The novum organum of Sir Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Albans epitomiz'd, for a clearer understanding of his natural history

THE NOVUM ORGANVM OF Sir FRANCIS BACON, BARON of VERULAM, Viscount St. Albans.

EPITOMIZ'D: For a clearer understanding of his NATURAL HISTORY.

Translated and taken out of the Latine by M. D. B. D.

LONDON,

Printed for Thomas Lee at the Turks-head in Fleetstreet. 1676.


LICENS'D

Jan. 26. 1675.

Roger L'Estrange


THE PREFACE TO THE READER.
I Need not recommend to your perusal this useful Treatise, seeing that it proceeds from such a Genius, whose most trivial conceptions have obtained the esteem of his Age, not inferiour in Learning to any of the former. He was a person of a sound judgement, sharp wit, vast comprehension, and of extraordinary abilities both natural and acquir'd. But I need not run o∣ver the praises of a person so well known amongst us to oblige my Reader to a kind reception, and favourable interpretation of this obscure, but useful Book: For the things therein contained are so excellent in themselves, and so well design∣ed, that we may be inclinable of our own accord to embrace and peruse them.

The Authors purpose, as you may 〈◊〉, is to censure the limitations of Sciences to the bounds prescribed to us, by the shallow pates of some of former Ages, to discover the mistakes of our understandings, to point at the sources from whence they proceed, to rectifie the common errours of men, backed by ill grounded Axioms, to direct us to a right interpretation of Na∣ture's Mysteries, and oblige us to settle our judgements, upon better and soun∣der principles than ordinary; his purpose is to open to us a Gate to a greater Proficiency and improvement in all kind of Learning, to pull down the Wals of Partition, and remove the Non plus ultra, that we might sail to those Indies full of Gold and Jewels. I mean the Sciences not yet discovered to our World, and fetch from thence all the Rarities, the Knowledges, and Inven∣tions, that might pleasure and benefit our humane life. For that purpose he ad∣viseth us not to take things and notions too much upon Trust, but to ground our belief upon Practice, and well ordered experience. He layes down several Principles, which may seem strange and new; but if they be rightly exami∣ned, we shall find them naturally proceeding from the nature of things. I confess the most excellent conceptions are wrapped up in obscure terms, and in such new contrived expressions, that King James at the first perusal judg∣ed this Novum Organum to be past all Mans understanding. But we may con∣sider,


that a new Method, and new Things and Principles deserve new ex∣pressions, and that 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 speaks not to the Vulgar, but unto the 〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he 〈◊〉 other Lands never found out 〈◊〉 and adviseth them in 〈◊〉 to seek and to proceed on without mind∣ing the discourage 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 of our Predecessors in Learning.

This 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was 〈◊〉 upon as a seasonable Addition to his Matural History,〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 have made it too 〈◊〉, I have been desired to 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Directions as might be answerable to that subject. 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉, after a serious perusal, I did scarce know what was to be set aside; for all the things things there∣in contained, are so material and seasonable, that I have wondred, that our English Curiosi have not had the desire to study and understand the directi∣ons that are 〈◊〉 given 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their mistaken 〈◊〉. In such a Case, that this Novum Organum might be the better intelligible, a meer in∣terpretation is not sufficient, in regard of the Authors difficult and new found expressions, a Comment weuld be required, which if it were well and judi∣ciously composed according to the Authors true meaning and intent, I am perswaded every one 〈◊〉 be of my Judgement, that it is the best and most useful Treatise of our Dayes for the purpose that is designed. I am perswad∣ed that it might be of a singular use to such Vertuosi amongst us, as are not perfectly acquainted with the Latine Tongue, and yet imploy their Time and Studies in the improvement of their abilities, and finding out inventions useful to the Life of Man, for it would supply them with such principles as their 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 might wonderfully improve in new disco∣veries.

I was sorry 〈◊〉 my, Pen was limited to so few sheets, and that I had not the liberty to make the whole Organum appear in our Language. For brevity sake therefore I have in some places shortened the Authors expres∣sions. 〈◊〉 this will be sufficient to give a taste of the whole, which such 〈◊〉 understand the Language of the Learned may peruse at their lea∣sure, Vale.

M. D.

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Part of the Novum Organum, OR, APHORISMS OF THE Interpretation of NATURE and KING∣DOME of MAN.
Taken out of the First Book.
MAN, Natures Minister and Interpreter, acts and un∣derstands only so much of the ordering of Nature, as he hath observed by the assistance of Experience and Reason: more he neither doth, nor can apprehend.

Neither the Hand alone, nor an Understanding eft to it self, can do much. Things are performed by instruments and helps, which the 〈◊〉 needs as much as the Hand. Now as 〈◊〉 Instruments assist and govern the Hands mo∣tion, likewise the instruments of the Understan∣ding prompt and advise it.

Humane Knowledge and Power are co-incident in the same, or happen to be alike, because ignorance of the Cause renders the Effect unintelli∣gible: for Nature is not overcome without submission, and that, which in Contemplation stands instead of the Cause, in Operation serves as a Rule.

As to Operation, Man can do no more but only apply or remove na∣tural Bodies. The rest Nature willingly compleats.

The Mechanick, the Mathematician, the Physitian, the Chymist, and the Magician are variously concerned in natural Operations, but as it hap∣pens at present their attempts are but slight, and their successes inconsi∣derable.

It were an extravagancy, and a plain contradiction to expect the ac∣complishment of those things, which were never yet done unless by means never yet attempted.

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Even those Operations which are found out are rather to be ascribed to Chance and Experience than to Sciences; for the Sciences, which are now professed amongst us, are nothing else, but an adorning and a set∣ting forth of things formerly invented, not the modes of Invention or the desigments of new Operation.

The Cause and Origine almost of all the Mischiefs, that happen in Sci∣ences, is this alone, that we too much admire and set up the strength and power of our understanding, and we neglect the true helps and aids thereof.

Natures subtilty far exceeds the subtilty of our Sense, or that of our Understanding; so that the delicate meditations of Mankind, their specu∣lations and inventions are but foolish things, if they were narrowly sear∣ched into.

As Siences commonly so called are unprofitable for the invention of Operations, so the Logick now in use is not conducible to the finding out of true Sciences.

The Logick, which we now use tends to the establishment and confir∣mation of Errours, which are founded in vulgar notions rather than to a serious enquiry after Truth, therefore it is more hurtful than profitable.

A Syllogisme is not used amongst the principles of Sciences, and in medi∣al axioms it is imployed in vain, for it falls much short of Natures subti∣lity. It hath therefore a command over assent, not over the things them∣selves.

A Syllogisme consists of Propositions, Propositions of Words, Words interpret Notions, therefore if Notions, the basis of Things be confus'd, and rashly abstracted from things, nothing will be firm that is built upon them, therefore our only assurance is in a right induction.

There is no soundness in Logical and Physical Notions, neither sub∣stance, nor quality, action, passion, nor being it self, are proper Notions, much less heavy, light, thick, thin, moist, dry, generation, corruption to attract, to expel element, matter, form, &c. All these are phantasti∣cal and ill designed.

The Notions of the lower Species, as a man, a dog, a dove, and the im∣mediate apprehensions of our senses; namely, hot, cold, white, black, don't much deceive us, and yet nevertheless by the fluidity of matter and m•xture of things they are sometimes confounded. All other Notions, which men have hitherto used are aberrations, and are neither duely nor truely abstracted, and raised from the very things themselves.

The things that are already invented in Sciences, are such as most com∣monly depend on vulgar Notions. If any will search into the more in∣ward, and remote mysteries of Nature, he must make use of Notions and Axioms, abstracted from things in a more certain and solid manner, that the working of the Understanding may be better and surer.

There are and may be two ways of searching and finding out truth: one from Sense and perticulars leads to the most general Axioms, and out of those Principles and their unquestionable Authority judges and finds out middle Axioms. This way is much in use. The other raiseth Axioms from Sense, and perticulars by a continual and gradual ascent it proceeds at last to generals. This is a true way but not yet attempted.

The Understanding left to it self goes the former way, observing a Logical method; for the mind delights to leap to generals, that it might acquiesce there, and after a little stay it loaths Experience. But these
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evils are now at length augmented by Logick for the pomp of dispu∣tations.

An Understanding left to it self, accompanied with sober, patient, and grave Wit, if not hindred by former 〈◊〉, essays the other way, which is right but not successful; because when the Understanding is not directed and assisted, is but weak, and unable to overcome the obscurity of things.

Either way derives its beginning from sense and perticulars, and acqui∣esces in things most general. But yet they differ very much, for the one does lightly run over experience and perticulars; the other conver∣ses in them in a right and methodical manner. Again the one layes down at first, certain abstract and un profitable generals. The other rises by degrees to these things, which indeed are more known to Nature.

It can never be that Axioms framed by arguing, for finding out new Operations, should be of any value, because the subtilty of Nature doth far surprise the acuteness of disputation. But Axioms rightly abstracted in order from perticulars, do easily discover and shew forth other new per∣ticulars, and therefore by that means Sciences became active.

The Axioms now in use sprang from small and slender experience, and a few common perticulars, they are for the most part made and enlarged according to their measure, so that it is no wonder, if they lead not to new perticulars. Now if by chance any instance not observed or known before, offer it self, the Axiome is salved by some friviolous distinction; whereas it is more proper, that the Axiom it self should be mended.

That humane reason, which we use in Natures assistance, we are wont to call anticipations of Nature, because it is rash and hasty. But that rea∣son, which is rightly extracted out of things, we call interpretation of Na∣ture.

An icipations are strong enough to gain consent, seeing that if all men were equally and conformably made, they would agree well enough a∣mong themselves. To speak plainly, no right judgement can be made of our way, nor of those things which are found out agreeable unto it by anticipations, I mean by the reason now in use: because we cannot desire any one to stand to the judgement of that thing which is it self called in question.

It is no easie matter to deliver, or explain those things which we have produc'd; because things new in themselves are to be understood by the Analogy they have with old ones.

Borguas tells us of the French Expedition into Italy, that they came with chalk in their hands to mark out their Inns, and not with arms to break through them. Our design is the same, that our doctrines might be admitted by well disposed and capacious Souls, for there is no need of confutations, where we disagree in the very principles, notions, and forms of demonstration.

Their reason, who held non-comprehension, and our way do in some sort agree in the beginning, but they vastely differ and are opposite in the end, for they absolutely affirm, that nothing can be be known, but we say not much can be known in Nature, in that way as it is now handled. They by their assertion destroy the authority of Sense and Understanding, we study and give remedies to help them.

Idols, mistakes, and mis-apprehensions, which now possesse, and are deeply rooted in Mans Understanding, so besiege the minds of Men that
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Truth can hardly get admission, but if it should they would hinder and disturb the restoration of Sciences, unless Men being fore warned would arm themselves against them, as much as they could.

There are four sorts of Idols or false Images, which besiege Mens minds: we, for distinction sake, have called them first Idola Tribus. 2. Idola Spe∣cus. 3. Idola Fori. 4. 〈◊〉 Theatri.

