may imagine or conceive darknesse or blindnesse under the notion of positive entities, though you know them to be privations. And indeed, wee can∣not imagine privations and negations without some re∣flexion on their habits and affirmations; because entities are only the objects of the intellect. You shall do well to name the Aristotelians, who are guilty of this your accu∣sation.
You would make Aristotle a weak Logician [if hee* 5.103 should meane by qualities nothing else but a disposition of parts,] as you say. But he is of another mind; for qua∣lities are with him in one predicament, the disposition of parts in another, to wit, in the Category of Site: there∣fore your definitions are lame, for want of Logick and
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Metaphysick; for you define [beauty, a composition of parts and colours in due proportion,] whereas beauty is a qualitie, composition an action, and proportion in the predicament of relation. So when you define [health a due temper of the humours,] health is not the temper of humours, but is the effect of this temper: For, as sicknesse is an affection hurting and hindering our naturall, vitall, and animall actions; so health is an affection, preserving and main∣taining these actions in safetie: but affections are quali∣ties. Neither is [agility a due proportion of spirits, and strength of sinewes,] as you define it; for, proportion is a relation, but agilitie a qualitie. Besides, there is in Ele∣phants a due proportion of spirits, and more strength of sinews then in a Mouse or Weasle, and yet no waies that agilitie. And as bad is your definition of Science, which, you say [is nothing else but ordered phantasmes,] whereas I have ordered phantasmes of contingencies, corruptible and individuall things, and yet of these there is no science. Though I have ordered phantasmes of the effect, yet, for want of the knowledge of the cause, I have not the science of it; for, scire est per causas cognoscere. And, if you take phantasmes for the objects of knowledge, as they are in the phantasie, sure science cannot be phantasmes, no more then the eye can be the colour which it sees: Knowledge or Science, and the thing knowne, are relatives; but these are opposites: therefore not the same. Lastly, science is a habit, phan∣tasmes are patible qualities, if you speak of the objects in the phantasie; but these are different species of qualitie.
You conclude your first part pleasantly, making your* 5.104 selfe merry in these sad times, but with your owne sha∣dow and conceipts, playing with these, as a Cat doth with her owne taile: You make the Aristotelians speak
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absurdities of your owne invention, and of which they never dreamed, and then you laugh at them, comparing them to a boy, that, by adding Bus, turned all English words into Latine. Thus, Turnus-like in the Poet, you fight not against Aenaeas, but his Image, or rather your owne imaginations; and you play upon these Sampsons, who can easily pull down, with the strength of their ar∣guments, this temple of your large discourse, which you have been so many yeares in building. If you were not a Gentleman, whom, for your good parts, I honour, I could say, that the boy was not so much to blame for Bus, as you are for being too busie in jeering at such emi∣nent men, and at those Maximes which have been so unanimously received by all Universities, and for so many hundred yeares constantly maintained; but your worth and my modestie enjoyne mee silence, and re∣straine my pen from recrimination.
But let us see what it is that you so play upon them* 5.105 for, [Because when you aske how a wall is white, they answer, There is an entity, whose essence is whitenesse, in the wall: If you aske againe how whitenesse sticks to the wall, they reply, By meanes of the entity called union. If againe you aske, how one white is like another, they answer, 'Tis done by another entity, whose nature is likenesse.] Thus you make them very simple and ridiculous, and indeed, no wiser then the boy with his Bus, or rather Bussards then Philosophers. These men (whom you mock) say, that [praedicare sequitur esse,] the wall is called white, because it is white; and it is white in concreto, because the Painter would have it so, by introducing whitenesse the abstract into it. But I will tell you, why whitenesse is in the wall, & other accidents in their subjects; because they cannot subsist without them;
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and they cannot subsist without them, because their es∣sence is to inhere. If you aske a reason of this their es∣sence, I must leave you, and send you to the Author of nature. If you dislike the terme of entitie to be given to whitenesse, and union, and likenesse; then they must be non-entities: for the one or the other they must needs be, seeing there is no medium between entity and non-en∣tity. But Philosophers are not so childish as you make them, when you will have them say, that whitenesse sticks to the wall by meanes of union; this is to tautolo∣gise, not to satisfie: they say not then, that union unites whitenesse to the wall, but that accidents are united to their subjects, as heat to the fire, because without them the substance, whose ultimate perfection consists in ope∣ration, cannot work; nor the accidents, whose essence is inherence, without their subjects cannot subsist. So wee say, that in mixture the substances are united, not by meanes of union, but of humiditie, which is the glue and cement in naturall compositions, as drinesse dissolves the union. Againe, one whitenesse is not like another, be∣cause of likenesse: that's childish; but because nature aimes at unitie, and in similitude there is a kind of unitie. The reason why shee aimes at unitie is, because there is most entity, where is most unity; multiplicity enclines to non-entity, from which nature flies as farre as shee can: and because she aimes at perfection, which consisteth in unitie; therefore she aimes at unitie. And because where there is division, there are parts; now parts being of the whole (which is the same either generically or specifi∣cally with the parts) they resemble the whole, and each other in some sort: Or, if you aske mee the reason why two eggs are like each other, I answer, Because they have
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the same qualitie. So then the identity of the qualitie is the cause or ground of similitude; and so saith Ari∣stotle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they are like that have the same* 5.106 qualitie; yet not qualities only, but other entities also are the ground of similitude: The thing generated, and the generator have the same similitude, because they have the same essentiall forme. All things that are united in a specificall forme, have a specificall similitude; and they have a genericall similitude, that have the same ge∣nus, and so equivocall effects are like their causes. So there is the similitude of actions, passions, quantities, rela∣tions, site, &c. And as the forme, whether essentiall or accidentall, is the ground of that similitude, which is cal∣led of participation; so entitie it selfe is the ground of that which is called the similitude of proportion. Thus man is like unto God, because hee is an entitie as God is, but by participation; therefore like to him onely by analogie and proportion. And because the entities of God and of man are not of the same order; therefore God is not like man, no more then you are like your pi∣cture, though perhaps your picture may be like you. Lastly, [you will not admit qualities, except we can shew you out of Aristotle a medium between naturall and logicall en∣tities.] Then belike you suppose, that wee make qua∣lities neither naturall nor logicall entities, but some middle between both: but if you were versed in Phi∣losophy, you will find, that Aristotelians make qualities naturall or reall entities; and therefore place them di∣rectly in the predicament, which is the receptacle of reall entities onely. You would take it ill, if any should tell you, that the habits of wisedome, learning, &c. the naturall faculties of seeing, hearing, &c. which are in
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you, as likewise your passions and patible qualities, with your forme and figure, were not naturall and reall enti∣ties. But this shall suffice briefly to have pointed at some of your deviations, which I have done hastily, not having time to make a full survay of your Treatise. Let us now pass to your second Discourse, and see whe∣ther your in-sight in the nature of the Soule, be as good as that which you have made shew of in your Treatise of the nature of Bodies.
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ANIMADVERSIONS upon Sir Kenelme Digbie's Treatise, of the nature of the SOULE.
IN your Preface you traduce Philoso∣phers* 5.107 [for turning all bodies into spirits, because they make heat and cold to be of it selfe indivisible, a thing by it selfe.] This is a great mistake; for neither do they make heat and cold in them∣selves indivisible, but divisible rather, to wit, into degrees: nor do they make them things by themselves, but they say, that they have no being, ex∣cept in and by their subjects; so neither doe they make them indivisible, in respect of parts, but they hold qua∣lities partible, according to the parts of the bodie in which they are. And if they did, yet it will not follow, that therefore they turne bodies into spirits; for spirits are not free from divisions: nor are qualities bodies, as we have already shewed; nor can bodies be turned into spirits, except you meane such spirits as flie up and downe your nerves and arteries. And indeed, not Philo∣sophers, but the Masse-Priests are guilty of your accusati∣on; for they, as it were, by magicall words, ••rne the
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bread into a spirit, and they make the accidents of the bread to have essence and existence by themselves, with∣out their subjects.
[The nature of a thing apprehended, is truly in the man* 5.108 who doth apprehend it, and not the similitude; because where there is a likenesse, there is a dissimilitude, which is not in the thing apprehended; and therefore no likenesse, but the very thing it selfe.] Then first, the thing containing and recei∣ving, must be the same with the thing contained and re∣ceived, which is impossible: Then secondly, there will be no difference between the direct act of the intellect, in apprehending things without it selfe by the species or si∣militudes of these things; and that act which is called reflex, when the intellect understands it selfe, without any species: though in this the apprehendent, and thing apprehended be the same; yet it cannot be so in the out∣ward objects. Neither indeed is the intellect every way the same as it apprehends, and as it's apprehended: it ap∣prehends as the intellect, it's apprehended as an intelli∣gible object. Then thirdly, one and the same object may be multiplied in an instant to two or three thou∣sand, if there should be so many to look upon an ob∣ject at the same time. Fourthly, Tell us how an horned beast, passing thorow a mans eie, should not hurt it; or a stone thorow a looking-glasse, and not break it: but there must be a breaking of the one, and a hurting of the other, if the very substance of the thing apprehen∣ded is truly and really in the eie or phantasie, or mind of the man apprehending, or in the glasse. Is the very sub∣stance of the seale, or onely the impression and species of it in the wax? Fifthly, The intellect is not the same with the thing apprehended essentially and formally; but onely subjecti•• as they say;) for the intellect is the subject of
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the received species, which of an abstract becomes a con∣crete, and which before the reception of the species was intellectus, but not informatus, till they come. Now, if the thing received by the intellect be a substance, then it cannot be one with the intellect, being they are both actuall entities; Ex duobus in actu non fit unum per se. Sixt∣ly, If the intellect be every thing really which it under∣stands, then by understanding or apprehending a horse, it becomes a horse, and so man must needs be a horse, saith Scaliger. Seventhly, If the intellect be essentially* 5.109 the same thing which it apprehends, then the thing ap∣prehended cannot be present or absent without the de∣stroying of the intellect; but we say accidents may, and therefore the species are but accidents, because by their coming and going the intellect is not destroyed. Eightly, There is nothing in the intellect which was not before in the sense; but if the substance of the fire be re∣ceived into the chrystalline humor of your eye, before the visory spirits can apprehend, or convey that fire to the phantasie, & thence to the intellect; either the fire wil burn up the chrystalline humour, or the moisture of the humor extinguish the fire, and so the intellect be deprived of its object. Ninthly, Give me the reason why a man seeth that which sometimes he perceiveth not: Our Peripate∣ticks give the reason thus; because, though the chrystalline humour suffers in receiving the species, yet the visory spi∣rits act not by apprehending them, because the phantasie imployes them about some other object: but this could not be, if the substance of a man or horse be received into the eie; for it were impossible that such a substance could be received into the eye, and not perceived by the spirits in the eye. Lastly, There is a dissimilitude be∣tweene the thing apprehended and the power apprehen∣ding,
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though you deny it: for, if there be no dissimilitude betweene the fire that is in your chimney, and that in your eye, then there must be the same coales, heat, smoak, and quantity, in your eye, that is in the chimney: if it were so, your braines could not avoid conflagra∣tion, nor your eyes a totall extinction.
[A respect is no where to be found in its formall subsistence,* 5.110 but in the apprehension of man: the likenesse that one white hath to another, is onely in man, who, by comparing them, giveth nature and being to respect.] Then it seems there is no true and reall respect or relation betweene a father and his son, a master and his servant, a King and his people, but a meere notion in our apprehension; so that if men did not apprehend such notions, there should be no re∣lation at all betweene these: So you are no longer a fa∣ther, nor can your son be your son, but whilst you are thinking of it; and if you think not of it, nor dreame of it in your sleep, your son hath lost his filiation, and con∣sequently his tie of obedience and respect, which he oweth to you. 2. Our Philosophers were unwise men, to place relations in a predicament, which is the series of reall entities, if respects be meere notions; and so they ought not to be handled in Metaphysicks, if they be not reall entities. 3. What think you of that respect or re∣lation which is betweene the Creator and the creature? or those relations which are in the persons of the blessed Trinity? are they onely notions, and such as have no subsistence, but in mans apprehension? 4. In relation there is opposition, but opposits differ really. 5. A re∣spect or relation may be really lost from its subject, and therefore 'tis a reall entity; for when you die, the relati∣on ceaseth which you now have to your son, or he to you. 6. If all respects be notions, what distinction do
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you make betweene those which are called relata realia, and relata rationis? 7. Relations are so far from being meere notions, that in them there is a two-fold reality: The one, as they are accidentall formes, inherent in their subjects; the other, as they import a respect to another, which is called its terminus. Lastly, they are said to be like, which have the same quality; to wit, of white∣nesse, or such like; but if whitenesse be a reall entity, the likenesse, which is the identity of it, cannot be a noti∣on: for Metaphysick tels us, that identity is reall: And what will you say of that similitude which Adam had with God, or which a regenerated man hath, consisting in righteousnesse and true holinesse? Is this image of God in man, which by us was lost, and now by grace is repaired, a bare notion? then will our happinesse, and joy, and hopes, and religion, consist rather in conceit then in reality:
Dii meliora piis, erroremque hostibus illum.
* 5.111
[BEING or a thing (the formall notion of both which is meerly being) is the proper affection of man.] This anigma would trouble Oedipus, or Sphynx himselfe; for in your margin, by this word being, you understand existence: But is this the proper affection of man? what becomes of other creatures? have they no existence? If they have, then it is not proper to man quarto modo. If they have not, then they are but entities in possibility; for existence is the actuating and restraining of the essence (which in it selfe is indeterminate, and in possibility) to actuality, which we call existence; therefore existence is not the proper affection of man, but of entity as it is in act, or rather the formality of actuall entity. Besides, if ex∣istence be the proper affection of man, what shall we say of Angels, and other spirits; nay, of God himselfe?
