QUESTION 1
[70685] Of the 108 articles, q. 1
First of all, we must consider that the reason of each person is what his name signifies, just as the reason of a stone is what his name signifies. Now names are signs of intellectual conceptions: hence the reason of each thing signified by a name is the conception of the intellect, which the name signifies. Now this conception of the intellect is indeed in the understanding as in the subject, but in the thing understood as in the represented: for the conceptions of the understanding are certain similitudes of the things understood. But if the conception of the intellect were not assimilated to a thing, it would be a false conception of that thing, just as if it understood that it is a stone which is not a stone. Therefore the reason of the stone is indeed in the understanding as in the subject, but in the stone as in that which causes the truth in the conception of the intelligent intellect to be such a stone. When, therefore, the intellect comprehends a thing, it perfectly represents that thing with one conception; and thus it happens that there are different conceptions of different things. But our understanding cannot comprehend God, nor see Him in His essence in the state of the way, but it knows Him in some way from created things. Now the various perfections of created things, for example wisdom, will, and the like, indeed imperfectly represent the divine perfection: for from the fact that any creature is wise, it approaches in some way to the divine likeness; in the same way, from the fact that he is powerful, and from the fact that he is willing; so that whatever perfection or nobility belongs to a creature also belongs to God, who is the unequivocal effective cause of creatures. However, these different things are more eminently appropriate to God according to his simple essence. And likewise our intellect, receiving knowledge from created things through different conceptions, is assimilated to the one divine essence, albeit imperfectly. Thus, therefore, goodness, wisdom, and power, and if we say anything else of this kind about God, they differ in reason because of the different conceptions of our understanding, but they are the same thing, because the divine essence is one and the same, which our understanding represents in different conceptions. just as different things also represent the divine essence in different forms. Therefore, what is stated first can be understood in this way: since all perfection is most truly in God, since there is one true reason for wisdom and another for goodness, it is necessary that these differ in reason in God. but because they are simply in him, they are the same thing. But it is slanderously objected to this, that the very difference between wisdom and goodness is in God, and not only in the created intellect. For he did not understand these things when he wrote, but that in God, that is, when they are said of God, they differ in reason, that is, according to the different conceptions of our intellect, which represent one divine essence, albeit imperfectly. For it is already clear from what has been said, that the reason of which mention is made is indeed in the understanding as in the subject, but in the divine essence as in the represented. Likewise, the second objection, that the reason of divine goodness includes wisdom in itself, because divine goodness is wisdom, does not hold: because divine goodness is divine wisdom from the fact that it is divine, not from the fact that it is goodness. nor does goodness come from the fact that there is wisdom. Now this belongs to the reason of goodness and wisdom, namely, that which belongs to goodness in so far as it is goodness, and to wisdom in so far as it is wisdom. From this it is clear that the third also does not apply: for it does not belong to the reason of goodness and wisdom that which belongs to this or that in so far as it is divine, but that which belongs to goodness in so far as it is goodness, and to wisdom in so far as it is wisdom, as has been said.
QUESTION 2
[70686] Of the 108 articles, q. 2
It is also clear from the foregoing that a sound understanding can have what is stated secondly, namely: the reason by which the divine attributes differ is founded partly on the thing, partly on the understanding . It is necessary, however, that it should be poured over both in different ways. For the reasons by which the attributes differ are founded in our understanding, because they are in it as in the subject. But they are founded on matter, because there are certain similitudes representing the divine essence in their own way: for thus the reason of a stone is said to be founded on matter, inasmuch as the conception of the intellect represents a stone. But what is objected to the contrary, namely, that which is absolutely one, is not the foundation of diversity, is evidently false from the foregoing: for the same divine essence is represented by different things both in the intellect and in nature. And so he understood, when he wrote, that the reasons of the different attributes are based on the divine essence, as represented by the different conceptions of our intellect, which are signified by different names.
QUESTION 3
[70687] Of the 108 articles, q. 3
It is also clear from them that the third thing is to have a sound understanding, namely, that the diversity of reason's power, wisdom, and goodness is founded on the understanding as the subject, on God as the object, which furnishes the cause and support for its truth . Let it be understood, however, that it affords support to the truth , inasmuch as attributes of this kind are represented by each conception of our intelligent intellect: but not in so far as the very diversity of attributes represents any diversity in God, as is objected to the contrary. For this diversity of conceptions or reasons does not result from the diversity of God, but from the deficiency of our understanding, which cannot understand one thing perfectly except through many, which understands attributes according to the perfection found in created things.