The raising Notions and Axioms by true induction is doubtless a pro∣per remedy to drive away and remove these Idols, yet their indication is of great use, for the doctrine of Idols conduces to the interpretation of Nature; even as the doctrine of Sophistical arguments doth to vulgar Lo∣gick.

Idola 〈◊〉 are founded in humane Nature it self, and in every Fami∣ly and Stock of Mankind. For humane sense is safely affirm'd to be the measure of things. On the contrary, all the conceptions both of sense and reason are taken from the analogy of Man, not the analogy of the Universe. Humane Understanding is like an unequal looking-glass to the rayes of things, which mixing its own Nature with the Nature of things, doth wrest and infect it.

Idola Specus are the mis-apprehensions of every individual Man. For every one hath besides the mistakes of humane Nature in genéral, a den or indivi∣dual cave, where the hight of Nature is obscured and corrupted. This hap∣pens either through every Mans singularity; or through education and conversation among others, or by reading of Books and the authorities of them who are honoured and admired by every one, or through the different impressions which occur in a prepossessed and predisposed, or in a calm and equal mind, or the like: so that the Spirit of man, as it is pla∣ced or qualified in every Man, is a various, a troubled, and a fortuitous thing; wherefore Heraclitus said well, that men sought after Siences in lesser worlds, and not in the great and common World.

There are also Idols or mis-apprehensions arising from the mutual con∣tracts, and also ciations of Men, which by reason of humane commerce and society we call Idola Fori: For Men are associated by speech, but words are imposed according to the vulgar capacity; therefore a vitious and an improper imposition of words doth wonderfully mislead and clog the Understanding. Neither the definitions and explications, wherewith learned men are wont to defend and vindicate themselves in some things, do mend the matter for words, do plainly force the Understanding and disturb all things, they lead men into many idle controversies and foolish inventions.

Lastly there are Idols or misapprehensions, which are entered into Mens minds from divers opinions of the Philosophers, as also from the 〈◊〉 Laws of demonstrations: these we call Idola Theatri. Because all the kinds of Philosophy, which have been invented and received we look upon as so many Fables produced and acted to make fictitious and seni∣cal Worlds. Neither speak we of those amongst us, or only of the anci∣ent Philosophers and Sects; seeing many the like Fables may be composed and made, because the causes of the different errours are for the most part common; neither do we understand this only of universal Philosophy, but also of many Principles and Axioms of Sciences which have prevailed by tradition, credulity and neglect. But of all these kinds of Idols we must speak more largely and distinctly, that so the humane intellect may take more heed.

Page 5
Humane Understanding is inclinable of it self to suppose a greater order and equality in things than it finds. And whereas many things in Nature are monodical and altogether unlike, yet it appropriates to them paral∣lels, correspondencies, and relatives, which are not from hence, are de∣rived those Figments.

In Coelestial Bodies all things are moved by perfect Circles. In the mean time they reject Spiral and Serpentine lines, retaining yet the names: From hence it is, that the Element of Fire is introduced to make a quaternion with the other three, which are within the reach of our senses. To the Elements also, as they call them, fancy ascribes to them a double pro∣portion of excess in their mutual rarefaction, and such like dreames are invented. Nor is this vanity predominant in opinions only, but also in simple notions

The Humane Understanding attracts all other things to give its suffrage and consent unto those things which once please it, either because they are received and believed, or because they delight. And though a greater strength and number of contrary instances occur, yet it doth either not observe, or contemn them, or remove, or reject them by a distinction not without great and dangerous prejudice, by which an inviolable authori∣ty remains in those former conceptions. Therefore he gave a right answer, who, when a list of the Names of such as had paid there their vows for escaping the danger of Shipwrack, was shewn to him hung up in a Tem∣ple, and when he was questioned whether he did not acknowledge the Deity of the gods? He in answer demanded what was become of their pi∣ctures who had perished after that they had paid their Vows? There is al∣most the same reason for all Superstition, as in Astrological dreams, presages, &c. Men delight in such vanities, they mind the events when they come to pass, but when they fail, which is very often, they neglect and pass them by. But this evil more subtilly invades Philosophy and Sciences, wherein that which once takes, infects and corrupts the rest, though more firm and better. But in case this delight and vanity were wanting, yet it is a proper and perpetual error in Humane Understanding, to be rather moved and stirred up by affirmatives than by negatives, although in truth it ought to be indifferent to both: Yet on the other hand the strength of a negative Instance is greater in constituting every Axiom.

Humane Understanding is for the most part moved with those things, which suddenly and at once effect and reach the mind, and wherewith the fancy is wont to be filled and puffed up. As for the rest it supposes and fancies to have them in a kind of inperceptible manner, even like those few things that possess the mind. But as to that quick running over remote and heterogeneous instances, whereby Axioms are tried as it were by fire, the Understanding is altogether slow and unable, unless severe Laws and violent commands be imposed upon it.

Humane Understanding cannot rest, but still desires more and more, though all in vain. Therefore it is not to be imagined that Heaven should hear any extream or extime parts; for it may be alwayes necessarily ur∣ged, that there is something further. Again it cannot be conceived how Eternity hath run along until now, because there is a common distincti∣on usually admitted, that it is infinite a parte ante & a parte pòst, which can in no wise be proved, for then it would follow that one infinite is grea∣ter than another, and that an infinite consumeth and tends to a finite. The like nicety occurs through the weakness of our imagination concer∣ning
Page 6

lines alwayes divisible, but this mental infinity more dangerously interposes in the invention of causes: For whereas Universals chiefly ought to be in a positive nature, as they are found out, being not real∣ly causable, yet the Humane Understanding being unable to rest, still desires things more known, but whiles it tends to further things it falls back to nearer ones, viz. Final causes, which indeed arise rather from Humane Nature, than the nature of the Universe. Out of this Fountain Philosophy is strangely corrupted. But he is equally an unskilful and a slight Philosopher, who seeks out a cause in primary universals, as he who desires it not in subordinate and subaltern things.

Humane Understanding is not an Ignis fatuus a meer light, but it re∣ceives an impression from the Will and the Affections, which produces the reason why it desires Sciences, for what a Man had rather have true, that he resolves to believe. Therefore he rejects difficult things, through im∣patiency of inquiry; sober things, because they confine the hope; the high Mystery of Nature, because of our natural Superstition; the light of experience, because of an arrogancy and pride, least the mind should seem to converse in vile and transitory affairs, he rejects Paradoxes be∣ing too much over-ruled by the mistakes of the vulgar. Lastly affe∣ction qualifies and infects the Soul many wayes which cannot be con∣ceived.

But the greatest hinderance of the Humane Understanding, and its most dangerous errors proceed from the dulness, unsufficiency, and decepti∣ons of the senses: those things which make impressions on the senses are of a greater weight than others of a higher nature, that do not affect them: Therefore contemplation most commonly ends with the sight, insomuch that there is little or no observation made of invisible things. Therefore the actings of the Spirits shut up in sensible bodies are hid from us. And all subtil transformation, that happens in the parts of the grosser things, which we commonly stile alteration, but is in Truch a subtil metaschematism escapes also our knowledge. Nevertheless, if these two that we have named be not found out, there can be no great matter performed in the works of nature.

Again the nature of common air, and of all Bodies which in thinness surpass the air, they being many in number are almost unknown, for sense in it self is a weak and an erroneous thing, nor do the Organs conduce much to enlarge or sharpen the senses, but the truest interpretation of Nature is made by in∣stances, and by fit and proper experiments, when sense judges of the ex∣periment, the experiment of Nature, and of the thing it self.

The Humane intellect is by its own Nature carried on to abstracts, and those things which are unstable it fancies to be constant.

But it is better to dissect Nature than abstract her, which was done by Democritus's School. By that means he searched further than the rest into Nature. For that purpose we must rather examine matter, its schemes and transformations, its pure acts and the Law of action and motion. Forms are but the invention of mens brains, unless you will call the Laws of the act forms.

Of this kind are those false imaginations, which we call Idola Tribus, they proceed, either from the equality of the substance of the humane Spi∣rits or the prepossessions, coarctations, and turbulent motions thereof, or from the inspirations of the passions, or disagreement of the senses, or the manner of impression.

Page 7
Idola Specus proceed from the proper nature of every individual mind or body, as also from education, custome or other casualties, which kind though various and manifold, yet more especially we propound those which require most caution, and have greatest power to defile the Under∣standing, and render it 〈◊〉 contemplations of Nature and most sim∣ple Bodies only disturb and impair the Understanding, but contempla∣tion of Nature and of Bodies compound, and in their configuration asto∣nish and dissolve the intellect, This is most evident in the School of Hencippus and Democritus compared with other Philosophy, for it so much considers the particles of things, that it almost neglects their frames: and others so amazedly behold them, that they cannot arrive to Natures sim∣plicity. These contemplations therefore are to be altered and interchange∣ably assumed, that the Understanding at the same time, may be made pe∣netrating and capable, and those inconveniencies we speak of be avoided with the false notions proceeding from them.

Let therefore your speculative prudence be so disposed in expelling and removing the Idola Specus, which proceed either from the predominan∣cy, or excess of composition and division, or from our affection to the times, or from large and small Objects. In general let every one, who studies the nature of things, chiefly suspect that which captivates his Un∣derstanding, and so much the greater heed is to be taken in these opini∣ons, that the Understanding may be kept equal and pure.

But Idola Fori are the most troublesome of all, which, by a confede∣racy of words and names, have 〈◊〉 themselves into the Under∣standing. For men believe that their Reason governs words, but so it happens that words retort and reflect their power upon the Understand∣ing. This hath made Philosophy and Sciences Sophistical and unactive. Now words are for the most part accommodated to vulgar capacities, and by lines most apparent to common apprehensions they divide things. But when a sharper intellect, or more diligent observation would transfer those lines, that they might be more agreeable to Nature; words make a noise: from hence it comes to pass, that the great and solemn dis∣putations of learned men, often end in controversies concerning words and names, with which, according to the custome and prudence of Mathe∣maticians 'twere a wiser way to begin, and to reduce them into order by definitions. And yet definitions in natural and material beings cannot re∣medy this evil because they also consist of words, and words beget words, so that it is necessary to have recourse to perticular instances, and their ranks and orders, as we shall presently shew, when we come to the man∣ner and reason of constituting notions and Axioms.

Mis-apprehensions forced by words upon the Understanding are of two sorts. 1. The names of things which are not: for as there are things which through inadvertency wanting a name, so are there names with∣out things, through a Phantastical supposition. 2. Or the names of things which are but confused, ill determined, rashly, and unequally abstracted from things. Of the first sort are Fortune, the Primum Mobile, the Pla∣netary Orbs, the Element of Fire, and such like fictions arising from vain and false speculations. This kind is easier cast out, because it is exter∣minable by a continued abnegation and antiquation of such speculations. But the other sort is perplex'd and deeply rooted, proceeding from an ill and unskilful abstraction. For example sake, take any word, Humidum if you please, and let us see how its various significations agree, and we
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shall find this word Humidum to be nothing else but a confused note of divers actions enduring no constancy or reduction; for it signifies that which easily circumfunds it self about another body, and is in it self in∣determinable and inconsistent, that which easily gives place on all sides, and easily divides and dissipates, and as easily collects, and reunites it self, that which easily flowes and moves, easily adheres to another body and moistens it, that which is easily reduced into a liquid, or melts, ha∣ving been before consistent or solid: Therefore if you consider the pre∣dication and imposition of this word taken in one sense the Flame is moist, in another sense the Air is not moist. In one sense again small dust is moist, in another glass is so. Whence it is evident, that this notion was only rashly abstracted from waters and common liquors without any due verification.