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Is there no existence in them? Againe, existence is not an affection or propertie; for it is no accident, but the ve∣ry essence of the thing actuated, which before was in pos∣sibility; and therefore by Philosophers 'tis called actus primus, to distinguish it from properties and operations, which are called second acts; for a thing is first actuated by its existence, and then by its properties and operati∣ons. But what you meane by [the formall notion of both* 5.112 which, and of their meerly being,] I know not. Sibylla's leaves are not more obscure, to which you may adde, [your stock of being, and the grafts inoculated into it,] for* 5.113 with such mists of metaphors you involve your Philoso∣phy, against the rules and custome of Philosophers; and so you leave your Readers, as Sibylla left hers, unsatisfi∣ed; thus,
Inconsulti abeunt, sedemque odere Sibyllae▪
I wish Mr. White had helped you here, whose aid hath not beene wanting to you at a dead lift hitherto. I should trifle away too much time and paper, if I should insist or name all your fancies, of the tribes as you call them of predicaments, whose office you will have [to comprehend all the particular notions that man hath: and how you will have [all entities to be respective] and all notions to be grafted on the stock of being, &c.] Abundance of such stuffe, with which your booke is fraughted, I passe over, as being not worth the expence of time; and indeed, they refute themselves. As likewise that you make [essence and existence the same] whereas they are one and the same in God onely, but not in the creatures, in whom the essence and existence differ: for, whilst a thing is in its causes, it hath an essence; but no existence, till it be pro∣duced by its causes, and as it were quit of them.
[All the knowledge we have of our soule, is no more but that* 5.114
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it is an active force in us.] I hope you know more of the soule then this, to wit, that it is an immortall, immateriall substance, infused by God into the body, created of no∣thing, consisting of the intellect and will, capable of bea∣titude. You know also, I hope, that the soule had no being till it was infused into the body, and that it is not in a place as bodies are, by way of circumscription, and that it is all in all, and all in every part of the body, and that after death it immediatly goeth to hell or heaven, not lingring about the grave, or sleeping in the dust till the resurrection. But it seemes you have not very great knowledge of the soule, when you say [that a thing ap∣prehended by the soule, becomes a part, or affection of the soule;] for neither hath the soule any parts, nor can that be an affection of the soule which comes from without.
In your 5. Chapter you make [1. Being to have a ve∣ry* 5.115 neere affinity with the soule. 2. To be the end of the soule. 3. To be the soules patterne and Idea.] For the first, there is small affinity betweene the soule which is a substance, and Being which is neither substance nor accident, but a transcendent. Being or existence is the generall affection of entity, so is not the soule: the body hath existence be∣fore the soule is infused, and when the soule is gone, it hath existence still: the body hath no more existence from the soule, then the soule from the body. 2. If be∣ing be the end of the soule, then it moved God to create it, for the end moveth, at least metaphorically; but sure nothing moved God, except his owne goodnesse and glory: and how can that existence which God gave to the soule in the creation, be the end of its creation? Is creation the end of creation? and the giving of being the end why being is given? what can be more absurd? And wereas being is internall and essentiall to the soule,
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how can it be the end, which is an externall cause? 3. Being is not the patterne or Idea of the soule; for Be∣ing is intrinsecall to the soule, so is not the patterne or Idea, but extrinsecall: As, the Idea or patterne of a buil∣ding is in the mind of the builder, but not in the house which is built: and if being is the end of the soule, how can it be the Idea? for the end excites the action of the agent, but the Idea determinates that action; and these are very different.
[You will not have the understanding to be the objects it* 5.116 understands by way of similitude, but by way of respects.] Un∣derstanding is by way of similitude, not of respect; for your son, who hath a neere respect or relation to you, doth not the more for that understand this your Booke; I beleeve he understands books written by strangers, to whom he hath no respect, better then these your intri∣cate mysteries. There are relations and respects between inanimate or senslesse creatures, and yet no understan∣ding: it is not therefore the respect, but the reception of the species into the intellect, and its assimilation or simi∣litude with the intellect, that makes understanding. Be∣sides, there are some respects grounded upon similitudes, then I hope there are some things understood by way of similitudes: I may truly say, all things, for nothing is un∣derstood, but what is in the understanding; and nothing can be there, but by way of similitude; every thing is intelligible actually, if its similitude be in the intellect actually.
[The amplitude of the soule, in respect of knowledge, is ab∣solutely* 5.117 infinite, that is, she is capable of knowing at the same time objects without end or measure.] Where is absolute∣nesse, there is no respect; how then can the soule be in∣finite absolutely in respect of knowledge? Is there an
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absolute respect, or a respective absolutenesse of infinitie in the soule? I thought God onely had been absolutely infinite; and what odds will you make between Gods knowledge and mans, if the soule at the same time is capable of knowing objects without end or measure? Gods knowledge cannot exceed this; for what can be knowne beyond infinitenesse and immensity? And if the soule knowes at the same time things infinite and im∣mense, then the soule must be also infinite and immense: For the Understanding, and the thing understood is the same; but infinitenesse and immensitie are Gods proper attributes. For my part, I confesse that all I know of in∣finitenesse is, that I know it not. For this cause Ari∣stotle proves, that the principles of naturall bodies can∣not* 5.118 be infinite, because they are knowne; for they could not be knowne, if they were infinite: And therefore Phi∣losophers could not attaine to the knowledge of God, be∣cause of his infinitenesse, but onely by degrees reached to the knowledge of some of his attributes: as first, that he was an entity, then a mover; then they came to know his power, after that his wisdome, and then his goodnesse. And sure, all the knowledge we have of God in this life, is but the light of the Owles eyes to the Sun. Our Peri∣pateticks are more modest, who say not, that the soule at the same time is capable of knowing objects without end or measure, as you doe; but they say, that the fa∣cultie of understanding must be proportionated to the object. Now, the object of the intellect is finite; for nature acknowledgeth no infinitum actu. Infinitenesse by succes∣sion there is, and so she may know infinite things, that is, one thing after another in infinitum; for she knoweth not so much, but she may know more: yet she knoweth not infinite things actually or habitually, because actually
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at the same time she knoweth that only which hath one species; but infinitenesse hath not one species. Hence it is, that shee knoweth in infinitenesse one part after ano∣ther; and so, wee know not God in this life, because there is no proportion between his actuall infinitenesse, and our finite understandings. Nay, in heaven wee shall not know him by way of comprehension, though we shall then know his essence. And because wee cannot actually at the same time understand many things, therefore the intelligible species enter into the understanding succes∣sively. And if at any time wee understand many things together, it is, not as they are many or divers, but as they are united in one common notion or nature. So the Angels themselves understand not many things at once, but as they are united in one species, whether wee speake of those species which are innate, or of those which they see in the glasse (as they call it) of the Trinity. And this truth of the Peripateticks you seem afterward to yeeld unto, when you say, that if knowledge be taken properly, we* 5.119 doe not know eternity, however by super naturall helps we may come to know it.
[All things which within our knowledge lose their being,* 5.120 doe so by reason of their quantities.] Quantities are not active; therefore nothing can lose its being, by reason of them. When a man dieth, hee loseth his being, as man; and yet the fame quantitie remaines that was be∣fore in the bodie. If you speak of the formall being of things, they are lost, not by reason of the quantitie, but by reason of the introduction of another forme, which expells that forme that was; as, the forme of the chick expells the forme of an egge, and then followeth a change of the quantitie: but if you speak of materiall be∣ing, that is not lost at all, the matter being eternall; and
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so quantity, which followeth the matter, remaineth too, but indeterminate, till the forme come, which restraines and confines the exorbitancie both of the matter, and of its quantity.* 5.121
You say [that those Philosophers, who search into nature, are called Mathematicians.] They are so by you, but by whom else are they so called? They use to be termed Physici, naturall Philosophers; but for Mathematicians, they consider not nature at all, neither the matter, nor the forme of things, but bare accidents; not as the natu∣rall Philosopher, (who handles them as affections of natu∣rall bodies) but as they are abstracted from all sensible matter: So the Geometrician considereth continued quan∣tities, the Arithmetician discrete quantities or numbers, Astronomers motions and measures of celestiall bodies, Opticks light and shadowes, Musicians sounds.
[All life consisteth in motion, and all motion of bodies* 5.122 cometh from some other thing without them. The soule can move, without receiving her motion from abroad.] First, all life consisteth not in motion: for, there is life in spirits, without motion; so there is in bodies too: In Dormise and other sleeping creatures in Winter, in trees at the same season, in women that are troubled with histerica passio, they have life, and yet no motion at all. Second∣ly, life consisteth not in motion; for it is not the action, but the act of the soule; not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Life con∣sists in union; but this is rather rest then motion. Life is not in the categorie of action. From life proceed di∣vers actions: as understanding, sensation, motion, nutrition, generation; but actionis non est actio. It's true, that life is manifested by motion; but it consisteth not in motion: for the foule, being separated from the bodie, liveth, but moveth not. Thirdly, all motions of bodies come not
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from without; for the forme is the cause of motion, but the forme is not an externall cause. Though your hand, in flinging up a stone, be an externall mover, yet when the stone falls downward, it is moved internally, by its owne forme. What externall mover is that which moveth the heart, even when it is separated from the rest of the bodie? Fourthly, the soule moveth not, but by receiving her motion from abroad: for, as all things have their formes from the first cause; so from the same cause they have their motion, which followes the forme, dans formam, dat consequentia: therefore the Apostle tells us, it is in God wee live, and move, and have our being.
You are troubled with phancies, when you tell us [of* 5.123 a perfect, and imperfect soule; that, you call a knowledge, an art, a rule, &c. and this, you call a participation of an Idea. So in our thoughts, you make some part of them corporeall, and some spirituall. In the soule you will have no accidents, but all to be soule that is in her.] We say, that every bodie is per∣fect in its owne kind; so that there is no imperfect bo∣die in the world: but how one soule is more imperfect then another, you must tell us, if you will have us be your disciples. The essence of every thing is indivisi∣ble; but the soule is the essence of the living creature, and the essence of the thing is the perfection of it. A negative imperfection there is in the creature, compared to the Creator: so in mens soules, compared to Angels; be∣cause they have not these perfections: nor are they ca∣pable of them in that estate they are now in, except their species be altered; and yet the soules are perfect in their owne kind: for, perfectum est, cui nihil deest. Thus a Dia∣mond is a perfect stone, though it hath not the perfecti∣ons of man. But a privative imperfection is not in any
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soule, because there is nothing wanting that ought to be in the soule (I speak here of naturall faculties, not of supernaturall grace) if there be some failing or defect in the organs, by which the soule worketh, that imperfe∣ction to no more to be imputed to the soule, then want of skill to an expert Musician, because his Lute is out of tune. Secondly, when you call [the soule a knowledge, an art, a rule,] you make the soule an accident, or a col∣lection of accidents; and so, you are more injurious to the soule then Hippocrates and Galen, who beleeved it to be nothing else but a celestiall heat. Thirdly, what you meane by [an imperfect soule, which (you say) is the parti∣cipation of an Idea,] I know not. Fourthly, neither can I tell [how some part of our thoughts are corporeall, and some spirituall,] seeing they are actions, and accidents of the soule. Fifthly, if there be no accidents in the soule, then there be no habits, nor actions, nor intelligible species in her; for these are meere accidents, but such are in every soule, or else you must deny, that there is either know∣ledge or wisdome, goodnesse or evill in the soule. 'Tis true, there are not materiall accidents in her, because she is free from materiality; yet, in that she is not a pure act, as God is, there is in her a potentiality, whence arise these spirituall and immateriall accidents which be in her.
[To be in a place, is nothing else but to be in a circumstant* 5.124 body. It is absurd to say [it is] therefore [it is somewhere.] it is an eminent property of a separated soule to be no where, and yet she is every where.] Place is not a bodie; for then two bodies must be in one place, which nature abhors. Neither is place any part of a bodie: not the matter, be∣cause the matter doth not containe as the place doth, but is contained; nor is it the forme, for the bodie may be separated from the place containing, without any hurt
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to the bodie contained: so cannot a bodie be separated from its forme, without its destruction. And if place were either matter or forme, there would be no motion to a place; for, bodies move to their place, because they are not in it; they move to enjoy that they want: but bo∣dies having and enjoying already their matter and form, cannot move to have or enjoy them; therefore place is not a bodie, but the superficies of an ambient bodie, or rather the concavity of that superficies. Secondly, it is no absurditie from the existence of a thing, to prove the ubiety of it; for whatsoever is, must necessarily be some∣where, except God, whose centre is every-where, his circumference no-where. And though spirits are not in a place, by way of circumscription, as bodies are, whose ex∣tremities fill the vacuity of the containing superficies; yet they are in their ubi, by way of definition or designati∣on; that is, whilst they are here, they are not there: whilst the Angel Gabriel is with the Virgin in her cham∣ber, hee is not the same time in heaven; and whilst our soules are here present in their bodies, they are absent from the Lord, saith the Apostle. And though Angels and our soules are in bodies, as in their ubi, yet they are not there as in a place; for neither is there any dilatation nor condensation of the bodies upon their entering in, no more then there is of the aire in your chamber upon the shining of the Sun beams in it: Or, if they be in a place, they are not there by any quantitative, but by a virtuall contact. Thirdly, you make it [the eminent property of a soule to be no-where, and yet every-where.] But if the soule be no-where, it is nothing; and if every-where, it is God, whose property it is indeed to be every-where, by his essence, power, and providence: but how the soule can be every-where, and yet no-where, is one of your riddles. I
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think you have read that passage in Seneca, Nusquam est, qui ubique est. But, indeed, neither are the soules no∣where, nor are they every-where; not no-where, for ubie∣tie is so necessary to created entities, that (like Hippoer ates twins) they live and die together: Tolle spatia corporibus, & nusquam erunt, & qui a nusquam erant, omnino non erant. What S. Austin speaks there of bodies, must be also un∣derstood* 5.125 of spirits; for, no reason can be given why spi∣rits should have more priviledge to exist without their Ubi, then bodies have to exist without their place▪ And how can wee imagine, that a spirit can work or produce any effect, except the cause and the effect, the work and the worker have a locall co-existence? Therefore Plato* 5.126 said well, that what is not contained within the com∣passe of heaven and earth, cannot be at all. And so saith Aristotle, that which is no-where, is not. If Sphinx be* 5.127 no-where, there is no such creature. And to say, that soules are every-where, is to oppose both Divinity and Philosophy: for the one teacheth us, that ubiquity is Gods property; the other, that Intelligences, which are of a more eminent essence or nature then our soules, are not in every part of their orbe, but in that onely which mo∣veth most swiftly. As their essence is finite, so is their ex∣istence, and so is their Ubi. As they cannot work every∣where, so they cannot be every-where. The soules de∣parted then are in their Ubi, which excludes ubiquitie.