QUESTION 4
[70688] Of the 108 articles, q. 4
But what is stated in the fourth place: in God there is no infinite extension, but intensive , it is not so in what is written; for it is written there thus: What is objected to concerning infinite emanation: I answer. Extensive infinity is imperfection, when it recedes from unity; but the infinite is intensive, it is of perfection when it approaches unity. The first therefore does not belong to God, but the second . For it is clear that he speaks of an infinite emanation. But emanation can have extension according to number, at least in creatures: although God cannot have extension according to dimensional quantity. But the infinite emanation is said to be intensive, though not properly so, in the manner of speaking in which God is said to be intense in goodness, because he is supremely good. But the divine emanation is not extensively infinite, because there is not an infinite number of emanating persons, although the divine emanation is eternal, as the objector proposes.
QUESTION 5
[70689] Of the 108 articles, q. 5
But what is stated in the fifth place: to produce persons in God is not of the nature of perfection, but if it were in creatures , the understanding is simply false; unless it be added that it is not of the nature of absolute perfection, or said to itself; and this he himself seems to understand by what he adds, although he does not express it well; for he adds: because he says only what is not to produce something in this way a person in a creature.
QUESTION 6
[70690] Of the 108 articles, q. 6
But what is placed in the sixth place, the relation in the divine, compared to the essence, is the only reason; compared to the object of which it is, so is a certain thing , thus is it understood: because a relation compared to its essence differs only in reason from it, but differs in reality from the opposite relation. whence he afterwards adds: for the relation itself, that is, by comparison with the essence, is the same as the thing itself, but differs in reason ; but it is not understood that a relation is only a reason to which some thing does not correspond, so that the objector is slandered.
QUESTION 7
[70691] Of the 108 articles, q. 7
But what is placed seventh, light is the quality of a universal agent, that is, of heaven , is understood to be universal in the genus of natural agents, and not simply, as the objector understood: for though light be in the air, yet it is in it from the heavenly body, as heat in water is from fire . Therefore, just as heat is the proper quality of fire, although it is caused by fire in other bodies, so light can be said to be the proper quality of heaven, although it is caused by heaven in other bodies.
QUESTION 8
[70692] Of the 108 articles, q. 8
But what is put in the eighth place, because in this name God, both the thing and the manner of signifying is the same as the person, therefore this name God can be supposed as a person , is not meant that the manner of signifying is the same as the person, as the objector understood, but that the manner of signifying in this name God, there is the same way of signifying a person, in so far as it signifies both in the concrete.
QUESTION 9
[70693] Of the 108 articles, q. 9
But what is said in the ninth, that divine generation is not limited to relation, but to hypostasis which is subject , is true if it is understood of substance as it signifies suppositum, but not if it is understood of substance which is essence or nature. Nor is it valid what is objected to the contrary. Relation in the divine is hypostasis: therefore, if it is limited to hypostasis, it is limited to relationship; As the divine essence is not valid, the divine essence is a hypostasis, therefore the divine generation is limited to the essence: for as the divine essence is not generated, so neither is sonship, but the son.
QUESTION 10
[70694] Of the 108 articles, q. 10
But what is said in the tenth, although these things are granted under some impropriety, nature from nature, light from light, substance from substance, God from God, yet these things are not commonly granted, essence from essence , is wrongly said, as to what is said that God it is improperly said of God. For this is proper, God from God, just as this also, God begat God, as the objector says, and as he himself determines in the fourth distinction; from which I think it happened by a mistake of the writer.
QUESTION 11
[70695] Of the 108 articles, q. 11
But what is proposed in the eleventh, even if the nature is the same in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, yet not having the same way , has a doubtful meaning. For if he understands the essential mode, it is expressly false: suppose he were to say that the essence is better or more perfect in one than in another; but if he understands the relative mode, according to what Hugh de Saint Victor, in Lib. de Trin., ascribes a certain mode of being to each person, so it is true what is said: because although essence is not referred to as being generative or begotten, as the objector says, it is nevertheless essence received or communicated through generation. Therefore the divine essence is in the father as not received from another; in the son as received through generation; in the holy spirit as received by the procession.
QUESTION 12
[70696] Of the 108 articles, q. 12
But what is stated in the twelfth, production by nature and by the will can be understood threefold: from nature alone, or from the will alone, or from nature and will together: in the first way the Son proceeds, in the second way the creature proceeds, in the third way the Holy Spirit proceeds , as regards that which objecting against, he has no great difficulty. For in this way the Son can be said to proceed from nature and the Holy Spirit from nature and will, just as the Son is said to be nature from nature, wisdom from wisdom, although the Father and the Son are of one nature and one wisdom. But that distinction seems to be rather slanderous, from which the Holy Spirit seems to be left out, as if he were in a middle way between the Son and the creature. Therefore, just as God the Father brought forth the Son not by will, but by nature, so we must feel about the Holy Spirit: for what God brings forth by will is a creature, as Hilary proves in Lib. of the synod It is said, however, that the Holy Spirit proceeds by the mode of the will, because it proceeds as love, just as the Son proceeds by the mode of the understanding, inasmuch as it proceeds as the word: yet just as the word proceeds naturally from God speaking, so also love likewise from God loving.