In words also there are certain degrees of pravity and error, less viti∣ous are the names of some substances, especially the lowest Species well deduced, for the notion of Chalk and Clay is good, the notion of Earth bad, more vitious are the actions of Generation, Corruption, Alteration: The most vitious qualities, excépt the immediate objects of sense, are hea∣vy, light, rare, dense, &c. And yet even among these it cannot be helped but some notions will be better than others, accordingly as more copious matter supplies Humane sense.

The other mistakes named Idola Theatri, are not innate, nor secretly wrought in the Understanding, but by fabulous speculations, and the perverse Laws of demonstrations plainly infused and received. But in these to undertake or endeavour a confutation is not agreeable to what we have spoken. For seeing that we neither agree in our principles nor demonstrations all disputation it taken away. But this is good luck for the Ancients, that they may preserve their reputation, for nothing is de∣tracted from them, seeing the way is so questionable. Because a lame Man, as they say, in the way, out goes a Racer out of the way, for tis evident the stronger and nimbler he is, the greater is his aberration, whiles he is out of the way.

But such is our manner of inventing Sciences, that we attribute not much to the sharpness and strength of wit, and yet we almost equalize them, for even as the describing of a right line or perfect Circle much depends on the 〈◊〉 and exercise of the hand, 〈◊〉 it be done meerly by the hand, but if a rule or compasses be used, there is little or no such de∣pendancy upon the hand: So fares it exactly with our Reason, Although there be no particular use of confutations, 〈◊〉 yet we must say something of the Sects and Kinds of these Theories, and afterwards of their outward signs, because they are in a bad condition, and lastly of the causes of so much unhappiness, and so long and general a consent in error, that Truth may have an easier access, and the Humane Understanding may be more throughly purged, and rid of these mistakes.

Idola Theatri or theoretical mistakes are many, and may be more, and in time to come will be, for unless mens wits had been employed about Religion and Divinity during many Ages, and also about civil Govern∣ments, especially Monarchies, they had 〈◊〉 such novelties in con∣templations. So that Men addicted unto them, ran the hazard of their fortunes, not only deprived of a reward, but also exposed to contempt and envy. Doubtless many more Sects of Philosophy, and Theories like to those, which once in great varieties flourished amongst the Grecians,
Page 9

had been introduced: for as upon the etherial Phoenomena's more figures of Heaven may be formed, likewise many more various opinions may be as easily founded and established upon the Phenomena's of Philosophy: Now the Fables of this Theater are like those that are acted on the poeti∣cal Stage, whence it comes to pass, that Scenical and 〈◊〉 narrations are more quaint and elegant than those taken out of true history, and better please the Readers.

In general either much out of little, or little out of much is assumed in∣to Philosophical matter, so that on all sides, Philosophy is founded on the too narrow basis of experience, and Natural History, and determines out of fewer things than it ought; for the rational sort of Philosophers snatch from experience several vulgar things, and they to neither certain∣ly found out, nor diligently examined or tried, the rest they place in me∣ditation, and the exercise of wit.

There is another sort of Philosophers, who have bestowed a great deal of pains in few experiments, and from thence have presumed to draw and frame a Philosophy strangely wresting all other things thereunto.

There is also a third sort of them, who intermingle divinity, and tradi∣tions of Faith and Adoration amongst whom the vanity of some has incli∣ned them to seek and derive Sciences from Spirits and Demons. Therefore the stock of Errours and false Philosophy is threefold, namely Sophistical, Emperical, and Superstitious.

Of the first kind Aristotle is an evident Example. By his Logick he cor∣rupted natural Philosophy made the world consist of Categories attribut∣ed to the humane Soul, a most noble substance, a genus made up ofsecon∣dary notions, transacted the business of dense and rare, whereby bodies under go greater or 〈◊〉 dimensions or spaces by the cold distinction of act and power. He asserted only one proper motion to be in all bodies, and if they had any other, that he said was from another; many more things he affirmed according to his fancy, which he imposed upon Nature, being every where more solicitous how he might explain himself in an∣swers, and make any thing positive in words, than of the internal truth of things. This plainly appears if you compare his Philosophy with others famous amongst the Grecians, for the Homoiomera of Anaxagoras, the Atoms of Lencippus, and Democritus, the Heaven and Earth of 〈◊〉, the discord and concord of Empedocles, Heraclitus's resolution of Bo∣dies into the adiaphorous nature of Fire, and the replication of them to density, have something of natural Philosophy in them, and a relish of na∣ture and experience: whereas Aristotles Physicks are nothing but logical notions, which under a more specious name, not nominal but more real he retracts in his Metaphysicks, nor let not that move any one, that in his Books of Animals, in his Problems and other Treatises he frequently useth Experiments. For he first decreed them, neither did he rightly consult experience in establishing his Determinations and Axioms, but after he had determined them according to his pleasure, he made experience a slave to his fancies: And upon this account he is more to be blamed than his modern Followers, I mean a Sect of Scholastical Philosophers, who have altogether forsaken experiments.

But the Emperical kind of Philosophy brings forth more deformed and monstruous opinions than the Sophistical or rational, because it is not founded in the light of common notions, which though slender and su∣perficial is notwithstanding in some measure universal and conducive to
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many things, but in a few narrow and obscure experiments. And there∣fore to those who daily converse in such experiments, and have thereby corrupted their fancy, this Philosophy seems probable and certain, but to others incredible and vain. A notable example whereof we find in the Chymists and their opinions, but now scarcely any where else, unless in Gilberts Philosophy. However we must by no means omit a caution concerning this Philosophy, because we inwardly foresee and presage that if men awakened by our precepts, shall at last betake themselves to experience, bidding adieu to Sophistical doctrines, they will sustain some damage, through a praemature and inconsiderate haste of the understand∣ing, by soaring too soon to generals and principles, which evil we ought to prevent.

But the corruption of Philosophy through superstition and intermixed Divinity extends it self further, and works much mischief, both to Philo∣sophy in general and particular. For the humane understanding is no less obnoxious to the impressions of Fancy, than to the impressions of vulgar notions. For the contentious and Fallacious kind of Philosophy ensnares the Understanding, but the other kind being phantastical, swoln and Poe∣tical doth rather flatter it. For there is in Man a certain ambition of the Understanding as well as in the Will, especially in sublime and elevated Wits. Of this kind you have an example amongst the Grecians, especially in Pythagoras, but joyned with gross superstition, but more danger∣oufly and subtilly in Plato, and his School. This kind of evil is found in the parts of other Philosophers; by the introduction of abstract Formes, final Causes, first Causes, and frequent omitting the medial, and the like. Wherefore take great heed to this matter, for it is the worst of evils to defie errors, and to adore vain things may be well accounted the plague of the Understanding.

Some modern Men guilty of much levity, have so indulged this vanity, that they have essayed to found natural Philosophy in the first Chapter of Genesis, the Book of Job, and other places of Holy Writ, seeking the li∣ving among the dead. Now this vanity is so much the more to be check'd and restrained, because by unadvised mixture of divine and humane things, not only a phantastical Philosophy is produced, but also an Heretical Religion. Therefore it is safe to give unto Faith with a sober mind, the things that are Faiths.

Hitherto our Excellent Author hath spoken of the bad authority of Philoso∣phy, founded in vulgar notions, a few Experiments, or in Superstition: he examines next the depraved matter of Contemplation especially in natural Philosophy.

He proceeds next to discover to us by what means demonstrations lead us into errors and mistakes, and concludes that experience is the best demon∣stration, if it be founded upon mature Experiments. He discourses afterwards of the several sorts of Philosophers among the Greeks, and takes notice of their imperfections, of their ignorance in ancient History, and in Cosmogra∣phy, so that they could not be acquainted with so many experiments, as the Learned of our dayes.

Afterwards he discourseth of the causes of Errors, and of their long con∣tinuance in credit in the World, that none might wonder how it comes to pass that some in these last Ages, find so many mistakes in the Learning and Wit admired in former Ages.

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The first Cause of the small prosiciency in Sciences, he saith, is the streights of time, and their ignorance of former Times: for their Observation had not scope enough, nor sufficient assistance from true History, to gather right and judicious Experiments.

In the second place another Cause of great moment certainly offers it self; namely that in those times, when the wits of men and Learning flourished most or but indifferently, Natural Philosophy had the least share in humane contemplations: nevertheless this ought to be account∣ed the great Mother of Sciences: for all Arts and Sciences, pluck'd away from this Root. may perhaps be polished and accommodated to use, but they will never grow. Now it is evident, that since the Christian Faith was embrac'd and encreas'd the most part of the rarest Wits applied them∣selves to Divinity. To this end large rewards were propounded, and all manner of helps plentifully afforded. This study of Divinity took up the third part or period of time amongst us Europeans, and the more be∣cause about that time Learning began to flourish, controversies touching Religion did wonderfully increase: but in the preceding Age, during the second period among the Romans, the chiefest meditations and studies of Philosophers were imployed and spent in Moral Philosophy, which was then the Heathens Divinity. Moreover the greatest Wits in those dayes for the most part applied themselves to Civil affairs, by reason of the Ro∣man Empires greatness, which required the labours of many men. But that Age wherein Natural Philosophy seem'd chiefly to flourish among the Grecians was a parcel of time of small continuance, for even in anci∣enter times, those Seven, called Wisemen, all except Thales, applied them∣selves to Moral Philosophy and Politicks. And in after times, when Iso∣crates had brought down Philosophy from Heaven upon Earth, Moral Philosophy prevailed further still, and diverted mens thoughts from physi∣ological speculations.

That very period of time also, wherein Physick Enquiries flourished was corrupted and spoiled with contradictions, and new determinations. Wherefore Natural Philosophy in every one of those periods, being great∣ly neglected or hindred, 'tis no wonder men profited so little in it, seeing they altogether minded other things.

Add moreover, that those who studied Natural Philosophy, especially in these modern times, did not wholly addict themselves thereunto, un∣less perhaps you may alledge the example of some Monk in his Cell, or Nobleman in his Country House. So at length it was made but a passage and draw-bridge to other things.