You say [you have explicated how time is the motion of* 5.128 the heavens.] You had need explicate this well; for how the measure can be the same thing with that which it measureth, I know not. Now, time is the measure of motion, but not of celestiall motion: for time, being the affection of that motion, must needs be after it; but a
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measure is naturally before the thing measured; and the cause is the measure rather of the effect, then the effect can be of the cause, saith Scaliger: Therefore, as the* 5.129 first bodie is the measure of other bodies, so is the first motion the measure of other motions. And nature by motion measureth time, because by motion shee begets time; but wee make time to measure motion, when wee say, so many degrees of the equinoctiall have moved in such a time. Againe, time cannot be motion, because time is the same every-where, but motion is not the same: one time is not swifter or slower then another, but one motion is swifter or slower then another motion. Be∣sides, it is a received opinion among Divines, that the motion of heaven shall cease after the resurrection, being the motion of the Sun, Moon and Stars is a part of that vanitie, to which the creature is subject; and of this mo∣tion there shall be then no use, either for distinction of times and seasons, or for generation, corruption, and alte∣ration of sublunary bodies: but though this motion shall cease, yet time shall not cease, except it be that which is caused by their motion, to wit, houres, dayes, yeares, &c. But that time, which consisteth in the succession of dura∣tion or motion of any other thing, whether it be of our bodies, or of our thoughts, that time, I say, shall not cease. To be briefe, time is not the motion of heaven, because that motion is onely in heaven, as in its subject; but time is every-where, and in every thing▪ neither is that time, which is caused by the motion of the first movable, the same that inferiour motions are, because they are separable; for the heaven might move and cause time, though there were no inferiour motion below: and there may be motions here below, though the hea∣vens
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stood still. The wheele of a clock would go, though the heavens moved not: And Iosuah did fight, though the Sun stood still.
[Though a separated soule consists with time, yet shee is not* 5.130 in time.] If you understand by being in time, to be mea∣sured by time, and to be overcome by it, I yeeld; for so, whatsoever hath a perpetuall being, is freed from the lawes of time, saith Aristotle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 5.131 And so motion onely is in time, to wit, per se, & primò, because it is motion only that primarily, and by it selfe is measured by time; for time is the number and measure of motion per prius & po∣sterius: And therefore motion, having of it selfe and primarily, prioritie and posterioritie, it is onely prima∣rily and of it selfe in time, and other things but in respect of motion. As for spirits, because they have no depen∣dence on time, nor on the motion of the first sphere, nei∣ther in respect of their being, nor of their conservation, they cannot be said to be in time: for, to be in time, in∣cludes three things: first, to be measured: secondly, to be comprehended: thirdly, to be mastered and consu∣med by time; and so onely corruptible bodies are in time, and yet these are not in time, but in respect of their motions and mutations: For the being or essence even of corruptible things consists in indivisibilitie, and have not in them priority and posteriority, nor succession, which are necessarily required for time. But though spirits are not in time after the manner of corruptible bodies, yet they are in time, in respect of their locall motions, thoughts, volitions and operations, which require a succession, priori∣tie and posterioritie, and cannot be in an instant: But this the Schoole-Doctors will not have to be called physicall
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time, which consisteth in a continuated motion; but tem∣pus discretum, being composed of divers minutes, or little stayes or delayes succeeding one another. And though their operations be indivisible in themselves, yet they, by succeeding one another, make up that discrete time, which is divisible: So unities and instances indivisible in themselves, make up numbers and time which are divi∣sible: So then this duration of spirits, though it be indivi∣sible and permanent, according to their proper being, yet it is variable, according to their operations pro∣ceeding from them. And though in respect of indivisi∣bility and permanencie, they will have this their duration to be called, not tempus, but aevum; yet they acknow∣ledge them to be in discrete time, in regard of their suc∣cessive operations; and they admit, that their aevum is virtually divisible, having its succession, as it is co-existent with our time: And therefore the duration of Angels and separated soules is greater this yeare, then it was an hundred, or a thousand yeares ago, because they have been co-existent to a longer time. Besides, nothing but God can be said to be exempted from time, because his essence, existence, and duration or permanencie, is all one: but in the creatures these are distinguished; for duration is extrinsecall, and accidentall to the essence of the crea∣ture, even of spirits; and therefore they are not the same with their duration, but something else: they are in aevo, as we are in tempore, although aevum be not a fit terme to expresse the duration of Angels and soules, being it signifieth the same that eternity, onely proper to God; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and this is eternity: and God onely is eternall, knowing neither beginning nor exding, anti∣quity nor novelty: for the one supposeth an end, the o∣ther
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a beginning, as Tertullian sheweth: Deus, si vetus est,* 5.132 non erit; si novus, non fuit: novitas initium testatur, vetu∣stas finem comminatur.
Not long ago you said, [The soule was nothing else but* 5.133 an active force,] now you call it [an indivisible substance, an actuall knowledge of all things, a skill, a rule by what it selfe is, that shee is all that shee knoweth; her nature is order. That there are some imperfect soules, and an interiour soule; that the amplitude of knowledge is common to all humane soules separated; that phantasmes are little bodies, which goe with the body; that life is a generall motion, preceding that moment in which shee becomes an absolute spirit.] And then you confesse, [you have engulfed your selfe into a sea of con∣tradiction.] You have indeed, and I know not how to help you out, but by telling you, that if the soule be a substance, it cannot be a rule, a knowledge, a skill, an or∣der; for these are accidents. Secondly, if the soule be all she knoweth, then shee needs no other knowledge but of her selfe; for in knowing her selfe, she knowes all things. Thirdly, if there be some imperfect soules, then God is not a perfect Creatour; for he immediately cre∣ates the soule, and infuseth it. Fourthly, and if there be an interiour soul, tell us which is the exteriour, or how many soules a man may have. Fifthly, and if phan∣tasmes be bodies, how can they have their residence in the soule or understanding? Spirits may dwell in bo∣dies, but that bodies should reside in spirits, I have not heard till now. Sixthly, neither doe you tell us a reason why these your little bodies should forsake the soule upon her departure, and goe with the bodie. Is not the understanding of a separated soule, as capable to lodge and entertaine such guests, as before? Or, are these little bodies made of dust, that to dust they must returne? Se∣venthly,
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have all separated soules the same amplitude of knowledge? then the soule of Iudas in hell hath as much knowledge, as Abraham's soule in heaven; but I see no reason for it. Eighthly, if life be a motion, it is an imperfect thing, consisting not in esse, but in fieri; and so the life of man, both here and hereafter, cannot be perfect, no not in heaven. And in a separated soule, tell mee which is the mover, the motion and the mobile. Ninthly, tell us what this Shee is, that becomes an abso∣lute spirit: Is it the soule? or is it life? If the soule, then she was, before she was a spirit: If life, then motion may become a spirit. I see, it is not without cause you com∣plaine of engulfing your selfe into the sea of contradicti∣on. Help your selfe out againe, if you can.
But you plunge your selfe over head and eares, when* 5.134 you tell us, [That separated soules doe enjoy their knowledge, without the help of externall objects, phantasmes, instruments, or any other helps, having all things requisite in themselves.] This is to deifie soules, and to elevate them above the pitch of created entities. For the Angels themselves have not such an eminent knowledge, in that they stand in need of helps; both externall, to wit, that supreme light, and cleere looking-glasse of the Trinity, in which they see all things; as also of the innate species or idea, both of universalities and of singularities, without which they can have no knowledge: therefore à fortiori, if Angels stand in need of such helps, much more must departed soules. Secondly, memorie remaines in departed soules, but memory or recordation is by help of the species laid up in the mind, to the understanding of which, when the mind applies it selfe, this is called recordation. Thirdly, though the intelligible species depend from the senses and phantasie in their fieri, or being, yet they have no
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dependence from them in their conservation. For the sensible species in sleepe serve the phantasie, though the common sense, and all the outward, are bound up, and as it were dead. Fourthly, in Angels and departed soules there are divers habits both of love and knowledge, and vertue, yea, of tongues also in respect of entitie, though there be no use nor exercise (but after a spirituall way) of speak∣ing: now habits are the causes of action, and in vaine should they be left in the soule, if she by them did not worke, and actually understand: neither can the effect, to wit, actuall understanding, subsist without its cause, which is the habit; for this is such an effect as depends in its conservation from the cause. Fiftly, understanding, and the manner of understanding accompany the nature of the soule, but the nature of the soule is the same here and hereafter, therefore the manner of understanding must be the same, to wit, by the species. Sixtly, Whereas the soules departed do specifically differ from the Angels, they must have a different manner of understanding, to wit, by discourse: but this way needs help, not of the phantasme or senses, (being all commerce with the body is taken away) but of the species. Hence then it is appa∣rent, that departed soules stand in need of helps, and of objects of their understanding, and that they have not all things requisite in themselves: which objects are externall in respect of their essence, though the species be inherent or adherent to the soules: much more externall are these objects which they see in God, although God himselfe is not intelligible by any species, by reason of his immensity; neither doth the soule understand it selfe by any species, nor doth she know (except by revelation) what is done or doing here on earth; which she must needs know, if she had all things requisite for know∣ledge
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in her selfe; but indeed, Abraham is ignorant of us, and Israel knows us not. Nesciunt mortui quid hic aga∣tur,* 5.135 nisi dum hic agitur, saith S. Austin.
[Our looking upon the phantasmes in our braine, is not our* 5.136 soules action upon them, but it is our letting them beat at our common sense, that is, our letting them work upon our soule.] The phantasie being a corporeall sense, cannot work up∣on the soul which is a spirit: it is not then the phantasie that works upon the soule, but the agent intellect refines, purifies, and makes more spirituall those phantasmes, or species which are represented by the phantasie, and so impresseth them in the passive intellect; and this is cal∣led understanding. The agent intellect is the force or quality of the soule mediating betweene the phan∣tasie and passive intellect, framing the intelligible species, which the passive intellect receiveth, and so by the one power the soule acteth, and by the other suf∣fereth; but not at all by the phantasie, whose hand can∣not reach so high as to knock at the gates of the soule. It must then be a spirituall power that must worke up∣on a spirit: the passive intellect is rasa tabula, like cleane paper, having no innate species, or images of objects in it selfe, but what it receiveth from the active intellect; so that the phantasie helps the understanding onely dis∣positivè, not efficienter, being rather the materiall then ef∣ficient cause of understanding, furnishing those species which the active intellect refineth, and impresseth in the passive. If you should ask, whether our understanding is an action, or a passion, I answer, that it consists in both, for not only doth it receive the intelligible species, but al∣so operats upon them. And this is that action of the soule which you deny: and what do you talke of [letting our phantasmes beat at our common sense?] The phantasmes will
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beat whether you will or no. If you will not beleeve me, beleeve your owne dreames in sleep: I suppose your phantasmes then beat, when you could be content they would spare their labour, and be quieter. But so long as the spirits do make their intercourse betweene the phantasie and the common sense, there will be an agitation and beating of the phantasmes. But it seemes, you take the soule and common sense for the same thing, when you say, [that to let the phantasmes beat upon the common sense, is to let them work upon the soule.] They may beat upon the one, and not work upon the other; for the soul suffers not but by it selfe, and her suffering is perfective, not destructive, as that of the matter is. But she doth not worke upon, or deduce her selfe out of possibility into act, considered as the same thing, but in respect of her divers faculties, whereof the one is the efficient, the other the patient, and resembles the matter: and if it were not so, we should never actually understand; for what should excite the passive intellect to receive the species be∣ing purified and cleered from materiality, and those acci∣dents which neither conduce to the essence, nor to the intellection, if there were not an active power, altogether impatible, immateriall, immortall, using neither corporeall organs, nor being mixed with corporeall senses, which we call the active intellect, and which irradiats & illuminats intelligible things, making them actually intelligible, which before were potentially only, as the light makes these co∣lours actually aspectable, which in the dark were invisible?* 5.137
[In the state of a soule exempted from the body there is nei∣ther action nor passion: which being so, the soule cannot die; for all corruption comes from the action of another thing.] This is but a weake argument to prove the soules im∣mortality; for actions and passions do neither hinder
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nor further it. In departed soules there remaine loco-mo∣tive actions, for they move from the body to their ubi, where they remaine till the resurrection, and then they shall move again to their bodies; so the actions of under∣standing and will remaine in them. Shall any then con∣clude that the soules are mortall, because they are the subjects of action, and of passion? but their passion, as I said is perfective. The same actions are in Angels both in moving and removing. Were the Angels that carried Lazarus his soule into Abrahams bosome mortall? or that Angell that carried Habakkuk, because of this action? Are there not also in Angels the actions of intellect and will? Nay, action and passion do rather prove immor∣tality, and the cessation of these, corruption: For, whilst the body is the soules patient, it lives; but when it cea∣seth from suffering, and the soule from acting in it and by it, followes immediatly its corruption. What think you of the first matter which is the first subject of passi∣on, and yet it is eternall à parte post? And if you take a∣way all action and passion from departed soules, you must abridge them of the joyes they have in the fruition of Gods presence, and of their duty in praising him; so you rob God of his honour, and them of their happinesse. Againe, we have shewed that habits remaine in departed soules, but to what end, if there be no action? for, Ha∣bitus est propter actionem; and indeed, actions are more excellent then habits. Againe, if there be neither action nor passion in the departed soules, they are in the state of death, rather then life; for life consisteth in action, though it selfe be no action; and the soule is an act, there∣fore cannot be without action: but death is a cessation and rest from all action. If you had said, that some acti∣ons cease in the soule after her departure, as generation,
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nutrition, and such as are the actions of the whole com∣pound, you had said somewhat; but to exempt her from all action, is to make her a dead body, not a living soule: and though corruption, as you say, [is the effect of acti∣on,] or indeed, rather of passion, yet it will not follow, that all action is the cause of corruption; for there are actions of creation, generation, conservation, &c. Last∣ly, you contradict your selfe, for here you deny actions in separated souls, but in the next Chapter, cap. 11. p. 439. you say, [that the body hinders the soules operations, and that her actions will be far greater and more efficacious, when she shall be free from the burthen of her body.]