QUESTION 13
[70697] Of the 108 articles, q. 13
But what is said in the thirteenth, that generation is not an act of nature as it is common, but as it is combined with the property of the supposed generator , as far as what the objector touches, does not seem much to be slandered, because the combination can be referred to our understanding or expression, as, for example, when we say, essence and paternity are in the father; but not to the composition of the matter. But it might be more slandered from what is said, generation is an act of nature in the father, if it were understood to be an act of nature, as begetting; for it must be understood that it is an act of nature as by which the begetting begets: for nature does not beget, but the father naturally begets the son.
QUESTION 14
[70698] Of the 108 articles, q. 14
But what is put in the fourteenth, for the powers on the part of operations, namely, creation and generation, which are different, and according to what they are before and after, have a distinction , has a sound understanding. For although the power of creation and generation is the divine essence, as the objector touches, yet it conveys a respect which the essence does not convey; and as far as this respect is concerned, power is distinguished, although essence is not distinguished. Similarly, although the act of creation is God and the divine essence, yet it connotes the effect according to which creation is distinguished from generation, but not according to the very essence of the action, as it is the divine essence itself.
QUESTION 15
[70699] Of the 108 articles, q. 15
But what is stated in the fifteenth place is that, as the eternal is prior to the temporal, so something eternal is prior in order to the temporal; whence the order of power to the eternal act of generation is prior to its order to the temporal act of creation , there is no slander: because the act of creation is said to be temporal as far as the effect is connoted, on the basis of which it is not allowed that God creates from eternity, although his action is eternal, which is the divine essence . Even though the eternal does not have an order to something temporal as an end, it nevertheless has an order to something temporal as a beginning to an effect: for God, who is eternal, is the beginning and the end of all creation.
QUESTION 16
[70700] Of the 108 articles, q. 16
But what is stated in the sixteenth can be taken in two ways, simply and absolutely, and thus is not proper to God: or with precision, that is, nothing added, and thus is proper to God , the objector is slandered by not understanding what is said. For it is not taken absolutely here, according as what is said to be absolute is that which does not depend on another; but absolutely, that is, universally. Similarly, what is said with precision, that is, without any addition , he did not understand well. For he understood in writing that a being to which nothing is added, but a pure subsisting being, is proper to God; but he did not understand that being, as it is proposed without addition, is proper to God.
QUESTION 17
[70701] Of the 108 articles, q. 17
But what is stated in the seventeenth place is that the truths of things compared to the subject are different, but according as they are compared to the divine intellect, the truth of all is one , it is the most true; yet that one truth is not a created truth, as the objector understood, but an uncreated truth.
QUESTION 18
[70702] Of the 108 articles, q. 18
But what is stated in the eighteenth, that the reason of creation, as it is in creatures, is invariable, and is said to be eternal from the want of variation , the objector does not rightly attack. For although every creature is produced from non-being into being, and therefore is in some way variable, yet certain definitions and propositions are said to be invariable because of the necessary order of one term to another. just as Socrates is variable, so is his course and movement, and yet this is invariable: if he runs, he moves. However, this invariability does not make the statement eternal except according to what it is in the eternal intellect, that is, the divine.
QUESTION 19
[70703] Of the 108 articles, q. 19
Now that which is placed in the tenth and ninth is the tenth composition of a heterogeneous body and a vegetable soul; the eleventh from a body of this kind and a vegetable and sensible soul, like an animal; The twelfth of these, and the rational soul , is improperly said, as the objector touches, because it gives us to understand by the copula, that the rational soul is different from the vegetable and the sensible; but I believe that he referred the copula to the rational only, not to the substance of the soul. Wherefore it would stand better, if he said, from these and the rational, as he said above, from the vegetable and sensible soul.
QUESTION 20
[70704] Of the 108 articles, q. 20
But what is placed in the twentieth, that the divine essence is not from another in itself, but in the person of the Son , has a double understanding. For if it is understood that the divine essence existing in the Son is from another, it is false, as the objector attacks; But if it is understood that the divine essence is in the son from another, that is, from the father, it is true: for it is from the father that the divine essence is in the son.