This, this famous Mother of Sciences, was basely thrust down into ser∣vile offices, and made a drudge to wait upon Medicine, or the Mathema∣ticks; and again to wash the immature wits of young men, and give them a superficial mixture, that they might afterwards be the better qua∣lified to receive of another. In the mean while let no man expect a great progress in Sciences, especially in the practical part, unless natural Philo∣sophy be produced to particular Sciences, and those again reduced to Natural Philosophy: for hence it comes to pass, that Astronomy, Opticks, Musick, many Mechanichal Arts, Physick it self, and what is more wonder∣ful, even Moral Philosophy, Politicks, and Logick, have for the most part no considerable depth, but languish in the surface and variety of things, because when once these particular Sciences are divided, they are no longer nourished by Natural Philosophy, which out of the Fountains
Page 12

and true contemplations of motions, rayes, sounds; texture and figurati∣on of Bodies, affections, and intellectual apprehensions, communicates new strength and augmentation to them. And therefore 'tis no wonder, that Sciences grow not since they are separated from their roots. Another great and powerful cause, why Sciences are so little advanced, is this, that race cannot rightly be run, where the Goal is not rightly placed and fixed. Now the true and legitimate mark of Sciences is to enrich Mans life with new inventions and forces. But the greater number of men know nothing of this, because they are mercenary and professory, unless it happens that some Artist of a sharper wit, and ambitious of Glory, studies some new inventions, which commonly tends to his own undoing. Therefore most Men are so far from propounding to themselves the advancement of Arts and Sciences, that even out of those things that they have, they seek no more than what may be converted into professory use, gain, reputation, or the like advantages. And if any one amongst the multitude seeks know∣ledge ingeniously and for it self, yet you will find he doth this rather to obtain variety of contemplations and precepts, than for the rigid and se∣vere inquiry of Truth. Again suppose another more severely enquires after Truth, yet even he propounds to himself such conditions of Truth as may satisfie his mind and understanding in reference to the causes of things known long ago, not those which may give fresh pledges of ope∣rations or new light to Axioms, The end therefore of Sciences being not yet rightly defined, or well assigned by any body, no wonder if Error and mistakes attend those things which are subordinate thereunto.

The Noble Author condemns next the erroneous wayes which conduct to Sciences; namely obscure Traditiòns, giddy Arguments, the windings of Chance or unclean Experience; and wonders that none yet have recommend∣ed sense, and well ordered Experience, which he supposes to be partly caused by a great mistake. That the Majesty of Humane Understanding is impair∣ed with long conversing in Experiments and particular things, subject to sence, and determined to matter; especially seeing these things are labo∣rious in the inquiry, ignoble in the meditation, harsh in discourse, illi∣beral in the practice, infinite in number, and full of subtilty.

Again the reverence of Antiquity, and the authority and consent of those who have been accounted great men in Philosophy, has detained and inchauted men from making any progress in Sciences.

As for Antiquity the opinion which men entertain of it, is idle and in∣congruous to the word it self, for the old age, and great age of the world are terms equivolent to antiquity, and ought to be attributed to our times, not to the youthful age of the world, that wherein the Ancients lived.

For that Age in respect of ours was greater and ancienter, in respect of the World it self, lesser and younger: and therefore in like manner, as we expect a greater knowledge in Humane Affairs, a more mature and a riper judgement from an Old Man than from a Young Man, by reason of his Experience, and the variety and plenty of things which he hath seen, heard, observed, and understood, so also far greater matters may ratio∣nally be expected from our Age, than from the ancient times, if it would but know its strength, and were willing to try and mind things, because we live in the Worlds old Age, and are stored with infinite experiments, and advanced in our noble Observations. The discoveries of other Lands
Page 13

unknown to former Ages are no small helps to our experience. Besides it is a great weakness to attribute so much to ancient Authors, for Truth is the Daughter of Time not of Authority, and the ancientest times are the young∣est in respect of the World. The other cause of mens mistakes is their admi∣ring the operations which can shew grey hairs, and a too great esteem of li∣beral Arts and Learning already found out, which is an act of simplicity and childishness. But the greatest damage hath happened to Sciences through pusilanimity; and the smalness of those tasks, which humane Industry hath proposed to it self, and yet, what is worst of all, that pusilanimity is ac∣companied with Arrogance and disdain.

Moreover Natural Philosophy in all Ages hath had a troublesome and harsh Enemy; namely Superstition, and a blind immoderate zeal of Re∣ligion.

Lastly the way to all Reformed Philosophy hath been blocked up by the unskilfulness of some Divines, who were afraid least a deeper enquiry should dive into Nature beyond the bounds of Sobriety, traduce and falsly wrest those things, which are spoken of Divine Mysteries in the sa∣cred Writings, against Searchers of divine Secrets: Others cunningly conceive, if the means be unknown, which they think greatly concerns Religion, all things may more easily be referred to the deity. Others from their example fear least motions and mutations in Philosophy should terminate in Religion.

Again all things in the manners and institutions of Schools, Uni∣versities, Colledges; and the like places destimated for learned Men, and getting Learning, are found to be against the advancement of Scien∣ces, &c.

But the greatest Obstacle in the progress of Sciences, and new under∣takings thereof is discerned in the dispairing of men, and a supposed im∣possibility, for even wise and grave men are wont to diffide in these things, pondering with themselves the obscurity of Nature, shortness of Life, deception of the Sences, weakness of judgement, difficulty of Ex∣periments, and the like, &c.

We must take our beginnings from God, in what we are about, for the excellent nature of Good therein it manifestly from God, who is the Author of Good, and Father of Lights.

The Foundations of Experience, for we must descend to them, have hi∣therto been either none at all or very weak; neither hath a sufficient System of particulars been any wayes as yet found outand congested, either in number, kind, or certainty, able to inform the understanding.

In the plenty of Mechanical Experiments, there is discovered a great want of such as assist or tend to the information of the understanding, &c.

Not onely a greater plenty of Experiments is to be sought, and procur∣ed, differing in kind from what ever was yet done. But also another me∣thod, order and process are to be introduc'd, for the continuing and pro∣moting of Experience. For wandring Experience, guided by it self, is a meer cheat, and doth rather amaze men than inform them. But when Ex∣perience proceeds regularly, orderly, and soberly, there may be some bet∣ter hope of Sciences.

Seeing there is such a great number, and as it were an Army of particu∣lars, but so scattered and diffused, that they disgregate and confound the understanding, we can expect no good from the skirmishes, light moti∣ons, and transcursions of the understanding, unless by fit, well disposed,
Page 14

and exact Tables, there be an instruction, and co-ordination of those things which appertain to the subject of our enquiry: and the mind be ap∣plyed to the preparatory and digested helps of these Tables.

But when this plenty of particulars is rightly and orderly placed be∣fore our eyes we must not presently pass to the Inquisition, and Inven∣tion of new particulars or operations, or if we do we must not rest in them, &c.

We must not permit the Understanding to leap or fly from particulars to remote and general Axioms, such as are called the principles of Arts and Things, or by their constant verity to prove or discuss medial Axioms.

But then Men may hope well of Sciences, when by a true Scale, and con∣tinual not intermitted degrees, we ascend from particulars to lesser Axioms, then to medial, for some are higher than others; and lastly to universals; for the lowest Axioms differ not much from naked Experience, but the supressive and more general which occur, are rational and abstracted, and have no solidity. The medial therefore are those true solid and lively Axioms, wherein mens fortunes and estates are placed, and above those al∣so are those more general, if not abstracted, but truely limited by these me∣dial or middle Axioms.

Therefore the humane understanding needs not feathers but lead and weights to hinder its leaping and flying. But this is not yet done, when it is we may have better hope of Sciences.

Now in constituting an Axiom another form of induction contrary to what was formerly, or is now used, is found out, and that not onely to prove or invent Principles, as they call them, but also lesser and medial Axioms, ye all. For that induction, which proceeds by simple enumera∣tion, is a childish thing, and concludes precariously, being exposed to the danger of a contradictory instance. And yet most commonly it gives judgement from fewer instances than it ought, or from those onely which are at hand. But that induction which would induce to the invention and demonstration of Arts and Sciences, must separate Nature by due re∣jections and separations, and, after sufficient negatives, conclude upon af∣firmatives, which thing is not yet done, nor so much as attempted, unless by Plato only, who indeed, to examine definitions and Ideas, doth in some measure use this form of Induction. But for the good and lawful institution of such an induction or demonstration. many things are to be used, which never yet entered into any mortal mans heart, so that greater pains is to be taken herein than was ever yet spent in a Syllogism. Now the help of this induction is not onely to be used in finding out Axioms, but also in terminating motions, for certainly in this induction our greatest hope is placed.

Far more and better things, yea and in shorter time, are to be expected from the reason, industry, direction, and intention of men, than from chance the instinct of Animals, which hitherto have given the beginning to Inventions.

This also may be brought as an encouragement, that some things which are found out, are of that kind, that before their production it could not easily come into mans mind to imagine any thing of them, for every body despised them as impossible, as the use of Guns the invention of Silk, the Seamans needle, &c.

Therefore we hope there are in Natures bosome many secrets of excel∣lent use, which have no alliance nor paralellism, with the things already
Page 15

invented, but are placed out of Fancies Road, not as yet found out, which doubtless after many revolutions of Ages shall at last come forth, even as those former did. But by the way we now declare, they may speedily and suddenly be both anticipated and represented.

We must not omit another thing, which may raise up our hope. Let men reckon the infinite expence of Wit, time, and money, which they are at in things and studies of far lesser use and value; the least part whereof, were it converted to sound and solid things, would conquer all difficulty.

Had we a man among us, who would de facto answer Nature's Queries, the Invention of all Causes and Sciences would be the study but of a few years.

Some without doubt, when they have read over our History and Ta∣bles of Invention, may object that something is less certain, or altoge∣ther, false in our experiments, and therefore perhaps will think with himself, that our inventions are founded on false foundations, and dubious principles. But this is nothing, for such things must needs happen at first, for it is all one as though in writing or printiug some one Letter or other should be misplaced, which does not usually hinder the Reader, for such errors are easily corrected by the sence, &c.

Many things also will occur in our History and Experience, first slight and common, then base and mechanical, lastly too curious, meerly spe∣culative, and of no use, which kind of things may divert and alienate the studies of men.

Now for those things which seem common, let men consider, that they themselves are wont to do no less than refer and accommodate the cau∣ses of rare things to these which are frequently done, but of things daily happening they enquire not the causes, but take them for granted.

And therefore they inquire not into the causes of weight, coelestial ro∣tation, heat, cold, light, hard, soft, slender, dense, liquid, concistent or solid, animate and inanimate, similar dissimilar, nor lastly Organical, but dispute and judge of other things, which happen not so frequently and familiarly by these as being evident, manifest, and received. But we, who know well enough, that no judgement can be made of rare and notable things, much less new things be brought to light without the causes of vul∣gar things, and the causes of causes rightly examined and found out are for∣ced necessarily to receive the most vulgar things into our History: Further∣more we perceive nothing has hindred Philosophy more, than because things familiar and frequently happening do not stay and detain the contempla∣tion of men, but are entertained by the by, and their causes not inquired into, so that information of unknown matters is not oftner required than attention in known things.

Now as touching the vileness and dishonesty of things, they are no less to be entertained in Natural History than the richest and most precious things, nor is Natural History thereby polluted, for the Sun does equal∣ly visit Pallaces and Sinks, and yet is not defiled. Again we do not build or dedicate a Capitol or Pyramid to the Pride of men, but we found an holy Temple for the worlds pattern in humane Understanding.