[To put forgetfulnesse in a pure spirit, so palpable an effect* 5.138 of corporiety, and so great a corruption, is an unsufferable er∣rour.] I do not think oblivion to be an effect of corporie∣tie; for, as the soul is the subject of memory, which is one of her faculties: of recordation, which is the work of the intellect, viewing over the species: of reminiscence, which is a disquisition or unfolding of the same species, if they be clouded or confused; so likewise is the same soule the subject of oblivion, as the same eye is of sight and blind∣nesse, the same aire of light and darknesse, there being the same subject of habit and privation. Now, there are habits in the soule departed as I have said, some actually there, as the habit of knowledge; some potentially, as in their roote and originall, such are the sensitive habits: where the habit is actually, there is the privation potenti∣ally; but where the habit is potentially, there the privati∣on is actually, as the habits of seeing, hearing, &c. in the separated soule, make it cleere. And what we have said of the habits, we may say of memory, which is a power and faculty in the soule, by which she retaines the species:
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why then may there not be in her a deletion, losse, or abolition of such species, the memory whereof will make her rather miserable then happy? therefore the blessed soules in heaven remember not the vanities nor infirmi∣ties of their former life: if they did, they could not be truly happy and joyfull; and so the oblivion of such things, is not in them [a corruption,] as you say, but a perfection rather. Therefore Albertus Magnus before his death prayed, that he might obtaine the oblivion of all former vaine knowledge, which might hinder his happinesse in the knowledge of Christ.* 5.139
Your Rhetoricall descriptions (which are both uselesse in, and destructive of Philosophy) make the soule some∣times equall with God, sometimes no better then a cor∣ruptible body; for to a separated soule you give those attributes proper to God, [as, freedome of essence, and sub∣sisting in it selfe, a comprehension of place and time, that is of* 5.140 all permanent and successive quantity, and the concurrence of infinite knowledge to every action of hers.] So you give to the soule independency, ubiquity, infinity, which three are Gods due. If you lay the fault of this upon your Rheto∣ricall expressions, I must answer you, that Rhetorick in such a subject may be well spared: use your Rhetorick when you will work upon the affections, but not when you will informe the understanding; for in this regard you do but cloud, not cleere the intellect. Rhetorick is like fire and water, a good servant, but a bad master; therefore ought not to be used, but with great discretion, especial∣ly in abstruse questions: For this cause, Logick was in∣vented, to curb and restraine the exorbitancy of Rhe∣torick. If you will dispute like a Philosopher, you must lay aside Rhetorick, and use Philosophicall termes; other∣wise
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you'l do as the fish Sepia, to wit, you'l so thicken the waters of your discourse, with that liquor that co∣meth out of your mouth, that you will make your selfe invisible, and delude the Reader, which is the fashion of those, who dare not confide in the strength of their argu∣ments; whereas naked truth cares not for such dressings, nor seeks she after such corners. And indeed, you are too much in extremes; for you do not more extol a separated, then you do abase an incorporated soule, as you call it, in saying, [that her being in a body, is her being one thing with the body she is said to be in:] for if she be one thing with the body, she hath the same essence and essentiall proper∣ties of a body, which I beleeve you wil not subscribe to.* 5.141
[Should a soule by the course of nature obtaine her first being without a body, and be perfect in knowledge, she must be a com∣pleat substance, not a soule, whose nature is to acquire perfection by the service of the senses.] 1. You suppose what is not to be supposed; for no soul can obtain her first being by the course of nature. 2. If she did, yet it were not repugnant to her nature to be perfect in knowledge. 3. Perfection in knowledge will not make her a complete substance. 4. Though the soule naturally acquires perfection by the service of the senses, yet that hinders not her bringing in of knowledge with her. Adams soul had perfect know∣ledge, as it was fit, being all the works of God were cre∣ated in their perfection, and Adam was to be the Doctor and instructor of his posterity, and because he was crea∣ted both in the state and place of happinesse, which could not subsist without knowledge; yet Adams soule ceased not therefore to be a soule, or the forme of his materiall body, nor did her knowledge make her a complete sub∣stance; for in her substance she was no more complete then our soules are in our nativity. Neither did that
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knowledge which Adam brought with him, hinder his soule from acquiring, by the service of his senses, a ful∣ler measure of understanding; for hee neither had the knowledge of future contingencies, nor of the secrets of mens hearts, nor of every particular individuum of eve∣ry species, nor of every stone or sand in the world, which belonged nothing to his perfection and happinesse. If you'l say, that Adams soule obtained not her first being by the course of nature, I grant it, nor was it possible she should: but by what course soever you imagine the soule to have her being, shee may bring perfect know∣ledge with her, and yet not cease to be a soule. But when you say, [That no false judgements can remaine in a* 5.142 miserable soule after her departure,] you make the damned soules in hell in farre better condition then wee are here upon earth, who are subject to false judgements, and er∣roneous opinions, even the best of us: but I am not of your mind; for, doubtlesse, false judgements are a part of that punishment which the wicked soules suffer in hell. But if there be no falshood or errour of judgement in them, they must be in this point as happy as Adam was in Paradise.
[If nothing be wanting but the effect, and yet the effect* 5.143 doth not immediately follow, it must needs be, that it cannot follow at all.] This inference will not follow at all; for wee see many effects doe not immediately follow upon the working of the efficient, and yet follow at last. The fire melts not the metall presently, nor the Carpenter builds the house, nor the Sun produces corne, grasse, and fruits immediately, nor doth the Physician presently cure diseases; and yet all these are efficient causes, and actu∣ally work: the effects follow at leasure, and at last, though not immediately. You should doe well to distinguish
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between 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the working or operation, and the work it selfe. When the efficient is not only in its act of entity, but of causality too, there followes im∣mediately operation, but not opus; the working, not the work; the effect in fieri, not in esse. Againe, you must discriminate between voluntary and naturall agents; the one operate freely, the other of necessity. The soule is doubtlesse a voluntary, not a naturall agent; so that the effect may follow, though not immediately. And if in naturall causes the effect followes still immediately, it is where the effect is an essentiall property of the subject flowing immediately from the forme: as, heat from the fire, which notwithstanding produceth not heat immedi∣ately in water, or other subjects. Lastly, if your argu∣ment be good, they are not to blame, who held the eternity of the world: for, they reasoned as you doe, that the cause being eternall, the effect must immediately or eternally follow, or else not follow at all: But they should have knowne, that God was no naturall, but a voluntary agent; and though from eternity hee did actually exist, yet he did not from eternitie actually create: The act of entity in him was eternall, but not the act of causality.
In the conclusion of your discourse you make nature* 5.144 play the Smith; for you say, [If the dull percussion, which, by natures institution, hammereth out a spirituall soule from grosse flesh and bloud, can atchieve so wondrous an effect by such blunt instruments as are used in the contriving of a man; fifty or an hundred yeares time, must forge out in such a soule an excellency above the forme of an abortive embryon.] You may with your Rhetorick as soon perswade me, that Mi∣nerva was hammered out of Iupiters braine, by the per∣cussion of Vulcans hatchet, as that the spirituall soule can by natures institution, or any dull percussion of hers
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be hammered out from grosse flesh and bloud. It is not nature, but the God of nature that is the efficient cause of the soule: It's not natures dull percussion, but Gods active inspiration that is the instrument: It is not flesh and bloud, out of which it is educed, but into which the immateriall soule is introduced. The soule is not framed either in, or of the bodie, by the work of nature; but is inspired by the breath of the Almighty, who in the be∣ginning breathed into Adam the breath of life, and so became a living soule. Nature cannot hammer out such a piece as the soule is, though shee had the help of Vul∣cans Cyclopes,
Brontesque, Steropesque, & nudus membra Pyracmon: She is of too pure a quintessence, and of too sublimated an alloy, to be extracted out of such grosse materialls as flesh and bloud are. After the bodie is articulated, the new created soule is infused, accompanied with her perfecti∣ons, which she receives not from, but communicates to the bodie; and so that rude masse of flesh in the matrix becomes a man: And the same soule which makes him a man, makes him lord over all the workes of Gods hands; by this he subdues the wilde beasts, commands the earth, masters the ocean, measures the heaven, searcheth into the nature of herbs, trees, metalls, mineralls, stones, &c. fore-tells celestiall changes, inventeth arts and sciences, and becomes the lively character and expresse image of the Almighty. Can nature then hammer such a divine essence out of grosse flesh and bloud? It is que∣stioned whether God himselfe can doe it, without im∣plying a contradiction, which is so repugnant to him. Nature indeed extracts the grosse soules of the beasts out of their grosse bodies, which, as they came of them, so they dye with them; but the reasonable soule, being
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1. the act of the bodie, and principle of all vitall opera∣tions: 2. being shee is a spirit, not capable of physicall matter and quantitie; for she is all in all, and all in every part of the bodie: 3. being shee is not onely the first act of the organicall bodie, but also the very agent or effici∣ent of the bodies organisation; therefore shee cannot be materiall, nor hammered out of the matter. 4. If shee were corporeall, either in her being, or in her extracti∣on, the world could not be perfect or complete: for, as it is made up of creatures, some meerly spirituall, some meerly corporeall; so, for the complement and perfection of it, there should be some creatures partly spirituall; partly corporeall; and these are onely men. 5. The effect cannot exceed the cause in perfection and eminencie, but the soule farre exceeds the bodie. 6. Man had not been fit to rule over the corporeall creatures, if hee had not a spirituall soule, which onely is capable of reason and dominion; and not the bodily substance. 7. One species cannot beget another; but the soule is a species of spirits, far different from bodily species. 8. There can be no con∣nexion between the superiour and inferiour creatures, but by certaine media, by which nature passeth from one extreme to another: therefore it was fit, that the spiri∣tuall and corporeall creatures, which are the extremes, should be united in that creature which is partly spiri∣tuall, partly corporeall; and this is onely man. 9. If the soule be not meerly spirituall, she cannot enjoy the visi∣on of, nor friendship and familiarity with God, who is a spirit; nor can she be capable of any spirituall gifts. The Spirit of God cannot dwell but in a spirit; nor can that which is meerly corporeall be like unto God, or see him as he is. 10. If the soules be materiall, they must be mor∣tall; for we have no other reason to induce us to beleeve
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the soules of beasts to be mortall, but because they are materiall, and educed out of the possibility of the matter. 11. As Christ proved the truth of his body, by feeding upon bodily substances, so we prove the spirituality of the soule by her food and delights, which are not cor∣poreall, but spirituall things; for knowledge, wisdome, truth, vertue, honesty, which are incorporeall things, are the soules chiefe delights, next to God, in whom only she rests, and with whom onely she is satisfied. Fecisti* 5.145 nos Domine à te, & inquietum est cor nostrum, nisi requiescat in te. 12. If the soule be of the parents seed, or conveyed with it, the seed must needs be man, and so a reasonable creature, and consequently capable, as being man, of eternall joy or paine. 13. The operations of the soule are spirituall, such as be the actions of understanding and will. The principall then of these operations, which is the soule, cannot be corporeall; for no operation can in dignity of entity exceed the substance whence it ariseth, or the power and facultie of the soule by which she worketh, and which differs from the soule as the property doth from the subject; for as the potentia or facultie receiveth its specification from the act, so the act hath all its dignity from the faculty: now, if the faculty be spirituall, the soule which is its subject cannot be corporeall, for no indivisible quality can be inherent in a divisible subject. And as the faculty re∣ceives its specification from the act, so doth the act from the object, and therefore the act by which we understand spirits, must be spirituall: And, though in the act of con∣ception we may fancie spirits to be like bodies, yet in the act of judgement, we know them to be immateriall sub∣stances, and of a far other nature or essence then bodies; and this act is elevated above the senses, and abstracts
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the spirituall object from all sensible conditions. 14. The soule knows all bodies celestiall, terrestriall, simple, mixed, &c. which she doth by receiving these intelligible ob∣jects: but she could not receive them being corporeall, if she were not free from corporiety her selfe; for Intus existens prohibet contrarium: and she doth not re∣ceive them as the senses doe, to wit, superficially one∣ly, but she pierceth into their inmost natures, search∣eth out their causes, properties, and effects, and yet higher she riseth above the senses, by substract∣ing bodies from individuation, and all sensible acci∣dents, which the senses cannot do; and so she conside∣reth them in their universalities, which is a kind of spi∣rituality: but this she could not do, if she were not spi∣rituall her selfe. 15. As the dissolution or corruption of the body dissolveth not the soule, neither doth the con∣stitution or generation of the body give being to the soul; for if she hath her being from the body, she must decay with the body. 16. Liberty of will proves also the im∣materiality of the soule; for all materiat agents worke either by necessity, as the insensitive; or are led by instinct, as the animat, except man, who is master of his owne actions, and can promote or stay, suspend, and incline them which way he likes best: and in this he comes neere to the Angelicall nature, for, onely Men and Angels have this prerogative of free-will; inferiour creatures want it, because of their materiality, which determinats them to one kind of operation, and so to a necessary working that way; as, for the fire to heat, for a stone to fall down∣ward. But such is the independency, and spirituality of mans soule, that no creature, neither Heavens, Stars, nor Angels, have any power to command or force mans
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will: whereas all materiall entities are subject to muta∣tion, by the influence and working of the superiour agents, to wit, the Angels, and the Heavens. 17. If the intellect or the soule were corporeall, she should be hurt and weak∣ned by a vehement object, as the senses are; to wit, the eye with too much light, the eare with too violent sounds: but no intelligible object, be it never so strong and powerfull, hurts the intellect at all, but perfects it ra∣ther. 18. If the soule were corporeall, it would grow weak and feeble, and by degrees decay, as the body doth by old age; but we see the contrary, for the soule, even when the body is weakest, is most active, and by old age rather perfected then weakned. 19. If the soule were cor∣poreall, entity in its latitude could not be the adequat object of the intellect; for the materiall and organicall fa∣culties are determinated by the matter to some particular objects: onely mans understanding, as likewise that of the Angels, have entity as entity for their object; that is, both uncreated and created, spirituall and corporeall, sub∣stantiall and accidentall entities: which could not be, if the intellect were not spirituall. 20. That this hath been the doctrine of the Church, of Fathers, of Councels, of Philosophers and Poets, is manifest to them, who are con∣versant in their writings: even Aristotle himselfe was of this opinion, though a few passages in him have caused some to doubt. And the Scriptures, lastly, are plaine in this case, which we will not forbeare to alledge, though we deale with a Philosopher: Solomon tels us, that the* 5.146 Spirit returnes to God that gave it. Christ commends* 5.147 〈◊〉 spirit into the hands of his Father. S. Paul sayes, that 〈◊〉 holy Spirit beares witnesse with our spirits: in which* 5.148 places, the word spirit is used, as it is opposite to a corpo∣reall
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substance. Apollinaris of Alexandria indeed held the souls to be corporeal, and Tertullian too, but in that sense that he held God himself to be corporeall, to wit, a true & reall substance, and not imaginary or fictitious. And when we read in Athanasius, Basil, Damascen, and some others, that the soule is a bodily substance, we must know that they speake of her, not as she is in her selfe, but as she is compared to God, to wit, that both soules and Angels are infinitely distant from that purity and excellency which is in the Divine Essence, in comparison of which, they are corporeall and grosse substances. And the more willingly they used to call the soule corporeall, because they would beat downe their heresie, which held the soule to be a part of the Divine Essence; such as were Carpocrates, Cerdon, the Gnosticks, Manichees, and Priscil∣lianists; then which heresie none can be more pernici∣ous, for it makes God changeable and divisible, and the soule altogether immutable, all-sufficient, eternall, omnipotent: these then are two dangerous rocks wee must avoid, to wit, deifying of the soul with the Gnosticks, and incorporating her with the Stoicks. He that holdeth the soule to be Particula divinae aurae, is a Manichee; and he that beleeves the soule to be a body, is a Sadducee: the one is injurious to God, the other to the soule; the one is the scholer of Carpocrates, the other of Cleanthes or Chrysippus, but neither of Christ.