QUESTION 21
[70705] Of the 108 articles, q. 21
But what is stated in the twenty-first, that the essence is the principle of notional acts as it is connected with the personal properties , is not slandered by the fact that it says that the essence is connected with the properties in the way that has been explained above. But it seems more to have a slander from the fact that it is said, essence is the principle of notional acts : for it is false if it is understood that essence is the principle of such acts as generating or breathing; but if it is understood to be the principle of notional acts as such, it is in harmony with the words of the Master, in the 7th dist. in the first book, where he says that the power of generation is the divine essence; but the power of generation is the principle of generation, as by which the begetter begets.
QUESTION 22
[70706] Of the 108 articles, q. 22
But what is stated in the twenty-second, of other attributes from nature and will, is not the primacy of the agent, but only of the exemplar; whence the essence is with respect to the thing of another, not with respect to the substantial thing ; two principles acting; saying, of those things which are done, some things are done by nature, and others by purpose or will. But power and virtue are not distinguished from these two, by the fact that they have a common relation to both: for power and virtue are both natural, and rational, or voluntary; Similarly, the intellect in acting is not distinguished from the will, because the intellect does not move except through the medium of the will. However, something proceeds in the divine by way of the understanding, that is, the word, just as the Holy Spirit also proceeds by way of the will, such as love.
QUESTION 23
[70707] Of the 108 articles, q. 23
But what is set forth in the twenty-third, the son proceeds as the word, and the art by which the father can produce all things; the holy spirit, as love, by which love wants to produce them , has a multiple understanding. For it can be understood that the father can and wills the son with the Holy Spirit; and so it is false, as the objector attacks. It can also be understood that the father can beget the son and wants to beget the Holy Spirit; and so it is true: for the Father produces all things through the Son and the Holy Spirit; and what he does, it is clear that he can and wills. Therefore he is able and willing to produce all things through his son.
QUESTION 24
[70708] Of the 108 articles, q. 24
But what is stated in the twenty-fourth, the Holy Spirit proceeds as the reason for willing, the creature as the willed , if it is understood that the Holy Spirit is the reason for willing on the part of the willing, is false, as the objection touches; because it is not a reason for the father to will that is not a reason for him to be. But if it is understood from the part of the willed, what is written is true: for the end is the reason for willing those things which are for the end. But no one doubts that the Holy Spirit is the cause of the production of creatures, like the Father and the Son.
QUESTION 25
[70709] Of the 108 articles, q. 25
But what is stated in the twenty-fifth, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as if there were several agents, but still as one in the beginning in which they act , can be rightly understood. Nor is it similar with regard to the procession of the creature, and of the holy spirit: because the holy spirit requires, according to the nature of its procession, a distinction in those from whom it proceeds; it also proceeds as a connection between the two: which cannot be said of a creature. And it is not necessary that the effect be a simpler cause, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the many according to the fact that there are many in some way; but the father and the son breathe by a respiratory power, which is the divine nature, which is one in both. However, these things are not said to the extent that in the divine there is cause and caused, or agent and effect; but these things are said in this manner, according as we speak of the divine in a human manner. Nor is it necessary that if it proceeds from many inasmuch as there are many, that it does not proceed entirely from one; but that he should not proceed from the one without regard to the other.
QUESTION 26
[70710] Of the 108 articles, q. 26
But what is placed twenty-sixth, although the spirit proceeds from them as they are more in number according to the number of agents, yet not according to the form which multiplies them , has the same reason as the preceding one.
QUESTION 27
[70711] Of the 108 articles, q. 27
But what is placed in the twenty-seventh does not follow that it is more authorial, because both mediately and immediately , if it understands the absolute mode, it is false. But if he understands the relative mode, in so far as something is true, and in so far as something is false, because the relation in which the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit is common to the Father and the Son. Hence, as regards this, the relative mode is the same, but the relation in which the son is to the father is peculiar to him. According to this method, then, it can be said that the son is the author of the Holy Spirit in a different way than the father; inasmuch as the son has these things from another, but not the father. And the same can be said of all things that belong to the father and the son, because the son has everything from the father, and the father from nothing.
QUESTION 28
[70712] Of the 108 articles, q. 28
But what is put in the twenty-eighth, God generating is an essential noun drawn to the personal, just as a power combined with a notional act is notional , it has a sound understanding. Nor is it similar to essence and power, as it is objected, because essence does not imply any relation to the principle, as does power: according to the reason of which relation it is called the power of generation, that is, which is the principle of generation.
QUESTION 29
[70713] Of the 108 articles, q. 29
What is said in the twenty-ninth, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from two, the Son from one, whence it seems to proceed more , is completely false; unless he makes force in what is said, it seems : to be understood, it seems sophistical, which it is not.