Therefore we follow our Copy for whatsoever is worthy of essence is worthy of Science, which is the image of Science, but vile things subsist as well as costly ones. Moreover, as out of some putrid matters, as musk and civet, sometimes the best odours come, even so from low and sordid in∣stances
Page 16

sometimes excellent light and information flowes.

Before all things we have and must speak first of this thing, viz. That we how at first setting out, and for a time, seek only lociferous not fructiferous Experiments, according to the examples of Divine Creation, which only produced Light on the first day, and bestowed a whole day upon it, not intermingling with it, in that day, any material Work. If any one therefore think these things are of no use, it is all one as if he should think Light useless, because it is indeed no solid nor mate∣rial being; for we may truely affirm, that the light of simple Natures be∣ing well examined and defined, is like Light which affords passage to all the secret Rooms of Operations, drawing after it all the companies and troops of Operations, and potentially comprizing the Fountains of most noble Axioms, yet in it self it is not of so great use: Thus the Elements of Let∣ters of themselves and separately signifie nothing, neither are of any use, but yet are like the first matter in the composition, and preparation of e∣very word. Thus the seeds of things strong in power are as to use, ex∣cept in their increase of no value, and the scattered beams of Light unless they unite together, become unbeneficial to men.

Some also will doubt rather than Object, whether we speak only of Na∣tural Philosophy, or else of other Sciences; namely, Logick, Ethicks and Po∣liticks to be perfected according to our way. But we surely understand what we have said of all this, and as vulgar Logick, which rules things by syllogism, belongs not onely to natural, but to all Sciences. So ours, which proceeds by induction, compriseth all things; for we make an Hi∣story and inventory Tables, as well of Anger, Fear, Modesty, &c. as of Politick Examples, and so of the mental motions of memory, compositi∣on and division, judgement and the rest, no less than of heat and cold, or light and vegetation, &c. But as our method of interpretation after Hi∣story is prepared and ordered, doth not only behold mental motions and discourses, as common Logick, but also the nature of things. So we govern the Understanding, that it may apply it self in a perfect and apt manner to the nature of things.

But that ought by no means to be doubted, whether we desire to destroy and demolish the Philosophy, Arts, and Sciences which we use, for we on the contrary willingly allow their use, cultivation, and honour; nor do we any wayes hinder, but that those which have been in credit, may nourish disputations, adorn Orations, be used in professory employments. Last∣ly, like currant money, be received among men by consent. But how truely we profess this very thing, which we mention concerning our af∣fection and good will towards allowed Sciences, our publick Writings, especially our Books of the Advancement of Learning declare and at∣test.

It remains that we now speak somewhat cóncerning the excellency of the End. Had we before treated 〈◊〉 these things, our expectations pro∣bably had better succeeded, but now we are in hopes, that all prejudices being removed, these matters may perhaps be of more weight.

For though we had perfected and compleated all things, nor had called others to share in our labours, yet should we have refrained these words lest we might be thought to proclaim our own merits, but seeing the indu∣stry of others is to be sharpened, and their minds to be stirred up and in∣flamed, 'tis fit we put men in remembrance of some things.

First then the Introduction of noble Inventions seems to carry the grea∣test
Page 17

sway amongst humane actions, as former ages also have judged; for they gave divine honor to the Inventors of things, but to those who were me∣ritorious in civil affairs, as the founders of Cities and Empires, Lawgivers, 〈◊〉 of their Countreys from temporal evil, Destroyers of Tyranny &c. they only decreed heroick honor. Inventions also, are the new creations, they are man's Glory, they cause him to be a God to the rest of man∣kind. New inventions are of a wonderful consequence as the Art of Print∣ing, Gun-powder, and the Sea mens compass. These three have changed the Face and State of affairs in the whole World. First, in Learning. Se∣condly, in Warfare. Thirdly, in Navigation.

There are three sorts of ambition, the first desires to enlarge man's own power over Countries and People, this is common and ignoble, the Second, endeavours to enlarge other mens, as our Prince's Dominions, this hath more dignity, but no less desire.

But if any one endeavours to restore and inlarge 〈◊〉 power and domi∣nion of mankind, over the university of things, doubtless this ambition is sounder, and nobler than the other two: Now mans dominion over things consists onely in Arts and Sciences, for nature is not trusted, but by obedi∣ence.

It is now high time that we propound this art it self of interpreta∣ting nature, wherein though we suppose we have given most true and profitable precepts, yet we do not attribute unto it any absolute necessity or perfection, as though nothing could be done without it. For we are of opinion if men had by them a just History of Nature and Experience, and would diligently study it, and could command themselves in two things; first in putting away received opinions and notions. Secondly, in forbear∣ing a while generals and subgenerals, they would by the proper and genuine strength of the understanding, without any art, light upon our form of in∣terpretation; for interpretation is the true and natural work of the mind, all obstacles being first removed: But certainly our presents will make all things more ready and sure.

Nevertheless we do not affirm that nothing can be added unto them. On the contrary we, who consider the mind not only in its own faculty, but as it is united with things ought to determine, that the art of invention may grow and increase with things invented.


Page 19
Part of the Novum Organum, OR, APHORISMS OF THE Interpretation of NATURE and KING∣DOME of MAN.
Taken out of the Second Book.
IT is the business and intent of humane power to produce and superinduce a new nature, and new things upon a body given to it; but it is the busi∣ness and purpose of humane science, to find out the true form of this body, or the right difference, or the essence of nature, called natura naturans, or the Fountain of emanation: these words we use, be∣cause they express the thing, and discover it best. Now to these works of the first rank there be two of a second and inferior sort, that are subordinate. To the first, the transformation of concrete bodies from one to another within possible li∣mits. To the second, invention in all generation and motion of a Secret proceeding continued from an apparant efficient and vissible matter to a new form; as also the invention of an hidden schism of resting bodies not in motion.

Although the ways leading to the power and humane science, be near∣ly allied and almost the same, nevertheless it is the safest, because of that old and pernicious custome, of spending time in abstracts to begin and raise sciences from their very foundations, which look upon the active part in order, that it might consume and determine the active part, therefore we must see to some nature to be superinduced upon another body, what precept or direction any should require for that purpose, and that in an easie and plain expression.

For example, suppose any should desire to cover over Silver with the yellow colour of Gold, or give unto it an increase of weight, with a re∣gard to the Laws of matter, or to make an obscure stone become transpa∣rant, or glass gluttinous, or to cause a body not vegetable to grow; we must see in such a case what direction or deduction may cheifly he de∣sired, first a person would doubtless wish for something of a like Experi∣ment to be shewn unto him, which might not fail in the operation, nor de∣ceive in the undertaking. Secondly, he would desire some directions which might not bind him, and force him to certain mediums, and parti∣cular
Page 20

ways of acting, for it may be, that he may be unable to purchase, and procure unto himself such mediums, therefore if there be any other me∣diums and other methods of acting, besides that direction of producing such a nature, it may perhaps be of such things, as are in the power of the Worker; yet notwithstanding he may be excluded from the 〈◊〉 of such, things by the narrowness of the Rule, so as that he shall meet with no 〈◊〉. Thirdly, he may desire, that 〈◊〉 may be shewn unto him, which may not be altogether so difficult, as the operation that is in question, but that comes nearer to the practise.

Therefore it is 〈◊〉, that every true and perfect Rule of working be certain, 〈◊〉, and well designing, or in order to action: therefore this is the same as the invention of a true form, for the form of any nature is such, that when it is supposed the nature it self must needs follow, there∣fore it is always present, wherever that nature is, it be speaks it in gene∣ral and 〈◊〉 it. Such is the form of a thing that when it is taken away the 〈◊〉 of the thing is removed.

Therefore it is always 〈◊〉 from it, when that nature is absent, and is in it alone. 〈◊〉, a true form is such, that it deduceth the nature of a thing out of the Fountain of being, which is common to many, and more 〈◊〉 than the nature, as they speak, than the form. Therefore the Rule of knowing a true and perfect Axiom is this, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 found out which might be convertible with the nature given, and yet be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a more known nature, like as of a true genus.〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉, the one active, the other speculative, are the same in effect, and what is most useful in operation is most true in speculation.

But the Rule or Axioms of transforming bodies are two fold. The 〈◊〉 consider'd a body, as a troop or conjugation of simple 〈◊〉, as in 〈◊〉 these things do meet, that it is yellow, weighty, and of such 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 may be beaten thin and drawn into wire, of such a bigness that it is not vo∣latile, and that it loseth nothing by fire, that it is to be run in such a man∣ner, that it is to be separated and loosned by such means, and the like of the other natures or properties of Gold.

Therefore such an Axiom deduceth the thing from the forms of the sim∣ple 〈◊〉 or properties, for he that knows how to bring new forms and methods of yellow, of weight, of fluidity, &c. he will see and take care of their graduations and means, that all these be conjoined in one bo∣dy from whence transformation into Gold may be expected. Therefore this manner of marking belongs to the primary action, for there is the same method required in bringing forth one simple nature, as many; onely man meets with more difficulty in working, when he is to joyn together many natures, which meet not of themselves unless by the ordinary and usual ways of nature; nevertheless we may affirm that the method of working, which considers the 〈◊〉 natures, though in a concrete body, proceeds from those things, which in nature are constant, eternal, and universal, and open a wide door to mans ability, which as affairs are now manag'd our humane understanding can scarce comprehend or represent.

But the Second kind of Axioms, which depends from the invention of a secret proceeding, acts not by simple natures, but by concrete bodies, as they are found in natures ordinary course; for example, suppose an Inquisi∣tion is made from what beginnings, how, and in what manner Gold, or any other Metal, or Stone is generated from its first matter and deform substance until it comes to a perfect mineral, likewise in what manner Herbs grow,
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form their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the sap in the earth, or from the seed until it riseth up to be a plant with all the succession of motion, and the divers, and continued endeavours of nature. Likewise of the ordinary genera∣tion of animals from their conception to their birth, in like manner of all other bodies.

But this inquisition relates not onely to the generation of bodies, but al∣so to other motions and workings of nature; for example, suppose an in∣quisition be made into the universal series, and continued manner of nou∣rishment, from the 〈◊〉 reception of the Food, until it turns into the sub∣stance of the body; likewise of the voluntary motion in animals, from the 〈◊〉 impression of the fancy, and repeated endeavours of the spirits, to the movings and turnings of the Arters, or of the outward motion of the tongue, and lips, and other instruments to the giving of articulate 〈◊〉; for these things relate to concrete or collegious bodies, and in operations they are lookt upon as particular and special custom of nature, not as fun∣damental, and common Laws, which constitute forms. But we must needs 〈◊〉, that this method seems to be the most expedite, the most likely and 〈◊〉 and more than the other primary.