[You will have a soule of fifty or a hundred yeeres standing,* 5.149 to be more excellent then the soule of an Embryon.] All souls are of equall excellency and perfection, as well the soule of an Embryon, as of Aristotle; if you speake of the essen∣tiall or specificall excellency, which is equally communi∣cated to all the singulars or individua of the same species: for there is but one specificall difference by which man,
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and every particular man is distinguished from the beasts, so that one man is not more reasonable then ano∣ther. It is true, that the genus may be more perfect in one species then in another, so man is a more excellent creature then a beast, because the difference of rationali∣ty, which is in man, is more excellent then the irrationali∣ty of beasts: but Peter is not a more excellent man then Paul, because the specificall difference is not more in Peter then in Paul; in respect of some accidentall differences, there may be some inequality, but these concerne no∣thing the nature or essence of man: even so, one soule may have more knowledge, or other accidentall perfecti∣ons then another, in respect of fitter organs, and a better disposed phantasie; otherwise the same essentiall excel∣lencie is equall in all, and the soule of a foole is not lesse excellent then that of Salomon, nor of an Embryon, then of him who hath lived a hundred yeares, except in acci∣dentall perfections, as I have said: for had the Embryons soule the same perfection of organs, and phantasie that the soul of Aristotle had, she would exercise the same organi∣call acts that he did; the same, I say, that immediatly flow from, and depend upon the soule.
[Among the Intelligences, the lowest knows as much as* 5.150 the highest, and yet the knowledge of the highest is infinitely more perfect and admirable then the knowledge of his inferi∣ours.] The neerer any Intelligence is to God, the more perfectly doth he know his will, and the more acquainted he is with his counsels; the neerer he is to that Divine Light, the more illumination he must needs have: but the superiour Intelligences are neerer to God then the in∣feriour, and therefore better acquainted with his coun∣sels. There is a greater measure of knowledge and o∣ther perfections in the superiour, then in the inferiour In∣telligences,
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seeing the inferiour worke by the power of the superiour; and God, who is the God of order, not of con∣fusion, will have a dependency of these inferiour spirits from their Superiours. Secondly, where there is a grea∣ter similitude with God, and a more lively representation of divine excellencies, there must be the greater know∣ledge; but this similitude is greatest in the superiour In∣telligences. Thirdly, where are fewest intelligible species, and more universall, there is a more excellent way of knowledge; but such are the species of the superiour In∣telligences, whereas the inferiour must make use of mul∣titudes of species, which is an imperfection in knowledge. Fourthly, the inferiour Intelligences do not understand so exactly the nature of the superiour, as the superiour doe themselves, therefore their knowledge cannot be so great, as that of the higher Intelligences. Fiftly, can the lowest Intelligence as well understand the nature of that orbe, which the supreme Intelligence moveth, as he him∣selfe that by his understanding moveth it? I deny not but all the Intelligences immediatly behold the Divine Es∣sence, yet not all in the same measure and perfection: we looke upon the same Sun that Eagles do, but much more weakly then they; therefore doubtlesse the inferiour In∣telligences must in knowledge yield to the superiour, who know things both sooner, and more exactly: sothat what is revealed immediatly by God to the superiour, is com∣municated by them to the inferiour Intelligences. But whereas you make [the knowledge of these spirits equall, and yet the knowledge of the highest infinitely more perfect and admirable,] is to me an admirable riddle; for, can there be in equality an infinite inequality? this is one of your contradictions, and none of the least: If their know∣lege be equall, it must be infinitely perfect in both, or
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else it is not equall: besides, you must grant, there may be two infinits; which cannot be, because there must be something in the one which is not in the other, or else they cannot be discriminated; but there can be no infi∣nitude where there is a defect.
I like not your phrase [of a complete soule, completed in* 5.151 its body;] for the soule receives no completion or per∣fection in or from the bodie, but shee brought it with her. You should rather say, that shee is incomplete in the bodie, because she becomes a part of the compositum, and every part is incomplete. She was complete before she in∣formed the bodie, and she will be complete after she hath forsaken the bodie: Complete, I say, in her entitie, whe∣ther it be of essence or existence; and complete in her knowledge too: for wee know but in part here, and in aenigmate. The souls of beasts have their completion from those bodies whence they have their originall, without which bodies they have no subsistence; but mans soule gives subsistence to the compositum, whereof the bodie is a part: so that the soule receives no more completion in or by the bodie, then an exquisite Musician hath in or by his Lute. The soule, being separated, ceaseth to in∣forme the bodie; but doth not therefore cease to be com∣plete, no more then a Lutenist ceaseth to be a Musician, when he layes aside his Lute.
You will have us [to supply what is wanting, before wee* 5.152 are called to our dreadfull account: which is soon done, if we be what our nature dictateth us to be; if we follow but reason and knowledge, our wants are supplied, our accounts are made up.] Wee shall make but a sorry account, if wee follow such guides as our owne nature, reason, and knowledge: These are blind guides, which will lead us into the ditch. The Scripture tells us, that the naturall man comprehendeth
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not the things of Gods Spirit, neither can he: That our* 5.153 naturall wisdome is enmity against God; for it cannot be* 5.154 subject to the Law of God. Of our selves wee cannot* 5.155 thinke a good thought, as of our selves. Our foolish* 5.156 hearts are darkned. Our understanding is darkned. Wee* 5.157 were sometimes darknesse. The light shined in darknesse,* 5.158 but the darknesse comprehended it not. There is none* 5.159 * 5.160 that understandeth, none that seeketh after God. Wee are* 5.161 stiffe-necked and of uncircumcised hearts, and have al∣waies resisted the holy Ghost. Evill trees cannot bring* 5.162 forth good fruit. Our hearts are perverse and deceitfull* 5.163 above all things. The imaginations of the thoughts of* 5.164 mans heart are onely evill continually. Wee are by na∣ture* 5.165 dead in our sins and trespasses. What guides were reason, nature and knowledge to the Iewes, when Christ would have gathered them, as the hen gathers her chic∣kens* 5.166 under her wings, and they would not? What fruit can wilde olives, or withered vine-branches bring out, if* 5.167 the one be not inserted into the true and naturall olive; the other into the true Vine? Doe men gather grapes of* 5.168 thistles, or figs of thornes? If God had not opened the heart of Lydia, her owne reason and nature had never opened it. God must give us a heart to understand, and* 5.169 eyes to see, and eares to heare. Hee must take away our stony hearts, and give us hearts of flesh, that wee may walk* 5.170 in his statutes, and keep his judgements. He must give us his Law, and write it in our hearts. And indeed, he must* 5.171 give us ipsum velle, even Will it selfe; for, as by nature our understandings are darkned, so our wills are perver∣ted, our affections, inclinations, thoughts and desires are all depraved. If nature and reason had been good guides, man, who was made upright, had not found out to him∣selfe so many inventions, as Solomon complaines. Cain's
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posteritie had not fallen from the true Church; nor had the posteritie of Noah, by Cham and Iaphet, nay, by Sem too, fallen into idolatry. Why did God communicate his will by tradition before, and by writ after the Law; nay, oftentimes by miraculous and extraordinary waies, if mans reason and naturall knowledge had been good guides? And how can these be but deceitfull guides in supernaturall things, which faile us even in the causes of things meerly naturall? Therefore that saying, Naturam ducem sequi optimum, is not true in supernaturall things, nor altogether sure, as I said, in naturall. The ship of mans soule will split against the rocks of errour, if shee have no better helme to steere by, then the helme of rea∣son. Reason is not the Starre that will bring us to Bethle∣hem, nor the cloud and firie-pillar that will conduct us to Canaan. We must deny our selves, if we follow Christ. And what is that, but to abandon nature, and naturall reason in the things that concerne Christ? Peter had rea∣son and nature, when he bid Christ, speaking of his death, have a care of himselfe; but how Christ took him up for it, you know. There was as much nature, reason and knowledge in the great Rabbies, as in the poore ignorant Fisher-men, yet these followed Christ, and forsook all; so did not the others. The young Lawyer had too much nature and reason, which hindered him from, not furthe∣red him to Christ. And truly, the Gentile Philosophers ac∣knowledged, that reason was oftentimes clouded and en∣slaved to fear, anger, love, and other passions; even so in us all, what was straight, is become crooked; and what was alive, is dead: Wee are dead, saith the Apostle, in sinne; what reason can be expected from a dead man? I know this is but a similitude, yet it sufficiently proves, that un∣till Christ hath spiritually quickned us, our reason and
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nature will little availe us. Our hearts are by nature bar∣ren, as the mountains of Gilboa; fruitlesse, as the fig-tree in the Gospel; untame, as the wilde colt, or the wilde asse, that scornes the voice of the hunter: and all this is naturall to us. If Lycurgus his dogge had not had more then na∣ture, when he forsook the flesh-pot, to run after the Hare, hee would have staid at home with his fellow, which had nothing but nature. And even the Schoole-men ac∣knowledge, that nature is wounded in us; to wit, our un∣derstanding with ignorance, our wills with wickednesse, our irascible faculty with weaknesse, our concupiscible with lust. You had done well then not to have named these guides, which, like ignis fatuus, will bring us out of the way. You should have named him, who is the onely* 5.172 way, the truth, and the life, without whom wee can doe nothing, as he saith himselfe; and without whom there* 5.173 is no coming to the Father. 'Tis hee who first opened heaven to all beleevers; who is the doore, by whom wee enter: and the key of David too, who openeth, and no man shuts; shutteth, and no man openeth. The bright morning-starre, the Sun of righteousnesse, the ladder of Ia∣cob, upon the steps or degrees of whose merits and gra∣ces, wee may climb up to heaven. The true brasen Ser∣pent, by looking on whom we are cured of our spirituall wounds. If then by nature you had meant God, who is Natura naturans: If by reason, you had meant Christ, who is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the reason or word of the Father, whose service* 5.174 is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a reasonable service: If by knowledge you had meant that which is in Christ, by which he justifieth* 5.175 many, & in respect of which he is called the Wisdome of the Father; for in him are hid all the treasures of wis∣dome and knowledge: Or, had you meant that which wee have of Christ by illumination, and in respect of
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which, the Apostle accounted all things lost, desiring to know nothing but Christ crucified: If, I say, you had meant such guides, I had approved of your judgement, and I had been your fellow-traveller; for, indeed, by these onely [our wants are supplied, and our accounts made up:] And in this respect naturam sequi, est Deo obsequi.
The Conclusion, wherein is asserted the Soules Immortality, and Objections answered.
THus, Sir Kenelme, I have briefly run over your vo∣luminous Discourses of the nature of Bodies, and of the Soules immortalitie; in which, though you have shewed much wit and good language, yet your argu∣ments and descriptions of the Soule are not of that evi∣dence and validitie (which I have shewed) as to con∣vince our understanding, and to vindicate our beliefe in assenting to all your dictats in this your laborious Work: therefore give mee leave, without prejudice to your paines, to point briefly at such reasons and arguments, as I conceive will be more evincing and pressing, and more prevalent, both with Christians and Pagans, then those which you have imparted to us.