QUESTION 30
[70714] Of the 108 articles, q. 30
But what is set as the thirtieth is for another reason, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from one to the other, therefore it seems to have more of a process of procession , it is simply said badly, unless there is also force in what is said: it seems .
QUESTION 31
[70715] Of the 108 articles, q. 31
But what is said in the thirty-first is said to be temporal in one way, which is subject to temporal variation, and in this way that by which we are raised above time, is not temporal, or in time: so indeed is grace , this seems to be taken from what Augustine says, that inasmuch as something we know the eternal in mind, we are not in this world: which is indeed true from the point of view of the object into which we are raised, which is above the world and above time; but on the part of us who are exalted, when we are temporal, and in the world, grace is temporal.
QUESTION 32
[70716] Of the 108 articles, q. 32
As for what is stated in the thirty-second place, giving sometimes implies communication alone, sometimes also emanation, sometimes translation; in the first way it can be said that each person gives himself, in the second way one person gives another, in the third way each person is said to be a created gift; but of course it would not be said, if he said, that in the second way every person gives whatever to another, as the objector understood.
QUESTION 33
[70717] Of the 108 articles, q. 33
But what is stated in the thirty-third place is that the saints of the new testament are more disposed to receive grace than the saints of the old testament, because the hindrance of Adam's sin has been removed. as in Baptism, neither was the price paid for the redemption of the whole human race.
QUESTION 34
[70718] Of the 108 articles, q. 34
But what is stated in the thirty-fourth, that the existence of the soul is nothing other than what it gives to the body , must be true. For if the soul is the form of the body, and the form and the matter are one according to their being, that would not be true if the being of the form were one thing, and the being which gives the matter another thing. And for this reason it does not follow that the soul has a corruptible being like the body, because the body can lose that being, but the soul cannot: and for this reason the soul remains having that being separated from the body.
QUESTION 35
[70719] Of the 108 articles, q. 35
What is said in the thirty-fifth is that there was no visible mission in the Old Testament , which is true, but it is deceived by the objection that it does not distinguish between apparitions and missions. .
QUESTION 36
[70720] Of the 108 articles, q. 36
But what is said in the thirty-sixth, at the end of the Church there will not be a time of spiritual propagation for the multiplication of the faithful , this may be true if it is understood as to the time of the Antichrist: not that at that time some will be converted to the Church, as Augustine says in 20 de Civ. of God, but because of tribulations not many will be converted.
QUESTION 37
[70721] Of the 108 articles, q. 37
But what is stated in the thirty-seventh, that all action is from the form inherent in the agent , if it is understood as inherent accidentally, as the objector understood, is false; if it is understood as inherent, that is, existing in the agent in any way, it is true: for we say that substantial form is in fire, and deity in God.
QUESTION 38
[70722] Of the 108 articles, q. 38
But what is said in the thirty-eighth is false, namely, that God does not act in the soul except through a new influx: for a new influx can come into the soul but by a new disposition of the recipient, just as a new illumination in the air results from a new disposition of the air . For it is manifest that God acts in the soul not only by causing in it some attitude, for example of grace or virtue, but also by inclining the free will to this or that; which is not properly said to influence, but rather to move to action.
QUESTION 39
[70723] Of the 108 articles, q. 39
But what is stated in the thirty-ninth, in spiritual things, addition does not depart from simplicity , it is true, if it is understood of addition which is by way of intention, as that which is better is said to be added in goodness above that which is less good; but it is not true if it is understood as the addition of thing to thing, or species to species: for the intellect is less simple, which has more intelligible species.
QUESTION 40
[70724] Of the 108 articles, q. 40
But that which is placed in Lent is appropriate to be given to the son by act and not by aptitude , I believe it should not be said improperly.
QUESTION 41
[70725] Of the 108 articles, q. 41
But what is stated in the first chapter, that the uncreated word is not a reason for pronouncing other words , is simply false.
QUESTION 42
[70726] Of the 108 articles, q. 42
But what is stated in the forty-second time, although the end of both is the same, yet the order of both to that end is different, because the Holy Spirit orders to it in the manner of an efficient one , is improperly said, if by end is meant that for the sake of which there is something else: for the Holy Spirit is not for the sake of created some effect; But if the end is taken as a limit, just as a point is called the end of a line, so some created effect may be said to be the end to which the operation of an uncreated person ends.
QUESTION 43
[70727] Of the 108 articles, q. 43
But what is put in the forty-third place, that which proceeds from something to another as an object, is not said to proceed with respect to it as a gift , it has no necessary reason.