〈◊〉 wise the operative part, which answers this speculative, doth 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉, working from those things, which are commonly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 things near at hand, or from those things to other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 highest and radical operations upon nature depend 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 Axioms. Moreover, when man hath not the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but onely of knowing and beholding, as in 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 are not within mans reach he cannot change nor alter them. 〈◊〉 the inquisition of the fact it self, or of the truth of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉 as the knowledge of causes and agreements, relates to the primary and universal Axioms of simple 〈◊〉 as the nature of voluntary rela∣tion, or the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the load stone, and many others; which are more common than the 〈◊〉: neither can any body hope to ter∣minate the question, whether in the daily motion, the earth doth in truth come round, or the Heavens unless he understands 〈◊〉 the nature of vo∣luntary rotation.

The hidden proceeding, which we have mentioned, is otherwise, so that our humane understanding, as it is now wrapt up in 〈◊〉, can∣not easily search into it; neither do we 〈◊〉 certain measures, 〈◊〉, or degrees of proceeding visible in bodies, but that continued proceed∣ing, which for the most part is not subject to our senses.

For example, In all generation and transformation of bodies, we must inquire what is last, and what flies away, what remains, what is added, what dilates it self, what is drawn to it, what is united, what is separated, what is continued, what is cut off, what means, what hinders, what com∣mands, and what yields, and many other things.

Again, neither are we to enquire after these things in 〈◊〉 and transformation of bodies, but in all other alterations and motions we are likewise to enquire, what proceeds, and what succeeds, what is most fierce, and what is most remiss, what gives the motion, what commands, and the like.

All these things are unknown to, and never handled by the Sciences, which are composed by the grossest and the unablest wits. Seeing 〈◊〉 natural action is transacted by the least beginnings, or by such as are so small, that they are not to be perceived by our senses, no body can hope
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to rule or turn nature, unless he can comprehend and take notice of them in a due manner. Out of the two kinds of Axioms, which are already mentioned, Philosophy and Sciences are to be divided, (the common re∣ceived words which approach the nearest to the discovery the of things, be∣ing applied to our meaning) namely that the inquisition of forms, which in reason according to their own Laws are eternal and unmovable, constitutes the Metaphysicks; but the inquisition of the efficient, of the matter, of the se∣cret proceeding, and hidden schismatism, all which things regard the com∣mon and ordinary course of nature, not the foundamental and eternal Laws, should constitute the Physicks. Now to these are subordinate two practical Sciences, to Physick the Mechanick is subordinate, and to the Metaphysicks, the better sort of Magick, in regard of its large ways and greater command in nature.

Now that we have thus described our doctrine we must proceed to the precepts in a right and orderly manner; therefore the discovery of the in∣terpretation of Nature contains chiefly two parts. The first tends to the drawing out and raising Axioms from experience; the second teacheth how to take and derive Experiments from new Axioms. The first part is divided in a threefold manner into three ministrations; into that which relates to sense, into that which relates to the memory, and to that which relates to the mind or understanding.

First we must have a Natural and Experimental History; sufficient and good, which is the foundation of the thing: It must not be feigned or contrived onely, but we must find what Nature doth, or bears.

But the Natural and Experimental History is so various and scattered that it confounds and disturbs the understanding; unless it be limited and placed in a right order; therefore we must form some tables and ranks of instances in such a manner and order, that the understanding may work up∣on them.

Which, when it is done, the understanding left to it self, and moving of it self, is not sufficient, but unable, for the working of Axioms, unless it be ruled and assisted; therefore in the third place a lawful and true in∣duction is to be brought in, which is the Key of the Interpretati∣on; we must begin at the End and proceed back-wards to the rest.

An inquisition of forms proceeds in this manner, first, upon nature giv∣en, we must bring to the understanding all the instances of notes, that a∣gree in the same Nature, though by different matters; Therefore such a collection is to be Historical, without any hasty contemplation or greater subtilty than ordinary, for example in the inquisition of the form of Hot.

Convenient Instances in the Nature of Hot.
1. THe Sun beams chiefly in Summer; and at Noon.
2. The Sun beams beaten back and pressed together; specially between Mountains, Walls, and through Burning-glasses.
3. All fiery Meteors.
4. Fiery Thunderbolts.
5. The bursting forth of flames out of the Caves of Mountains, &c.
6. All Flame.
7. All solid bodies of fires
8. Hot and Natural Baths.
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9. All liquids heated or boiling.
10. Vapors and hot smoak, and the air it self, which receives a strong and furious heat, when it is shut up, as in all places of reflection.
11. Some kind of storms, by the constitution of the air, when there is no respect to the time of the year.
12. The air shut up in subterraneous Caves, chiefly in win∣ter.
13. All hair and shag, as wooll, the skins of beasts, feathers, have some∣thing of heat.
14. All bodies, as well solid as liquid, as well thick as thin, as the air, may be heated for a time.
15. Sparks of fire out of Iron or steel, when they are struck out.
16. All bodies rubb'd together as a stone, wood, cloth, &c. So that the axle-trees, and wheels of Carts sometimes are enflamed.

And the custome amongst the Western Indians is to make fire by rub∣bing.

17. All green Herbs, and moist, shut up close together, as Roses, Pease in a basket, and Hay, if it he laid up wet will often take fire.
18. Lime watered.
19. Iron when it is first dissolved by strong waters, in glass with∣out any assistance of fire, and likewise Pewter, &c. which is not so hot.
20. All animals chiefly in their inwards, though the heat in insects, because of the smalness of their bodies cannot be perceived by our feeling.
21. Horse-dung and the new excrements of such like creatures.
22. Strong oil of Sulphur and Vitriol performs the office of heat in burning linning.
23. The oyl of wilde Majoram, and the like, doth the office of heat in burning bones and teeth.
24. The strong spirit of wine well rectified performs the office of heat, so that if the white of an Egg be cast into it, it will thicken and whiten al∣most in the same manner, as when it is boiled, and cloth being cast into it will burn, and be brown as a toasted piece of bread.
25. All sweet sents, and hot herbs, as dragon wort, cresses, &c. Al∣though the hand feels not their heat, neither when they are entire, nor when reduced to ashes, but when they are chewed a little, they heat the tongue, and the pallet, as if they did burn.
26. Strong vinegar, and all things acide or sharp, are hot in a member, where there is no*Epidermis, as in the eye and tongue, and in a wounded part, or where the skin is taken off, they cause pain like to that of heat.
27. Also extroardinary cold seems to be burning.
28. Garlick.
This List we are want to name the Table Essence and Presence.

Secondly, we must examine with our understanding the instances which are deprived of* nature given.

The Instances at hand which have not the nature of heat.
THe beams of the Moon, of the Stars, and of the Comets seem not to be hot to our feeling, for we may observe that the greatest frosts
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are in the full Moon, but the fixed and bigger Stars, when the Sun goes under them, or draws near them, they are thought to be heated by the heat of the Sun, as when the Sun is in Leo, or in the Dog Days.

The Sun beams, in the middle region of the air, are not hot: The rea∣son is, because that region is not near enough to the body of the Sun, from whence the beams burst forth, nor to the earth that reflects them back; therefore this is plain, upon the tops of mountains, which are not the highest, snow abides upon them alwayes. But on the contrary, some have taken notice, that on the top of the Pick of Tenerif, and on the top of the Mountains of Peru, there is no snow to be seen, but upon the sides of these hills snow remains; therefore the air on the top of those Mountains is not cold, but subtil and sharp, so that in the mountains of Peru it pricks and offends the eyes with its sharpness, and the stomack, so that it makes men inclinable to vomit. The Ancients have taken notice, that, on the top of mount Olympus, the air is so subtil, that such as climb up to the top, must carry with them spunges dipt in water and vinegar, and often put them to their mouths and noses, because the air is there so subtil, that it sufficeth not for respiration. They say also that there is there so great a calm, free from all rain, storms, snow and winds, that some who sacrificed there, upon Jupiters altar, having made with their fingers an impression in the Ashes upon the Altar, the next year the same Letters and impression were to be seen without the least alteration. And such as venture up to the top of the Pick of Tenerif go by night and not by day, they are called upon a little after the rising of the Sun by their guides to hasten down again, because of the danger, as it seems, caused by the subtilty of the air, for fear that it should stiffle the spirits.

The reflection of the Sun beams near the northern pole are very weak and inefficacious in matter of heat.

Let this Experiment be tried, take a Looking Gloss made contrary to the burning-glasses, and put it between your hand, and the Sun beams, and take notice whether it don't diminish the heat of the Sun, as the burn∣ing-glass increaseth it.

Try this other Experiment, whether by the best and strongest burning-glasses it is not possible to gather together the beams of the Moon in one point, and cause thereby a small degree of warmth.

Try also a burning-glass upon any thing that is hot, but not luminous or shining, as upon hot urine, or hot stone, which is not fiery or upon boiling water or the like, and see whether it increaseth not the heat, as at the rayes of the Sun.

Try also a burning glass before the flame of the fire.

The Comets have not always the same effects in encreasing the heat of the year, though some have observed that grievous droughts have succeed∣ed them. Bright beams, and columns, and *Chasmata, and such like me∣teors appear more frequently in the winter than in the Summer, and especi∣ally in great frosts, when the air is very dry. Thunder and Lightnings seldom happen in Winter, but in the time of great heats. But falling Stars are thought to consist for the most part of a thin substance, bright and kindled, near a kin to the strongest fire.

There are some Lightnings that yield light but don't burn, such happen alwayes without thunder.

The breaking out, and eruptions of flames are to be seen in cold regions as well as in hot, as in Istandia, Greenland, as the trees which grow in cold
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Countreys are more combustible, more full of Pitch, and Rosom, than o∣thers that grow in hot Regions.

All flame is hot, more or less: Nevertheless, they say, that Ignus fa∣tuus, which lights sometimes against a wall, hath but little heat: it may be like the flame of the spirit of wine, which is mild and soft; but that flame is yet milder, which some credible and discreet Historians affirm to have been seen about the hair and heads of Boys and Girls, which did not so much as singe the hair, but did softly wave above them.

Every thing that is fiery, when it turns into a fiery red, when it should not yield any flame, it is always hot.

Of hot Baths, which happen by the scituation and nature of the Sun, there hath not been sufficient inquiry.

All boiling liquors in their own nature are cold, for there is no liquor to be toucht, which is so naturally, which remains always hot; heat there∣fore is given to it for a time, as an acquired nature or quality; so that the things themselves, which are in their operations most hot, as the spirit of Wine, some chymical Oiles, and the Oyl of Vitriol, and of Sulphur, and the ike, which at the first touching are cold, but soon after they burn.

There is a doubt whether the warmth of wool, of skins, and of feathers, and the like, proceed not from some small inherent heat, as it riseth from animals, or whether it proceeds not from a fatness and Oyliness, which is agreeable to warmth, or whether it comes not from the inclusion and fra∣ction of the Air.

There is nothing Tangible, or yielding spirit, but is apt to take fire: yet many things differ in this, that some receive heat sooner, as Air, Oyl, and water; ohers not so quickly, as Stone, and Metals.

There can be no sparks struck out of Stone, or Steel, or out of any o∣ther hard substance, unless some minute parts of the substance of the Stone or Metal be also struck out.

There is no Tangible Body to be found, but becomes warm by rubbing; therefore the Ancients did fancy, that the heavenly Globes had no other warmth or vertue to cause heat, but that which was derived to them from the 〈◊〉 of the air, when they were rowled about in their swift and surious course.