1. We will first then begin with divine Testimony, which is of greater authority then all humane capacity. God tells Moses, Exod. 3. that he is the God of Abra∣ham, Isaac, and Iacob; by which words our Saviour proves the soules immortalitie, in affirming, that God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, Matth. 22. and consequently, that these were not dead, but alive in their soules. Solomon tells us, Eccles. 12. that the spirit returnes
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to God that gave it. The Scripture tells us, that Samuel's soule was alive after her separation, 2 Sam. 28. which place, though it be controverted, whether it was truly Samuel's soule or not; yet that apparition which was be∣leeved by the Iewes, shewes, that they doubted not of the soules immortalitie. Christ tells us of Lazarus his soule, that was carried by Angels into Abraham's bo∣some, and the rich Gluttons into hell, Luke 16. Hee tells us also of that rich mans soule, which, after his barnes were full, was to be taken from him, Luke 12. But if she perished with the bodie, how could she be taken away? Hee assures the good thiefe, that his soule should be with him that night in Paradise, Luke 23. And hee will not have us feare them that can destroy the bodie, but can∣not kill the soule, Matth. 10. by which he intimates, that the soule is not liable to death, as the bodie is.
2. Wee prove it by arguments grounded on the Scri∣pture: as first, The soule of Christ was immortall, when it was separated: therefore our soules are so. The con∣sequence is evident, because Christ was like to us in all things, except sin: The antecedent no Christian will de∣ny, except he will deny the hypostaticall union of the Di∣vinitie and the Humanitie, which was not, nor could not be dissolved by death; for the Divinitie was not sepa∣rated from Christs bodie in death, much lesse from his soule, to which it was immediately united. 'Tis true, Christs bodie died, because the soule was separated, by which the Divinity gave life to the bodie, to wit, ef∣fectively, not formally; but God, being united immedi∣ately and principally to the soule, shee could not die. And though God hath not so united our soules to him∣selfe, as he did Christs, yet hee is so neerly united to our spirituall soules, being a spirit himselfe, that they cannot
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die, except hee should forsake them, which hee will not doe; for he will not leave our soules, nor forsake them, nor suffer them to see corruption. Secondly, man was made to the image of God, Gen. 1. which image consist∣eth partly in hyperphysicall graces, as righteousnesse, and true holinesse; and partly in five physicall gifts: 1. under∣standing, 2. will, 3. dominion, 4. liberty, 5. immortality. Thirdly, mans soule was not educed out of the earth and water, as the soules of other creatures were, but imme∣diately inspired by God, Genes. 1. by which it is plaine, that the soule of man is of a farre more excellent condi∣tion and nature, then the soules of beasts are; and that shee hath immediate dependence from God, not from the bodie: therefore not mortall. Fourthly, if the soule die with the bodie, there can be no resurrection; and so* 5.176 our hope and faith are in vaine. Now, there can be no resurrection of the bodie, if the soule, its forme, be not pre-existent: For how can the soule be re-united to the bodie, or informe it againe, if it be extinguished with the bodie? Fifthly▪ the Kingdome of Christ, the joyes and* 5.177 happinesse of the Saints, and the torments of the wicked are eternall: therefore the soules of men, which are the subjects of Christs Kingdome, and the inheritors of joy or paine, cannot be mortall; for what subjects shall this eternall King have, or to what end are the rewards and punishments eternall, if the soules, which are the chiefe subjects, and chiefly interessed in these rewards and paines, perish and die? Sixthly, Moses shewes, that the Sun, Moon, and Stars of heaven were made for the ser∣vice of man, Deuteron. 4. which argueth, that man is of a more excellent nature then they. Now, this could not be, if he were not spirituall and immortall in his soule; for in his bodie hee is inferiour to them, in regard
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they are incorruptible, and unchangeable substan∣ces.
3. We prove that the soule is not onely immortall by Divine power, but also of her owne nature. First, she is made to the image of God, but this image, as I have shewed, consisteth not onely in supernaturall graces, but also in naturall powers and faculties of the soule. Se∣condly, the soule is a spirit of her owne nature, there∣fore of her owne nature immortall; for spirits are free from the prime qualities, which are the causes of corrup∣tion. Thirdly, the soule is a simple uncompounded sub∣stance, therefore cannot be corruptible; for, how can that be dissolved which was never compounded? And though Tertullian held the materiality, yet he acknow∣ledgeth* 5.178 the soules immortality to be naturall to her, Salva erit anima natura sua per immortalitatem. Fourthly, if the soule were not in her selfe immortall, how should the Heathen Philosophers who knew not God, nor the Scriptures, dispute so accurately as they do in defence of her incorruptibility? But when I say that the soule is im∣mortall by nature, my meaning is not that she is the ef∣ficient cause of her owne immortality, or that she is not mortall and dissoluble by externall power, for so God is onely immortall, as the Apostle sheweth, and as the sixt* 5.179 Synod hath defined, and some Fathers have proved; so that the Angels in this respect are not immortall: but my meaning is, that the soule is not a subject capable as bodies are, neither hath she in her selfe any passive power or possibility of dissolution.
4. The soules immortality is proved by naturall and morall reasons, thus: 1. If the soule perish, it must be either by annihilation, or dissolution: not by the first na∣turally,
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for nothing of its owne nature can be annihila∣ted: God indeed by his omnipotency may annihilate what he made of nothing, but there is no entity of it selfe ca∣pable of non-entity, nor any action tending to it natu∣rally: Neither by the second, for nothing is dissolved but what had parts, (dissolution being nothing else but the so∣lution of one part from another) but what is not compoun∣ded hath no parts, and such is the soule, as I have shew∣ed: For she is independent, as she is a substance, from any subject: as she is a spirit, from any created substance; there∣fore dieth not when the body dieth: for neither is she compounded of essentiall parts, which we call matter and forme; nor of integrall, which we call members or limbs: And hence it appeares, that though the soules of beasts may be free from such compositions, yet they are not from dependence on the body, of which they came, and with which they decay. 2. The soule is a quintes∣sence, and of a more excellent nature then the foure ele∣ments are; and therefore as she is not of their nature and substance, she cannot be capable of their affections and properties: but the maine quality and property of ele∣ments is to be the subjects of generation and corrupti∣on. 3. Such as the operation of a thing is, such is the sub∣ject whence the operation proceeds, for operations are emanations of the substance, and flow from thence: but the chiefe operation of the soule, which is understanding, is spirituall; therefore the soule cannot be corporeall: for, if the soul were compounded of the elements, these operations of the soule must be in the elements; for what∣soever is in the compound, was before in its principles, these being their acts, whose principles they are: but understanding and will were never in the elements, nor are
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they capable of such operations: and so the soule is im∣mortall as she is incorporeall. 4. If the soule may be annihilated naturally, then naturally she was produced of nothing; but such a production is repugnant to the Peri∣patetick tenents, and so, by consequence, must such an an∣nihilation be. 5. Whatsoever is corruptible, is corrupted or destroyed by a contrary agent, for without contrariety there can be neither generation nor corruption: But in mans soule there are no contrarieties, for she can receive contrarieties without contrariety, because she receives not contrary formes as they are in their naturall, but as they are in their intentionall being: Hence it is that the hea∣vens, though they be compounded, are not corruptible, be∣cause they are not subject to contrarieties. 6. The Gen∣tiles, by the glimmering light of Nature, knew there were some supreme entities, by which the world was guided, the wicked punished, and the innocent rewarded; which the Poet acknowledgeth:
Si genus humanum, & mortalia temnitis arma;
At sperate deos memores fandi atque nefandi.
But they saw, that for the most part, wicked men enjoyed most outward happinesse here, and good men were most wronged and oppressed; therefore they beleeved the soules immortality, that wicked men might receive their due punishment, and good men their reward, or else they must confesse that their gods were unjust. And as this reason did strongly move them, so it must us also, to beleeve the soules immortality: for it is a righteous thing with God, to render vengeance to the wicked, and* 5.180 to you that are afflicted peace with us, saith the Apostle. 7. It is an undeniable Maxime, that God and Nature made nothing in vaine; but if there should be in mans soule
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such a desire, and so earnest an affection to immortality, and yet not enjoy it, that desire which God hath given to her had been in vaine. 8. From what proceeds the horrour of conscience in wicked men, their trembling at the report, and serious thoughts of future judgement? on the other side, the unspeakable joyes of good men, their cheerefulnesse, comforts, and alacrity, even in their paines and afflictions, if they did not beleeve the soules immor∣tality, and that after this life all teares should be wiped from their eyes? 9. God made man for some end, and that was to enjoy eternall beatitude, which consisteth in the enjoyment of himselfe: but if the soule be mortall, man cannot attaine to his end, and so God made him to no end. 10. In extasies and raptures, though the body be without sense and motion, and seemes as it were dead; yet the soule is not, but remaines unperished, or unextin∣guished: which doth argue her immortality. 11. If the soule were mortall as the body is, she would grow aged, feeble, and would decay, as the body doth; but we see the quite contrary, for then she is most active and vigo∣rous, when the body is most weake and decrepit. 12. If the soule be corruptible, she may be separated from her existence and being: now this cannot be done, but by the worke of an externall and contrary agent, which is more powerfull then the soule; but no contrary agent abolisheth one forme, but by introducing another; nor ta∣keth away one existence, but by giving another: for no action tends to a negative, but to some thing that is posi∣tive. 13. The Gentiles, by the light of nature, beleeved the immortality of the soule; hence sprung the doctrine of transanimation among the Pythagoreans, of the Elysian fields, and places of torment among the Poets,
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Hac iter Elysium nobis, at laeva malorum* 5.181
Exercet poenas, & ad impia tartara mittit.
Hence Tully concludes, that the ancient Romans beleeved the soules immortality, because they were so carefull of their dead bodies, and funerall ceremonies; Tam re∣ligiosa* 5.182 jura majores nostri mortuis non tribuissent, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, &c. So Homer acknowledgeth* 5.183 the soule of Patroclus to live, appearing after his death to Achilles: The word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by him, and imago by the Prince of Poets, is much used for separated soules, as—Inhumati venit imago,—Nota major imago,—Sub* 5.184 terras ibit imago, &c. The barbarous Indians assent to the soules immortality, as Acosta, Lerius, Martyr, and others do witnesse: and Aristotle, who in some places seemes* 5.185 to doubt, yet in other places plainly asserts this doctrine so universally beleeved, that the soules can subsist by themselves, because they have distinct affections and ope∣rations from the body, and the understanding or intellect enters from without into the body; it is void of passibili∣ty, and is some divine thing; and that the actions of the mind are not one with those of the body; and so in the ninth and tenth Chapters of his Ethicks, we may see how he affirmes the immortality of the soule, by her desire of beatitude. And whereas some think that he held the soule mortall, because he saith, she depends on the phantasie in her operation; they are mistaken, for he speaks of the soule as she is united to the body, and so she depends on the Phantasie; but yet onely objectively, instrumentally, and occasionally, as the Philosophers speake, and not efficiently or formally; for it is true, that the In∣tellect receives its species from the phantasie, and therefore in the body depends antecedently from the phantasie:
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otherwise the Intellect is meerly inorganicall, and no waies depending on the phantasie, as a proper mover, and of it self, but onely the passive Intellect thus depends on the active, and the act of understanding is altogether in∣dependent: And so when he sayes, that the passive Intel∣lect is corruptible, he meanes nothing else but the phan∣tasie or cogitative faculty, which, because it is in some sort capable of reason, he cals the Intellect, as he cals the pas∣sive Intellect sometimes by the name of phantasie, because it is moved by the superiour Intellect. And so when he sayes, that remembrance and love perish in the soule, he meanes that their dependence, the one from the phanta∣sie, the other from the appetite, perisheth, because these are corporeall faculties, and perish with the body; but otherwise recordation and love, in respect of their entity, remaine in the soule as in their subject. So likewise when he saith, that the Intellect is in the possibility of the mat∣ter, he meanes that it is in the possibility of the matter in respect of introduction, not of eduction; as the matter is capable to receive it, when by a superiour power it is thither induced. The soule then is in the possibility of the matter by way of reception, but not by way of extracti∣on. So likewise, when he sayes, that the dead are not hap∣py, he meanes the happinesse of this life, which con∣sisteth in operations flowing from the compositum, of which the soule is not capable. And lastly, when he sayes, that all have ending which had beginning, he meanes of those things which had beginning by gene∣ration; and so it is true: but the soules originall is by creation.
Out of all then that wee have said, it is apparent to any man, who is not a wilfull Saducee or Arabian, that
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the soule is every way incorruptible, both in respect of grace, and in respect of nature; both in respect of exter∣nall and internall agents, both in respect of annihilation and dissolution. There is onely an obedientiall power of dissolution in the soule, as there is in Angels, and in the heavenly bodies, by the infinite power of the Almighty; and that rather by the negative act of his influx, then any positive act of resolving that into nothing, which he made of nothing: so that the soule hath no parts, prin∣ciples, or causes in her selfe of corruption, nor of annihila∣tion. Such reasons and arguments I take to be more e∣vincing, then these far-fetched notions of Sir Kenelm's, which he hath clothed with too many words; whereas Philosophicall arguments sort not well with Rhetoricall flourishes, and Tullian pigments.
Now let us see what hath of old been, or can of late be objected against this knowne and generally acknow∣ledged truth, by the impugners thereof.* 5.186
First they say, that the soule is immortall by grace, not by nature: To which I answer, that shee is immor∣tall by both; by grace, in that the soule hath her depen∣dence from God, the first and sole independent entitie, of whom, and by whom she is what she is, and so by that entitie, as I said, shee may be deprived of that being, which of his bounty she obtained: for, though she be free from subject and termination, yet she is not free from the causality of the first agent. Shee is also immortall by na∣ture, in that there is nothing either in her owne, or in the universall created nature, that can destroy or dissolve her. Our bodies are destroyed either by externall agents, or by internall; the naturall heat wasting our radicall moisture, as a candle that is either wasted by the wind, or by its
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owne heat: but in the soule, which is a spirit, there is no such thing.
Secondly, they alledge Solomons words for them, Ec∣cles.* 5.187 3. 19. where hee saith, There is one end of man and beasts; as man dieth, so doe they. Answ. Here is no comparison between mans soule, and that of beasts; but between the death of the one, and of the other: so that both are lyable to death and corruption, and to outward violence, and inward distempers, which procure death in both: and both are so lyable to the law and dominion of death, that from thence there is no redemption or re∣turning by the course of nature: So that it's no more possible for man to avoid death, or its dominion, of him∣selfe, then it is for a beast. Secondly, Solomon speakes not this in his owne person, but in the person of the Atheist, who will not forgo his earthly pleasures, be∣cause hee beleeves not any heavenly, or any life after this.