QUESTION 44
[70728] Of the 108 articles, q. 44
But what is put in the forty-fourth can be taken as equal in two ways: as if it means only a relation, or as with a relation, it implies an act or a movement towards it; In the first way, the father is said to be equal to the son, and secondly , the son is equal to the father. For equality signifies only relation, yet presupposes unity. As to this, however, it does not seem well said that equal sometimes implies a movement towards equality: for this kind of movement does not mean equal or equality, but adaptation. Granting, however, that it signified this kind of movement, it does not follow that it is inappropriate, from the fact that he says that the son is equal to the father in this way: for although there is no movement towards equality in the son, he nevertheless receives from the father, whence he is equal to him. to the son, that movement towards equality in the creature.
QUESTION 45
[70729] Of the 108 articles, q. 45
But what is said in the forty-fifth, that the son is said to be equal to the father, inasmuch as he says that he is equal to motion to the same extent as the relation follows , has a sound understanding: for although there is no motion in the son, yet generation has something similar to motion in so far as it receives, as Basil says , is common to the Son and the creature.
QUESTION 46
[70730] Of the 108 articles, q. 46
But what is said in the forty-sixth, that one person has no being in himself , is false according to what is said that God is in himself: which is explained more negatively than affirmatively, because of course he does not need another in whom he is, in the manner of speaking in which it is said that the father is from himself. because not from another.
QUESTION 47
[70731] Of the 108 articles, q. 47
But what is said in the forty-seventh, the act of existence is threefold: one completely unmixed with power, so as to be divine; another is always mixed with power, such is the case of generable things; thirdly, having himself in the middle: for he is mixed with power inasmuch as he is from another; but partly not, inasmuch as it is simple and at the same time completely complete, and such is the being of angels , it can have a sound understanding. For the writer does not intend to exclude from the angelic being any powers, but the power which would be transmutable, which is in corruptible things.
QUESTION 48
[70732] Of the 108 articles, q. 48
But what is stated in the forty-eighth is that the power and action of eternal things is not all at once, but successively: yet not continuously, but intermittently , it is true of actions according to their nature: for they have successive actions; whence Augustine says that God moves the spiritual creature through time , and to be moved through time is to be moved through actions; but the actions of the angels, according to which they enjoy the word, are without succession, and according to them they are in the participation of eternity. Even the power of angels is said to be interspersed, not as regards the essence of the power, but according to the fact that the power is divided against acting, because sometimes an angel can do something, and sometimes he does.
QUESTION 49
[70733] Of the 108 articles, q. 49
But what is said in the forty-ninth chapter, that matter is distinguished from God by an imperfect distinction, although God is distinguished from himself by a perfect distinction , is not properly said enough, although it may be sustained. But it would be properly said that the first matter is distinguished from God by something imperfect.
QUESTION 50
[70734] Of the 108 articles, q. 50
Now that the fiftieth is placed, the order of something is said in two ways: either as the subject which is ordered, or as the reason according to which the order is attended to; in the first way it is not in the divine order of nature, but in the second way it can be rightly and wrongly understood. For there is no order except some distinct things which agree in something: for those things which agree in nothing have no order to each other. Therefore the reason of order may be taken in the divine persons or from the part of the distinction of persons: and thus the reason of order is not nature, but relation; or on the part of concord, and thus nature is the reason of order: for this is why it is called the order of nature in the divine persons, because the divine nature is communicated to the Son by the Father, and by both the Holy Spirit.
QUESTION 51
[70735] Of the 108 articles, q. 51
But what is stated in the fiftieth first, that essence in God is one thing, but has a multitude of different attributes in God alone, but in itself, according to its own natures and reasons , is false, and improperly said, according to what the words sound like. For he contradicts himself if the words are strictly discussed. For he says in the first place that the attributes which the divine essence has in itself differ in God only in reason, and that they differ in themselves in reality: for to be in the divine essence is the same as to be in God. But this falsity is not due to the bad understanding of the writer, but because he wrote too wildly. It might well be said thus: the divine essence is one thing, to which many things are attributed, which differ in God by reason only; but in created things according to their proper natures and reasons.
QUESTION 52
[70736] Of the 108 articles, q. 52
But what is stated in the fifty-second place, that the divine suppositum itself has from the general nature the reason of subsisting by itself, from the special nature it has the reason of understanding, from the particular form the reason of distinguishing , has been wrongly accepted. For he added, saver, divine , from his own. And in the writing it is said thus: But the suppositum itself from the general nature , etc. and he speaks of the supposed creation; whence he had said a little above: an animal signifies a substance with a general property, a man with a special property, Paul with an individual one. But if it were to be understood of the divine suppositum, it would simply be wrongly said, because in the divine there is no genus and species.