Some Herbs and Vegetables, when they are green and moist, seem to have in them some secret heat; but that heat is so small, that it is not to be perceived by feeling when they are single, but when they are heaped to∣gether, and shut up, that their spirits cannot escape out into the air, but encourge one another, then the heat appears, and sometimes a flame in con∣venient matter.

New lime becomes hot when it is sprinkled with water, either because of the union of heat, which before was dispersed. or by the irritation and exasperation of the spirits of water and of fire; for there is a kind of con∣flict and antiperistasis. How the heat is caused will easily appear, if in∣stead of Water, Oyl be cast into it, for Oyl, as well as Water, Unites the Spirits shut up, but it will not Irritate or anger them.

All dung of Animals, when it is old, hath the power of heating, as we may see in the fatting of ground.

Aromatick substances, and Herbs sharp at the taste, are much hotter when they are taken inwardly; we may try upon what other substances they discover any hot vertue. The Seamen tell us, that when heaps and
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lumps of Spices or Aromatick substances, are long shut up closs, and then o∣pened, there is some danger for such as stir them, or take them out first; for the fumes that arise from them are apt to inflame the spirits, and to give fea∣vers. Likewise an Experiment may be tried, whether their dust will not be able to dry Bacon, and other flesh hung over it, as over the smoak of a fire.

There is an accrimony or penetration in cold things, as Vinegar, and Oyl, of 〈◊〉, as well as in hot, as in the Oyl of wilde Marjoram, and the like; therefore they cause a like pain in animals, and in inanimate substances they dissolve, and confirm the parts. In animals there is no pain but is accompanied with a certain sense of heat.

Cold and hot have many effects common to them both, tho produced in a different manner; for snow seems to burn the hands of children, and cold preserves flesh from putrefaction, as well as fire, and heat draws together some substances to a lesser bulk as well as cold.

A Table of degrees, or of such things as are comparatively hot.
WE must first speak of those things, which seem not to the feeling to be hot, and yet are so potentially afterwards: we shall descend to mention such things as are actually, or at the feeling hot; and to exa∣mine their strength and degrees of heat.

1. Amongst the solid and Tangible bodies, there is none found, which is hot naturally or Originally, neither Stone, nor Metal, nor Sulphur, nor a∣ny Mineral, nor Wood, nor Water, nor the Carcase of any anima; but in baths there is hot water by accident, either by subterraneous flames, as fire; such as is in Etna, and many other mountains, or by the conflict of bodies, as heat is produced in the dissolution of Iron and Pewter. Therefore our feeling cannot be sensible of any degree of heat in inanimate substances, but they differ in their degrees of cold, for Wood is not so cold as Metals.
2. But touching things that have heat potentially in them, and that are ready to kindle, there are many inanimate substances of that nature, as Sul∣phure, Naptha, Salt-peter, &c.
3. Those things which before were inflamed, as the Horse dung, by an ani∣mal heat, or lime, ashes, and soot; by the fire they yet retain certain relicks of their former heat. Therefore there are certain distillations, and separati∣ons of bodies, effected by the heat of Horse dung; and the heat is raised in lime by Water, as we have already said.
4. Amongst the Vegetables there is no plant, nor part of a plant as the droppings, or sap, which seems to our feeling to be hot.
5. There is no part of dead animals nor any thing separated from them, which appears hot, nor the Horse dung it self, unless it be shut up, and bu∣ried close. But nevertheless all dung seems to have heat potentially in it, as may appear by the improvement of the ground. Likewise the Corpses of dead animals have the same secret heat potentially; therefore in Church-yards, where they are daily buried, the ground hath by that means acquired a secret heat, which soon consumes a Carcase newly buried, and sooner than other earth.
6. Whatsoever fatness the ground, as all sorts of dung, Chalk, Sea∣sand, Salt, and the like have a secret disposition and tendency to heat.
7. All Putrefaction hath some beginnings of a little heat, though not to that degree as to be perceived by feeling
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8. The first degree of heat of those things, which are to be felt. To be hot by feeling is the heat of animals, that have a great Latitude of degrees; for the lowest degree, as in insects, is not to be perceived by touching. The highest degree scarce attains to the degrèe of heat of the sun beams in the hottest Regions and Times: Nevertheless it is reported of Constantine and of several others, that they were naturally so hot, and their constituti∣on so dry, that in several violent feavers their bodies did burn so much, that when any did but touch them with the hand it would seem to burn a while after.
9. All animals do encrease their heat by motions and exercise, by Wine, good Chear, and Venery, and in burning Feavers, and pain.
10. All animals in the intervals of Feavers are ceased with Cold and shivering at first, but a little after they burn the more.
11. We may further inquire and compare the heat of several animals, as of Fishes, four Footed Beasts, Serpents, Birds, and according to their several species, as in a Lyon, in a Kite, or a Man; for, according to the common opinion, Fishes are inwardly less hot, Birds most, especially, Pi∣geons, Hawks, and Austriches.
12. Let us inquire further of the heat compared in the same animal with the several parts and members, for Milk, Blood, Seed, Eys, are of a mode∣rate degree of warmth, and less hot then the exterior flesh of animals, when it moves and is stirred about, but what degree of heat is in the brain, stomack, heart, and other parts, was never yet found out.
13. All animals, during the Winter and in Cold storms, are outwardly cold, but inwardly they are thought to be hotter than in summer.
14. The Coelestial heat, in the hottest Regions, times of the Year, and Day, is not so hot as burning Wood, Straw, or Linnen, neither doth it burn but through a glass.
15. The Astrologers inform us, that some Stars are hotter th another, Amongst the Planets, next to Sol, Mars is the hotest, afterwards Jupiter, then Venus, but Luna is thought to be Cold, and Saturn colder: Amongst the fixed Stars Sirius is the hottest, then cor Leonis or Regulus, afterwards the Dog Star, &c.
16. The Sun warms most when he is nearest to our Zenith, over our Heads; the same we may think of the other Planets, according to their de∣gree of heat, for example, Jupiter is hotter when he is under Cancer or Leo, than when he is under Capricornius or Aquarius.
17. The Coelestial heat is increased three several ways, Namely, when the Globe is over our heads, when it draw near by proplnquity, and by a conjunction or association of several Stars.
18. There are several degrees of heat in flames, and fires in strength and weakness.
19. I Judge that the flame, that bursts forth and proceeds from certain imperfect metals, is very strong and fierce.
20. But the flame of thunder seems to be fiercer than all other flames, for sometimes it hath dissolved Iron it self into drops, which all other flames cannot do.
21. In things set a fire there is also a different degree of heat, we esteem the weakest to be burn'd Linnen, or Tinder, touch Wood or Match; af∣ter them the weakest fire is that of a burnt coal, and laths set a fire: But the hottest we think to be Metal inflamed, as Iron and Copper, &c.
Page 28
22. Motion increaseth heat, as we may perceive by blowing with bellows: for some of the harder sort of Metals are not to be dissolv∣ed, or liquefied by a dead fire, unless it be Stirred up by blow∣ing.
23. We Judge that the great fires that happen, when the Wind blows hard, do struggle and strive more against the wind than they do yield to it, for the flame in such a case flies back with a greater fierceness when the Wind yeilds than when it drives it.
By the common fire, especially by the subterraneous fires, which are the remotest and shut up clossest from the rayes of the Sun, you may expel the Caelestial Nature from the form of hot.

By the heating of bodies of all sorts, I mean of Minerals, of Vegetables, and of the exterior parts of Animals, of Water, of Oile, &c. In drawing them nearer to the fire or any hot body you may expel all variety, and sub∣til texture of bodies. By Iron or other fiery Metals, which may heat other bodies without minishing ought of the weight or substance, expel the mix∣ture of the substance of another hot thing.

Here follows several other directions and precepts most useful, if well understood; but because I am limited I proceed to the other helps of na∣tures interpretation recommended by the worthy Author. First, He placeth pre∣rogatives of instances. Secondly, Helps of induction. Thirdly, Arectificati∣on of induction, &c. Amongst the prerogatives of instances the solitary in∣stances are first. They are such as discover the nature, which is inquired after in such subjects, which have nothing common with other subjects, except that Nature. And again, such as discover not the nature inquired for in such subjects, which are like in all things with other subjects, unless it be in the Nature it self, for example, if the Nature of Colour, is inquired in∣to, the solitary instances are Gems of Christal, which yeild not not only a color in themselves, but cast it upon a Wall.

They have nothing common with the fired colours in flowers, coloured Gems, Metals, Wood, &c. unless it be the Colour; from whence it may easily appear, that colour is nothing else but a Modification of the Image of light cast into, and received in the first kind, by divers degrees of lightning upon the body; in the Second, by the textures and various sches∣matisms of the body.

The Second are the instances called Migrantes, they are such in which the nature inquired for passeth to the generation, when before it was not, or contrariwise passeth to corruption, when it was before these instances are useful for a right understanding of the nature of things, and to direct us to practise; for example, suppose the nature of whiteness be inquired into, the instance putting to generation is whole glass, and glass beaten to with powder, likewise simple water, and water stirred about into froth, for whole glass and water are transparent, not white, but glass beaten and wa∣ter turned into froth, are not transparant, but white; therefore we must inquire what happens from that change or passage to glass or water; for it is evident that the form of whiteness is conveighed in by the contusion of the glass, and the stirring of the water, and there seems to be nothing added besides the communition of the parts of glass and water, and the mixture of the air.

By these instances we may understand such as pass, not onely to gene∣ration and privation, but such as proceed to Majoration and Minorati∣on; for they tend also to discover to us the true forms of things.

Page 29
The Third assistances are named offensive, they are such as discover the nature inquired, for nakedly and in it self also, in its rise, and highest de∣gree of power, free from all impediments; for as every body receives the forms of many natures conjoyned, so as that in the concrete one weak∣ness depresseth, breaks, and binds another, by that means every form is ob∣scured: Now there are some subjects to be found in which the nature sought for is above the rest in its full vigor, either by the absence of the impediment, or by the predominancy of its vertue. These Instances do chiefly discover the nature of forms. For example, if you inquire for the nature of weight take quick-silver, which is the heaviest of all other things beside Gold, which is not much heavier: But the instance of quick∣silver is more proper to discover the nature of weight, than Gold; because Gold is solid and close, but quick-silver is liquid and full of spirits; ne∣vertheless it is heavier than Diamonds, and the most solid things, from whence we may understand the form of weight, which consists in the abundance of the matter, not in the compactness and closeness of the thing.

The Fourth instances are named clandestine. They shew the nature in∣quired for in its lowest power, and as it were in the Cradle and beginning, rising and hid under a contrary nature that domineers over it. These instan∣ces are of great consequence to find out the forms of things, for example, if we inquire for the nature of solid; the clandestine instances are such as discover a weak, and lowest degree of consistency, a solidity in a fluide substance, as in a buble of water, which is as a thin skin of solidity determi∣ned and made of a watery body. By this example, and by snow, froth, and melted Metals, we may understand that liquid and solid, are but ordinary notions, agreeable to the sense, for in truth there is in every body a liqui∣dity which is weaker and more infirm in bodies homogeneous, as water, but stronger in heterogenious, therefore the conjunction to an heterogene∣ous body unites and joyns together, but the insinuation of the homogene∣ous dissolves and loosens.