Thirdly, they would make Iob plead for them, when* 5.188 he sayes, there is more hope of a tree cut downe, then there is of man, Iob 14. Answ. Iob speakes not there in his owne person, but in the person of a wicked man. Se∣condly, though hee did speak this as from himselfe, yet this will not availe our moderne Saducees; for, by the course of nature, man cannot revive againe, though the tree may sprout again after it is cut: which the Poet in∣timates, when he sayes,
Pomifer autumnus fruges effuderit, & mox* 5.189 Bruma recurret iners:
Damna tamen celeres reparant coelestia Lunae. Nos ubi decidimus
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Quò pius Aenaeas, quò Tullus dives, & Ancus, Pulvis & umbra sumus.
Thirdly, man shall not returne againe to live that life, or to performe those functions which he did in this world, when he lived here: but hence it will not follow, that man shall not be raised by that power which gave him being at the first: or, that he shall enjoy no life, because he shall not enjoy this life.
Fourthly, they would faine draw in Austin to their* 5.190 side, because sometimes he doubts of the manner of the soules production, whether it is by creation or traducti∣on. Answ. 'Tis true, that sometimes hee doubted of the manner how the soule entered into the bodie, because he doubted of the manner how originall sin is propagated: but will this prove, that therefore hee doubted of the soules immortalitie, which hee strongly maintaines throughout all his Workes? And so hee doth also the soules creation and infusion, although in a few places he speaks doubtfully of traduction, so farre as it hath rela∣tion to originall fin; which notwithstanding is propaga∣ted, though the soule be pure which is infused, by rea∣son of the union betwixt the soule and the bodie: for ori∣ginall sin is in the parent, as in the efficient; in the seed, as in the instrument; in the soule, as in the subject; but in the flesh by way of punishment▪ or rather indeed the whole man is the subject of originall sin, which, with the soule, is convayed from the parent to the childe by, and in the seed; but onely dispositivè, not effectivè; by disposing and preparing the embryo to receive the soule, and not by way of efficiencie, producing the soule: and so, upon the infusion of a pure soule into the prepared and disposed embryo, the whole man is made up, who be∣comes
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the subject of originall sin, by reason of the union of the soule and corrupted flesh; and in that hee is the is∣sue of such a parent, the branch of such a stocke, which hath derived corruption in and by the seed, and fitted or disposed the bodie to receive a soule, though pure in it selfe, yet upon the union impure and corrupted, and even in it selfe actually void of originall righteousnesse, and inclinable or potentially subject to guilt or sin. As a leprous father begets a leprous son, which leprosie is not in the seed actually, but potentially and dispositivè; so the privation of righteousness is in the seed actually, but con∣cupiscence, or inclination to sin, dispositivè.
Fifthly, they tell us, that mans soule cannot conceive* 5.191 any thing, yea not a spirit, but under the notion of a bo∣die; therefore shee is corporeall, and consequently mor∣tall. Answ. Though shee were corporeall, yet is shee not therefore mortall; for, the Sun, Moone and Stars are bo∣dies, and yet incorruptible. Secondly, though the soul, being in the bodie, understands by the outward senses and phantasie, yet the act of understanding is inorgani∣call, and that not onely when she is separated, but while shee is in the bodie: though then in the bodie she stands in need of the phantasie, without the bodie shee shall not need it. Thirdly, the soule not onely understands bodies under materiall notions, but searcheth deeper then any corporeall facultie can do, even into the natures, formes, and abstruse principles of bodies; so that here shee un∣derstands the quiddities and essences of things, which a bodily power cannot doe.
Sixthly, they say, that the soule can suffer, to wit, by* 5.192 griefe, paine, &c. therefore shee is corruptible. Answ. As the soule is a spirit, so her sufferings are spirituall: all
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suffering supposeth not corruptibilitie, except it be caused by the prime elementary qualities, of which the soule is not capable. Secondly, there are some sufferings so far from being destructive, that they are rather conservative and perfective; such are the motions of the heavens. Thirdly, the soule suffers not, but by her selfe in griefe: for by her owne agencie she makes her selfe a patient; by her thoughts and knowledge of griefe and sorrowes shee grieves and sorrowes, and so becomes a sufferer.
Seventhly, they tell us, that immaterialitie is no ar∣gument* 5.193 of the soules immortalitie; for spirituall graces, which are infused into us, are immateriall, yet corrupti∣ble. Answ. These graces are accidents; we speake of the soule, which is a substance. Secondly, these graces are not corrupted by us physically, but metaphorically, or mo∣rally onely.
Eighthly, the desire of immortalitie, say they, is the* 5.194 affection of the whole man, not of the soule alone, and yet man is mortall: therefore they will not have us in∣ferre the soules immortalitie, from her desire thereof. Answ. Though this desire be subjectively in the whole man, yet it is originally in the soule. Secondly, it is a good argument to prove, that something is immortall in man, though not all, because he so earnestly desires im∣mortality. Thirdly, this desire is in man onely, and not in beasts; which shewes, that he, not they, hath an im∣mortall soule. Fourthly, though the beasts strive to preserve their naturall being, yet man onely aimes at a supernaturall being, as having a more divine knowledge and appetite then other creatures are capable of. Fifth∣ly, how much man desires immortalitie, is plaine by the many pyramides, obelisks, triumphant arches, mausolets,
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brasse, and marble statues, prodigious palaces, bookes, and other monuments; for which who would care, if hee thought his soule should perish with the beasts?
Ninthly, mans understanding perisheth after death;* 5.195 therefore the soule cannot be immortall. Answ. Though the act of understanding did cease, yet the power re∣maines, and consequently the soule, the subject of that power. for actually wee understand not many things here, by reason of some defect in the organs; yet the soule ceaseth not therefore to be, nor the faculty of un∣derstanding to be none. Secondly, the soule doth actu∣ally understand, and more excellently, being separated, then shee did in the bodie; because not onely doth shee retaine the species which shee carried out with her, but also shee receiveth an addition of new species, by divine illumination. Thirdly, though shee understands now by the phantasie, yet hereafter, by reason of new illumina∣tion, shee shall need neither phantasie, externall object, nor any corporeall organ. Fourthly, the knowledge which the soule shall have after death, shall be naturall to the soule, though it proceed from God; for he is the author both of naturall and supernaturall light.
These are the chiefe weapons, by which the Soules* 5.196 Antagonists strive to wound and kill her; which are of no more validity to hurt her, then that dart, which old feeble King Priamus flung at Pyrrhus, was able to hurt him:
—telum imbelle sine ictu
Conjecit, summo quod protinus aere pependit.
These arguments make a sound, but have no strength: These Arabian Pigmies will never be able with such en∣gines to overthrow the soules immortalitie, which is the
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strong Fort and Citadell of every good Christian in his afflictions. Let there be but way given to this doctrine of the Saducees, wee must bid farewell to lawes and civi∣lity, nay, to Religion and Christianity. We must bid adieu to vertuous actions▪ and to all spirituall comforts. Christ died, the Apostles laboured, the Martyrs suffered, but all in vaine, if the soule be mortall. Our faith, our hope, our preaching and reading, our restraint from pleasures, our sorrowing for sins, our taking up of our crosse, and fol∣lowing of Christ, is all in vaine, if the soule be mortall: And, in a word, wee Christians are of all men the most miserable, if the soule be mortall. Why did Abel offer sacrifice, Abraham forsake his countrie, Ioseph forbeare his mistresse, Moses refuse the pleasures of Pharaoh's Court? And why have so many thousands endured mockings, scourgings, bonds, prisonment, stoning, hewing asunder, murthering by the sword? Why would they wander up and downe in sheeps skins and in goats skins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented, if the soule be mor∣tall? What needs Cain feare to kill his brother, Ioseph to lye with his mistresse, Saul to persecute the Church, and Felix to tremble at the mention of a future judge∣ment, if the soule be mortall? Admit but such Lucreti∣an doctrine, you may shake hands with heaven and hell.
Esse aliquos Maneis, & subterranea regna,* 5.197
Et contum, & Stygio ranas in gurgite nigras,
At{que} unâ transire vadum tot millia cymbâ,
Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum are lavantur.
Here I had ended, but that I have now lighted on a* 5.198 Pamphlet by chance, the Scribler of which was ashamed
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to put to his name, his cause is so bad. He undertakes to prove the soules mortalitie, but so weakly, that I should lose too much time, and spend too much pa∣per to answer him according to his folly: For there is nothing in it but the froth of a luxurious wit, wanton∣ly abusing Scripture, and obtruding a cloud in stead of Iuno, shadowes of reason in stead of solid argu∣ments: As first, when hee will prove the death of the soule out of Scripture, hee brings those places that speake of the metaphoricall or spirituall death of the soule, which is the defiling of her by sinne, and her separation from God; and so hee confounds the life of nature, of grace, and of glory, as he doth death spirituall and corporall. Secondly, hee abuseth the Synecdochicall speeches in Scripture, when he will have those phrases which are spoken of man, to bee un∣derstood of the soule and bodie dis-junctively: And so, when the Scripture speakes of mans dissolution and death, hee will have the soule die as well as the bodie; but by this meanes hee must affirme, that the soule eates, drinkes, playes, sings, weeps, because these things are spoken of men. What? were the soules of the Egyptians drowned in the red sea, and the soules of the Chaldeans burned in the fiery fornace, or the soule of the disobedient Prophet torne by the Lion, because these men died such deaths? Many things are spoken of the whole man, but not wholly: the totall compositum is the subject of such predicati∣ons, but not totally. Christ died, was buried, was borne, was crucified; and yet his Divinity suffered none of these things. Hee is a bad Divine, that knowes not, that by the communication of properties, that is spoken
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of the person of Christ, which is proper onely to either of his natures; and so that is spoken of man, which is proper onely to either of his essentiall parts. Thirdly, he confounds the act and the ha∣bit, concluding that the habit is lost, because the act ceafeth; as that there is no habit or faculty of rea∣son in a mad man, because the act of reasoning is hindered: As if you should say, that a Musician hath lost his skill in Musick, when he ceaseth to play. Fourthly, some old objections hee hath inser∣ted, which wee have already sufficiently answe∣red; and the rest of the passages in his Pamphlet are so frivolous, that they are not worth the answering, or reading: for, Magno conatu, magnas nugas dicit. And so, he that shall diligently read this former Discourse of ours, and shall make use of these foure Observations which now I have set downe, will find that this irreligious Rapsodie of his, is but froth, a vapour, or one of his dreames,
Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima somno:* 5.199
and which I thinke will little prevaile with any ra∣tionall man, much lesse with him who is truly san∣ctified with grace. For he that was led meerely by reason, confessed, that the fatall houre of death was the last houre to the body onely, not to the soule. Decretoria illa hora, non est animo suprema sed corpori.* 5.200 For, even reason will teach us, that the soule, which in her selfe is immortall, (I exclude not here the generall, but the speciall or miraculous concourse
Page 126
of the Almighty,) may naturally subsist by her self after separation; for if her subsistence from the body were violent, then her returne to the body should be naturall; as, if the holding of a stone in the aire be violent, the falling downe of that stone, up∣on the removing of the impediment, must needs be naturall: But her returning to the body, is an not miraculous, and of supernaturall power; for though the soule, as she is the forme of the body, hath a naturall propensity, or innate appetite to a re∣informing of, or re-union with the body, yet is she not againe conjoyned with the body, but by a spe∣ciall and supernaturall worke of God in the resur∣rection. Neither againe must we thinke that the soule subsists after separation, by any speciall or supernaturall power, for then we shall make the soule so subsisting, of no better metall then the yron so swimming on the water, both being sustained not by their owne, but by a speciall and miraculous power; and by this meanes the soule of a dog may as well subsist after death, as the soule of a man: but he that thinks so, that the soule hath no other being after this life, may be in name a Christian professor, but is indeed a Cynick Philosopher, or Epicuri de grege porcus, fitter to dwell in the Isle of dogs, then among men. Therefore, as it was natu∣rall for the childs soule to subsist in the mothers wombe, and it is as naturall for the same soule to subsist without it; so is the subsistence of the same soule in and without the body essentiall and naturall to her, and not violent or supernaturall.