QUESTION 53
[70737] Of the 108 articles, q. 53
But what is stated in the fifty-third place, hypostasis in its understanding includes both common natures and property, not so that one of these is in the other, but so that both are to itself , as has been well said; but he is criticized too slanderously by the objector; for properties are said to be in persons, just as they are in persons: and likewise the divine essence is in the father, and is the father. In this way everything that is said about God could be disproved, since nothing can properly be said about God with our words.
QUESTION 54
[70738] Of the 108 articles, q. 54
But what is stated in the fifty-fourth, God the father in the same species, that is, by himself or his essence, understands himself and all things, therefore he begets the same species, that is to say the son, to himself and to all things brought forth from himself , is improperly said, just as if God were called the father He creates wisdom from himself; but it would have been properly said, if he had said, wisdom begets a son of itself, because it is of the same kind of bringing forth. But he happened to say: whence it would be more appropriate to say: God the Father begets a son from himself to himself and all things to be said: for the father says himself and all other things by his word, which is the son. But the objector explains that it is wrong to pronounce, that is, to produce.
QUESTION 55
[70739] Of the 108 articles, q. 55
But what is stated in the fifty-fifth, that the son agrees with the father more than the spirit in externals , is added in the writing, that is, in a respiratory relationship , that is, by a common respiration, this seems to have been accepted by Richard de Saint Victor. But it does not seem appropriate to say: because neither in the divine, something interior and exterior is said properly speaking, nor does the son agree with the father more than the Holy Spirit, although he agrees with him in several relations.
QUESTION 56
[70740] Of the 108 articles, q. 56
But what is stated in the fifty-sixth is that the father and the son are not the same principle of the Holy Spirit , although this is said by many because of the article which the pronoun has enclosed, by reason of which it seems to belong to a person. yet this does not seem to compel much, that it may be granted that father and son are the same principle, as well as one: for we use pronouns in common both for essence and for person.
QUESTION 57
[70741] Of the 108 articles, q. 57
But what is put in the fifty-seventh, speaking of the species of nature and of the species of knowledge, it is said that the son is the species of the father, according to the fact that the nominative is constituted with the genitive in the ratio of the efficient case, not in the ratio of the formal case , it has no calumny from the fact that the objector touches: for it does not follow that let the son be the efficient cause of the father, or vice versa; but the construction is according to the attitude of such a case, according to the manner of speaking which the grammarians use. Now he wishes to take this, that the son is the species of the father, from what Hilary says: the species is in the image. But Augustine interprets species as beauty. And although Hilary does not say that the son is the species of the father, it can still be understood in this way, the species or beauty of the father, as the splendor of the father is called.
QUESTION 58
[70742] Of the 108 articles, q. 58
But what is said in the fifty-eighth, something can be signified as the limit of action in two ways, according to the thing, something according to the reason: in the first way, the limit of breathing love in relation to the father is the son, in the second way, the father in relation to himself , it has been said too obscurely. Here, however, there seems to be a sense. For because the limit of action is principally distinguished from the agent, where there is a real distinction, the limit of action from the agent, he said, is a limit according to the thing: and thus there is a real distinction between father and son; But where there is no real distinction, he said that there is a limit according to reason: just as in the father when he loves himself, the lover and the beloved are distinguished only by reason. But it does not follow from this that the father loves himself in one way, and the son in another way, as the objector touches; but it follows that he loves himself as one, and his son as another.
QUESTION 59
[70743] Of the 108 articles, q. 59
But what is stated in the fifty-ninth, when speaking of essential love, the Holy Spirit loves himself, when speaking of notional love, no , I believe it to be false; for since notional love is nothing else than the Holy Spirit, just as this is true: the Holy Spirit loves itself, so this is true: the Holy Spirit loves itself with notional love; unless perhaps it is said that to love is conceptually taken to breathe love: and thus to love in no way belongs to the holy spirit.
QUESTION 60
[70744] Of the 108 articles, q. 60
But what is said in the 60th, although the Holy Spirit does not love himself or another person conceptually, yet he loves the creature both personally and essentially by himself , I believe to be simply false according to what has been said.
QUESTION 61
[70745] Of the 108 articles, q. 61
But what is put in the sixty-first chapter, when it is said, the father says all things in a word, the word is not called the beginning of the saying, but the limit , it must be understood from the part of the speaker; for the word is not a principle to the father, which is said; but it is said by the father as the beginning of other things which are said by this word: and thus all objection ceases.