The fifth sort of Instances are named Constitutive. They are such as con∣stitute a species of the nature inquired into, as a lesser form, for as the lawful forms which are convertible with the natures sought for, are hid in secret, & are not easily to be found, the thing it self and the weakness of our intellect requires that the particular forms be not neglected, but be diligently inqui∣red into, for whatsoever unites nature, although in an imperfect manner, it shews a way to find out forms.

For example, if any desires to understand nature of memory, or that which excites or helps memory, the constitutive instances are order and distribu∣tion, which evidently help our memory, also places in an artificial memory, &c. So that there are six lesser forms of those things which help memory; namely; limitation, a reducement of intellectual matters, to a sensibility an im∣pression into a strong affection, an impression into a pure and disingaged mind, a multitude of helps and a former expectation.

The Sixth are consormable instances or proportioned, for they shew si∣militudes, agreements, and conjugations of things, not in the lesser forms, as the constitutive instances do, but in a concrete body. They shew and discover a certain agreement between bodies, although they don't much 〈◊〉 to find out 〈◊〉, nevertheless they are very beneficial to reveal the Fabrick of several parts of the universe, and in its members they make a kind of dissection, and therefore they lead us, as it were, by the hand to high and noble axioms.

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For example, these are conformable Instances, a looking glass and an eye, the make of the ear, and the places where the Eccho sounds, but of which conformity, besides the observation of resemblance, which is very useful for many things, it is easie to gather and form this Axiom, viz. that the organ for the senses, and the bodies, that send back the sounds to the sense, are much alike. Again, the understanding being from hence in∣formed, may easily rise to another Axiom higher and more noble; namely, that there is no 〈◊〉 between the Consents, or Sympathies, of Sensible Bodies, and such as are inanimate without sense, unless it be that in the former, there is an animal spirit in the body, fitted to receive and entertain it, but in the latter there is none. Therefore as many consents as there are in inanimate bodies, so many senses there might be in animals, if there were as many holes or perforations in the animate body, for the animal spirit to move and fly to the member rightly disposed, as a right organ, &c. Ano∣ther conformable instance is the root of a plant, and the branches. Every vegetable swells and pushes out its parts round about as well downwards as upwards neither is there any Difference between the roots and branches, but only that the root is shut up in the Earth and the branches, spread in the air and the Sun, for if any one will but take a tender branch that grows, and turn the top towards the ground, though it toucheth not the earth, it will push forth a Root and not a Branch. And on the contrary, if the earth be put upon a plant, and be prest with a stone or other hard substance that might hinder the plant from spreading up, it will bring forth branches in the ground and underneath.

Other conformable instances are the Gum of Trees, and the most part of the gems of Rocks, for either of them are but the exudations and sweatings, the first out of the sap of trees, the Second out of Rocks, from hence pro∣ceeds the clearness and splendor of both. Namely from the thin and subtil percolation from hence it is also that the hairs of animals are not so beauti∣ful and of such a lively colour as the plumes of birds, for their sweat is not so fine when it issues out of their skin as when it comes out of a Fea∣thers.

Other conformable instances are the Fins of Fishes, and the Feet of four Footed Beasts, or the Feet and Wings of Birds unto which Aristotle adds four Circles in the motion of Serpents. Therefore in this great Fabrick of the World the motion of living creatures seems to be performed by four Ar∣ters or flexions.

Also in terrestrial animals the teeth, and in birds, their bills are alike, from whence it is evident that in all perfect animals there is a certain hard sub∣stance that draws to the mouth.

The Seventh are irregular instances, such as discover bodies in their whole, which are extravagant and broken off in Nature, and do not agree with other things of the same gender, but are only like to themselves, there∣fore stiled Monodicae. They are useful to raise and unite nature, to find out the genders and common natures, to limit them by their true differences. Neither are we to desist from an inquisition until the properties and quali∣ties, which are found in such things as are thought to be miracles in nature, may be reduced, and comprehended under some form or certain Law, that all irregularity and singularity might be found to depend upon some com∣mon form.

Such instances are the Sun and Moon amongst the Stars, the Loadstone a∣mong the Stones, quick-silver amongst metals, the Elephant, amongst the four
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Footed Beasts, &c. The eighth sort of instances are named Diviantes, because they are Natures errors, and Monsters, when Nature declines and goes aside from its ordinary course. The use of these is to rectifie the understanding, to reveal the common Forms; neither in these ought we to desist from the inquisition until we have found out the cause of the deviation. But this cause doth not rise properly to any Form, but onely to the hidden pro∣ceeding to a Form, for he that knows the ways of Nature, he shall with more ease observe its deviations. And again, he that understands its Deviations can better discover its ordinary ways and methods.

The Ninth sort of instances are Named Limitanea, such as discover the species of bodies, which seem to be composed of two species, or the Rudi∣ments between one species and another: such are Flies between rottenness and a plant, certain Comets between stars and fiery meteors, Flying, Fishes, between Birds, and Fishes, &c.

The Tenth are instances of Power, which are the noblest, and the most perfect, as the most excellent in every art; for as this is our business chiefly, that Nature should be obedient and yield to the benefits of men; it is fitting, that the works, which are in the power of men, as so many provinces, be over∣come and subdued, should be taken notice of, and reckoned specially such as are most plain and perfect, because from them there is an easier and a nea∣rer way to new inventions, never found out before.

The Eleventh instance are stiled Comitatus and Hostiles. They are such as discover a concrete body such in which the nature inquired after, doth always follow it as an individual companion, and on the contrary, in which the Nature required doth always fly from it, & is excluded out of its compa∣ny as an enemy: for out of such instances propositions may be formed, which may be certain, universal, affirmative, and negative, in which the subject shall be such a body in concrete, & the predicate the nature it self that is sought, for example if you seek for hot the Iustantia comitatus is the flame, &c.

The Twelth are subjunctive, &c.

The Thirteenth are instances of Union which confound and joyn toge∣ther Natures, which are esteemed to be heterogeneous, and for such are noted and confirmed by the received divisions.

For example, if the nature required is hot. That division seems to be good and authentick, that there are three kinds of heat; the Coelestial, the animal, and that of the fire. These heats especially one of them being compared with the other two, are, in essence and species, or by a specifick nature, differing and altogether heterogeneous; for the heat of the Coelestial Globes, and the animate heat, encourage and help generation; but the heat of the fire cor∣rupts and destroyes. It is therefore an instance of Union. This experiment, is common enough when the branch of a vine is brought into the house, where there is a continual fire, by which the Grapes will ripen a month soo∣ner than those that are in the air: so that fruits may be brought to Maturity when they hang upon the tree by the fire, whereas, this seems to be a work proper only to the Sun. Therefore the understanding is perswaded from hence to inquire, what are the differences which are really between the heat of the Sun and that of the fire; from whence it happens that their operations are so unlike, and they nevertheless partake of the same common nature. The differences are found to be four. First, that the heat of the Sun in respect of the heat of the fire is a degree much milder and more favourable. Secondly, That it is conveyed, to us through the air, which of it self is hu∣mide. Thirdly, and chiefly that it is very unequal, sometimes drawing
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near and increasing in strength, anon departing and diminishing, which ve∣ry much contributes to the generation of bodies. Fourthly, that the Sun works upon a body in a long space of time; but the working of the fire, through mens impatiency, performs the business in a shorter time. If any will be careful to attemper and reduce the heat of the fire to a more moderate and milder degree; which may be done several ways, if he will besprinkle it, and cause it to send forth something of humidity; cheifly if he imitates the Suns inequality. Lastly, if he stayes a little, by this means, he shall imitate or equal, or in some things cause the fires heat to be better than the Suns.

The Fourteenth sort of instances are the Judicial, which is when an in∣quisition is made, and the understanding is placed in an Equilibrium, in an uncertainty where to assign the cause of the Nature inquired for.

For example, suppose any man seeks the cause of the flux and reflux of the sea twice a 〈◊〉. This motion must needs proceeds from the progress and regress of the waters, in the manner of water troubled up and down in a bason, which when it toucheth the one side of the bason, it leaves the other. Or it must proceed from the rising and falling of the waters in the bottom, as boiling water: now there is a doubt unto which of these causes the ebbing and flowing, or flux and reflux of the sea is to be assigned; which if the first of these be assert∣ed, then it will follow, that when the flux is on this side, the 〈◊〉 will be at the sametime on the other. But Acosco with some others have found after a diligent inquiry, that upon the Coast of Florida, and upon the Coast of Spain, and Africa, the ebbing and flowing of the Sea happens at the same moment of time. This question is further examined in the Original.

The Fifteenth sort of instances are of divorce, because they discover the separations of those 〈◊〉 which often meet.

The Sixteenth are the Instances of the lamp, or of the first information, which assist the sense, for as all interpretation of nature begins by the sense, and from the perception of the sense leads by a right and straight-way to inform the understanding, which are the true notions and axioms; it must needs be, that the more copious and exact the representations of the senses are, so much the better and the happier all things must succeed.

The Seventeenth sort of Instances are stiled of the Gate, because they help the immedi∣ate actions of the senses. Amongst the senses, it is certain that the sight is the chief, in regard of information; therefore we must seek assistances to this sight.

The eighteenth are Instances called Citantes, which deduce that which is not sensible to be sensible.

The Nineteenth are Named Instances of supplement, because they supply the understand∣ing with a right information when the senses fail, therefore we must Fly to them, when we have no proper instances. This is done in a two fold manner, either by Gradation, or by Analogy. For example, the Medium is not to be found which stop the Load-stone in moving the Iron, neither gold, if we put it between, nor silver, nor stone, nor glass, nor wood, &c. Nevertheless after an exact tryal, there may be a certain medium sound, which might dull its vertue more than any thing else comparatively, and in some degree, as that the loadstone should not be able to drawIron to it self through gold of such a thickness, &c.

The Twentieth sort are stiled Instances persecantes, because they cut nature asunder, &c.

The One and Twenty sort are instances of the Rod, or of non ultra.

The Two and Twentieth are called Instances Curriculi. They measure nature by the moments of time, as the instances of the Rod measure it by the degrees of space. For all motion and natural action is performed in a time, some quicker, some softer, &c:

The Three and Twentieth sort are instances Quanti, &c.

The Four and Twentieth sort are instances of Predominancy,

The 25. sort are called Innuentes, because they discover and design the benefits of men.

The Six and Twentieth sort are named Instantiae Polychrestas.

The Seven and Twentieth are the Magick instances. They are such in which the mat∣ter or the officient is but little and slender, if compared with the greatness of the work, or of the effect that follows, in somuch that though they are common, they are looked upon as miracles, &c.

I am forced to out short, and abbreviate many excellent directions, and to pass over several weighty observations, because I am limited. However this abbreviation may give the Reader 〈◊〉 of the whole.

FINIS.