Page 127
But, to leave these men, whose soules are fitter* 5.201 to dwell with Nebuchadnezzars in a beasts body, then in their owne; I will conclude this Discourse with an acknowledgement and confession of that solace, and true comfort which I take in these dis∣mall and calamitous times in which we live, from the consideration of my soules immortality; that, however she be now tossed upon the proud and lofty billowes of the turbulent sea of afflictions in this life, with Noahs Arke, yet a higher mountaine then those of Ararat is prepared for her to rest upon; and however this weary Dove flutter upon these boysterous waters, that she can find no rest for the soales of her feet, yet she sees a window in that cele∣stiall Arke which is above, ready open to receive her. Christ hath not in vaine gone to prepare a place for us; he hath prepared it, that we may enjoy it: and to what end should he shed his blood for our soules, and redeeme them at so deare a rate, if they be mortall, and can not enjoy that which they long after, as earnestly as the Hart brayeth after the rivers of water? Doth God mock us, when by his Prophet he tels us of fulnesse of joy in his pre∣sence, and at his right hand pleasures for ever∣more? Is God our Father, and Heaven our Inhe∣ritance, and must we be put off from the enjoy∣ment of either? We are here miserable Pilgrims and strangers, if, after our tedious journey, we have no other home to rest in but a cold and stinking grave, and no other companions but wormes: bet∣ter is the condition of beasts, then of Christians. Sure∣ly
Page 128
the place of our future rest should not be called the Land of the living, if our soules there must die. And why should the Angels be so carefull of us here, if they must be debarred of our company hereafter? In vaine are our soules fed here with the Bread that came downe from Heaven, if they must not enjoy that same bread againe in heaven. Our condition will be far worse then that of the Prodi∣gals, if we shall be fed with husks here, and not have accesse, when we returne by death, to eat bread in our Fathers house, where is such exuberant plen∣ty. Can Christ, the Bridegroome of our soules, suf∣fer himselfe to be perpetually separated from his Bride, whom he hath bought with so high a price as his owne blood? Our life is a warfare, what en∣couragement have we to fight the good fight, if we enjoy not the Crowne of righteousnesse? Hath Christ no other reward for his souldiers but a crowne of thornes? then indeed we fight, as one that beateth the aire; and we were better, with Caligula's souldi∣ers, spend our time in gathering of shels and pebble∣stones, then fight under the standard of such a Gene∣rall. But indeed we need not feare, for he that per∣mitted the soule of the penitent thiefe into Paradise, and by the ministery of his Angels conveyed the soule of Lazarus into Abrahams bosome; and when himselfe gave up the Ghost, recommended his soule into the hands of his Father, will not leave our soules in hell, nor will he suffer his holy ones to see corruption. Though the shell of our bodies be bro∣ken, the precious kernell of our soules shall not be
Page 129
lost: these earthen pots may crack, but the jewels in them shall be preserved: There lieth a hid Man∣nah within (not our golden, but) our earthen pots, which is not capable of wormes and cor∣ruption. Let that proud insulting Conquerour, who rides upon the pale horse, bruise the sat∣chels of our bodies (as the Tyrant did that of A∣nacharsis) unto dust, yet over our soules, which are our selves, he hath no power. Be not dis∣maid; though our mistresse, Nature, strip us of the garment of our body, as Potiphars wife did Io∣seph, yet of our▪ soules she cannot rob us: she gave us the garment, it is her owne, she may challenge it; but the soule was no gift of hers, she hath no title to it, she cannot claime it. Disea∣ses, infirmities, and injuries, like so many Sodo∣mites, may beset these houses of our bodies; but they cannot injure our soules, which are the An∣gels lodged within us. The celestiall fire of our soules shall never be extinguished, though the temples of our bodies in which they burne shall be destroy∣ed. That fire which consumed the Temple of Peace at Rome, did no hurt to the Palladium that was in it; neither shall the conflagration of our bodies in a Calenture or Burning-feaver, prejudice or hurt our soules. The Vestall Virgins were not more carefull to rescue the Palladium from the flame, then the good Angels, our ministring spirits, shall be to convey our soules out of these flames, un∣to a place of refreshing. Therefore my soule shall
Page 130
not be dismaid, though she be carried in this weake and leaking ship of an infirme body, on the waves of the Red sea of persecution; for even from hence she smels by faith the sweet odours of her heavenly Arabia, though as yet with her bodily eyes she cannot see it. The hot firy furnace of affli∣ction shall no more consume and annoy her, then the flame did consume the firie bush, or the firie fur∣nace of Babylon did the three Children. The Presteres live in the fire, and are not burned; fresh waters spring out of the salt Sea, and yet are not there∣by infected; nor are the fishes salt which live in salt water: neither shall our Soule either suffer by sicknesse in the body, or die with the body; but after she hath fought the good fight, like a Conque∣rour or Emperour, she shall be carried out of this campus Martius upon the shoulders, not of Senators, but of Angels. And as an Eagle flew out of the fu∣nerall pile when it was set on fire, leaving the body of the Emperour to be consumed; so shall our soules flye up unto their Maker, leaving their bodies to be wasted by time and corruption. For, as it is impossible for the body to die till the soule forsake it, which is the life of it; so much more impossible is it for the soule to die, untill God, who is her life, forsake her: and that will never be, till God himselfe cease to be; for he hath promised never to forsake us, his love like himselfe is unchangeable. A mother may forget the fruit of her wombe, fathers and mothers may, and will forsake us, but the Lord
Page 131
will never forget or forsake us; but when friends, and all leave us, he will then receive us: there∣fore let our soules magnifie the LORD, and let our spirits rejoyce in God our SAVIOUR.
FINIS.
Notes
* 5.1
Sect. 1. Pag. 2. cap. 1.
* 5.2
Sect. 2. Pag. 9. cap. 2.
* 5.3
Sect▪ 3. Pag. 28. cap. 4. Pag. 30.
* 5.4
Sect. 4. Pag 34. cap. 5.
* 5.5
Sect. 5. Pag. 34 cap 5.
* 5.6
Sect. 6. Pag. 36. cap. 5.
* 5.7
Sect. 7. Pag. 36. c. 5.
* 5.8
Sect. 8. Pag. 39. c. 6.
* 5.9
In 1. Phys. quaest. 7.
* 5.10
1. •▪ q. 90. Art. 2.
* 5.11
7 Metaphys.
* 5.12
Sect. 9. Pag. 41. c. 6.
* 5.13
Contraria sunt sub eodem ge∣nere.
* 5.14
Sect. 10. Pag. 43. c. 6.
* 5.15
Sect. 11. Pag 43.
* 5.16
Sect. 12. Pag. 46. c. 7.
* 5.17
Sect. 13. Pag. 49. c. 7.
* 5.18
Sect. 14. Pag. 7. c. 8.
* 5.19
Sect. 15. Pag. 53. c. 8.
* 5.20
Sect. 16. Pag. 56. c. 8.
* 5.21
Sect. 17. Pag. •9. c. 8. Pag. 60.
* 5.22
Sect. 18. Pag. 61. cap. 8.
* 5.23
Sect. 19. Pag. 62. cap. 8.
* 5.24
Pag. 63.
* 5.25
Sect 20. Pag. 65. cap. 9.
* 5.26
Sect. 21. Pag 65. cap. 9.
* 5.27
Sect 22. Pag. 70. cap. 9.
* 5.28
Sect. 23. Pag 76. cap. 10.
* 5.29
Sect. 24. Pag. 80. cap. 10.
* 5.30
Pag. 76.
* 5.31
Sect. 25. Pag. 81. cap. 10.
* 5.32
Sect. 26. Pag 81. c. 10.
* 5.33
Sect. 27.
* 5.34
Pag. 86. c. 11.
* 5.35
Sect. 28. Pag. 87. c. 11.
* 5.36
Pag. 87.
* 5.37
Pag. 88.
* 5.38
Sect. 29. Pag. 95 c. 11.
* 5.39
Pag. 97. cap. 11.
* 5.40
Sect. 30. Pag. 98. cap. 11.
* 5.41
Pag. 99.
* 5.42
Pag. 99.
* 5.43
Sect. 31.
* 5.44
Pag. 181. c. 12.
* 5.45
Sect. 32. Pag. 27. c. 14.
* 5.46
In comment. de terrae motu circulari.
* 5.47
Sect. 33.
* 5.48
Cap. 15. c. 16.
* 5.49
Pag. 139.
* 5.50
Sect. 34. Pag. 142. c. 16. Pag 143.
* 5.51
Ibid.
* 5.52
Sect. 35. Pag. 143. c. 16.
* 5.53
Sect. 36. Pag. 152. c. 17.
* 5.54
Sect. 37. Pag. 164 ca. 18.
* 5.55
De doct. Christ. l. 2. cap. 22, 23.
* 5.56
Sect. 38. Pag. 164 c. 18.
* 5.57
Sect. 39. Pag. 176. c. 20.
* 5.58
Hist. Ameris.
* 5.59
In Brasil.
* 5.60
Sect. 40.
* 5.61
Cap. 21.
* 5.62
Virgil.
* 5.63
Sect. 41. Pag. 18. 5. c. 21.
* 5.64
Sect. 42. Pag. 186.
* 5.65
Pag. 186.
* 5.66
Pag. 200. c. 22.
* 5.67
Sect. 43. Pag 215. c. 23.
* 5.68
Sect. 44. Pag. 226. c. 24.
* 5.69
Sect. 45. Pag. 227. c. 25.
* 5.70
Homil. 7. in Gen.
* 5.71
Sect. 46. Pag. 231. c. 25.
* 5.72
Sect. 47. Pag. 225. c. 24.
* 5.73
Sect. 48. Pag. 244. c. 27.
* 5.74
Sect. 49▪
* 5.75
Pag. 245. c. 27.
* 5.76
Sect. 50. Pag. 249. c. 28.
* 5.77
Pag. 251.
* 5.78
Pag. 257.
* 5.79
Sect. 51. Pag. 262.
* 5.80
Sect. 52. Pag. 275. c. 22.
* 5.81
Sect. 53. Pag. 275 ca. 32.
* 5.82
Sect. 54. Pag. 277. c. 32.
* 5.83
Pag. 278.
* 5.84
Sect. 55. Pag. 283. c. 32.
* 5.85
Sect. 56. Pag. 286. c. 33.
* 5.86
Sect 57. Pag. 292. c. 34.
* 5.87
Sect. 58. Pag. 294.
* 5.88
Sect. 59. Pag. 298.
* 5.89
Sect. 60. Pag. 298.
* 5.90
Pag. 298.
* 5.91
Pag 299.
* 5.92
Pag. 301.
* 5.93
Pag. 306. c. 35.
* 5.94
Pag. 318. c. 36.
* 5.95
Sect. 61. Pag. 332. ca. 38.
* 5.96
Sect 62. Pag. 330. c. 38.
* 5.97
Sect. 63. Pag 342. Conclus.
* 5.98
Sect 64. Pag. 342. Conclus.
* 5.99
Pag. 342.
* 5.100
Sect. 65. Conclus.
* 5.101
Sect. 66. Pag. 344. conclus.
* 5.102
Pag. 344.
* 5.103
Sect. 67. Pag. 345▪
* 5.104
Sect 68. Pag. 345. Conclus.
* 5.105
Sect. 69.
* 5.106
5. Metaph. cap. 15.
* 5.107
Sect. 1. Pag. 352.
* 5.108
Sect. 2. Pag. 356. c. 1.
* 5.109
Exerc. 307. 6.
* 5.110
Sect. 3. Cap. 1. p. 359. & 360.
* 5.111
Sect. 4. Cap. 1. p. 360.
* 5.112
Pag. 361.
* 5.113
Pag. 361.
* 5.114
Pag 368. c. 2.
* 5.115
Sect. 6. Pag. 395. c. 5.
* 5.116
Sect. 7. Pag. 404. c. 6.
* 5.117
Sect. 8. Pag. 405. c. 6.
* 5.118
Lib. 1. phys. text. 35.
* 5.119
Pag. 410. c. 7.
* 5.120
Sect. 9. Ibid.
* 5.121
Sect. 10. Pag 419. c. 9.
* 5.122
Sect. 11. Pag. 420. c. 9.
* 5.123
Sect. 12. Pag. 423. c. 10.
* 5.124
Sect. 13. Pag. 424. c. 10.
* 5.125
Epist. 57.
* 5.126
In Timae• part. 3.
* 5.127
4. Phys. t. 1.
* 5.128
Sect. 14. Pag. 424. c. 10.
* 5.129
Exerc. 352. 2.
* 5.130
Sect. 15. Pag. 425. c. 10.
* 5.131
4 Physic.
* 5.132
In Marcion. 1. cap. 8.
* 5.133
Sect 16. Pag. 426, 427, 428▪ cap. 10.
* 5.134
Sect. 17. Pag. 430. c. 10.
* 5.135
De cura pro mortuis.
* 5.136
Sect. 18. Pag. 430. c. 10.
* 5.137
Sect. 19. Pag. 432. c. 10.
* 5.138
Sect. 20. Pag. 433. c. 11.
* 5.139
Sect. 21.
* 5.140
Pag. 439, 440, 441. c. 11.
* 5.141
Sect▪ 22. Pag. 441. c 1▪ 1.
* 5.142
Pag. 442.
* 5.143
Sect. 23.
* 5.144
Sect 24.
* 5.145
August.
* 5.146
Eccles. 12.
* 5.147
Luke 23.
* 5.148
Rom. 8.
* 5.149
Sect. 25. Conclus.
* 5.150
Sect. 26. Pag. 453. Conclus.
* 5.151
Sect. 27. Pag 453. Conclus.
* 5.152
Sect. 28. Pag. 456. Conclus.
* 5.153
1 Cor. 2. 14.
* 5.154
Rom. 8. 7.
* 5.155
2 Cor. 3. 5.
* 5.156
Rom. 1. 21.
* 5.157
Ephes. 4. 18.
* 5.158
Ephes. 5. 8.
* 5.159
John 1. 5.
* 5.160
Rom. 3. 11.
* 5.161
Act. 7. 52.
* 5.162
Mat. 7. 15.
* 5.163
Jer. 17. 9.
* 5.164
Gen. 6. 5.
* 5.165
Ephes. 2. 1.
* 5.166
Mat. 23. 37.
* 5.167
Rom. 11.
* 5.168
John 15. Mat. 7. Act. 16.
* 5.169
Deut. 29.
* 5.170
Ezek. 11. 19.
* 5.171
Jer. 30. 33.
* 5.172
John 14.
* 5.173
John 6.
* 5.174
John 1.
* 5.175
Rom. 12.
* 5.176
1 Cor. 15.
* 5.177
Luke 1. Matth. 25.
* 5.178
De resur. c. 34.
* 5.179
Tim. 6. Sess. 11.
* 5.180
1 Thes. 1.
* 5.181
Aeneid. 6.
* 5.182
De Amici•.
* 5.183
Iliad. 23.
* 5.184
Aeneid. 1. 2. 4.
* 5.185
De Anima. l. 1. t. 13. l. 3. t. 5. l. 2. de gen. Animal. c. 3.
* 5.186
Sect 6. Object. 1.
* 5.187
Sect. 7. Object. 2.
* 5.188
Sect. 8. Object. 3.
* 5.189
Horat. lib. 4. od. 7.
* 5.190
Sect. 9. Object. 4.
* 5.191
Sect. 10. Object. 5.
* 5.192
Sect. 11. Object. 6.
* 5.193
Sect. 12. Object. 7.
* 5.194
Sect. 13. Object. 8.
* 5.195
Sect. 14. Object. 9.
* 5.196
Sect. 15.
* 5.197
Iuven. Sat. 2.
* 5.198
Sect. 16. Mans morta∣lity.
* 5.199
Virgil.
* 5.200
Seneca.
* 5.201
Sect. 17.