QUESTION 62
[70746] Of the 108 articles, q. 62
But what is stated in the sixty-second passage, the son cannot be the beginning in respect of any act of the father, but the limit , has the same understanding: for even if he is the beginning of breathing and creating, he is not the beginning by which the father breathes or creates.
QUESTION 63
[70747] Of the 108 articles, q. 63
But what is said in the sixty-third chapter, that eternity cannot be said of eternity , is wrongly said as regards two things: first, because by that reason eternity can be said of eternity, as wisdom from wisdom, or nature from nature; secondly, because eternity is not inconsistent with the reason of origin, because both the Son and the Holy Spirit are eternal.
QUESTION 64
[70748] Of the 108 articles, q. 64
But what is stated in the sixty-fourth chapter, that a person is not distinguished by himself, but by his property , is false: for persons are distinguished by themselves and by their properties.
QUESTION 65
[70749] Of the 108 articles, q. 65
But what is stated in the sixty-fifth chapter, that Christ alone has the perfection of knowledge in the genus of creatures , is true according to some mode of perfection; whence it does not stand in the way that the knowledge of the blessed is perfect: for the manner of perfection is manifold.
QUESTION 66
[70750] Of the 108 articles, q. 66
But what is stated in the sixty-sixth is that ideas have a plurality in part connoted because of the plurality of respects, and that respect is eternal , it is true, if that respect is the understanding from God. For as God from eternity understood the multitude of creatures, so he understood the multitude of respects as they exist between himself and creatures: and this is sufficient for the plurality of ideas, which are nothing but the reasons of things, as they are understood by God; and thus the divine essence must not be multiplied, nor must there be any eternal real relation apart from personal properties, as is objected.
QUESTION 67
[70751] Of the 108 articles, q. 67
What is said in the sixty-seventh chapter is that there is a plurality of ideas in God according to reason, yet not of the human or angelic intellect, but of the divine . yet it does not follow that there is any real distinction from ideas in God, but that many things are understood by him.
QUESTION 68
[70752] Of the 108 articles, q. 68
But the fact that it is placed in the sixty-eighth, or according to something else, in the same instant, according to the thing, the Angel is in both terms, yet multiplied according to the reason , this is simply false; but this he says not by asserting, but by reciting an opinion.
QUESTION 69
[70753] Of the 108 articles, q. 69
But what is said in the sixty-ninth verse, that knowledge of that which is by an alien species is not assimilation with things, as you know, but knowledge by its own species , has been obscurely stated, and poorly understood by the objector: for he does not speak of the species which the knowing God knows, but of the species by which the known is known; For things that have a form are known by their proper forms, just as a man is known from the fact that his humanity is known. But those things which have no form, such as privations, are known by opposites. For to know blindness is to know the lack of sight.
QUESTION 70
[70754] Of the 108 articles, q. 70
But what is said in the seventieth chapter, that evil is known by God through an alien species, not through his own, whence as if by accident, not by itself , how it is to be understood, is clear from what immediately precedes; yet what he says by accident, not by itself, is not always well said: for blindness is not known by accident, when it is known to be a deprivation of sight.
QUESTION 71
[70755] Of the 108 articles, q. 71
But what is set forth in the seventy-first is the inner and outer action of God; the exterior ceases with the ceasing object , if he understands that God acts by some external action which is not his essence, it is completely false; But if the action of God is said to be external, not by reason of himself, but by reason of the object, then it can be sustained.
QUESTION 72
[70756] Of the 108 articles, q. 72
What is said in the seventy-second place is that creation places its object in time, and therefore the act is temporal, and subject to temporal laws, and may not be before it is .
QUESTION 73
[70757] Of the 108 articles, q. 73
But what is set forth in the seventy-third place, some things are said to be subject to divine providence as things done, others as things to be done; Evil as already done, good as to be done , is obscurely said, and it has this meaning: because by divine providence it is ordained that good should be done, but not that evil should be done. but already things are ordered to some good according to the eternal providence of God; whence the objection of the objector ceases.
QUESTION 74
[70758] Of the 108 articles, q. 74
But what is said in the seventy-fourth is that predestination is the first cause of salvation, free will the next; but the effect rather follows the condition of the proximate cause, as is evident in the generation of the lower from the necessarily motion of the higher , as far as something is true, that is, as far as contingency and necessity are concerned: for if the first cause is necessary, and the second contingent, the contingent effect follows; but it should not have been proposed in common. But what the objector slanders, that God is more a proximate cause than free will, is completely frivolous: for God is a proximate cause according to the efficacy of action, and not according to the order of the enumeration of causes.
QUESTION 75
[70759] Of the 108 articles, q. 75
But what is said in the seventy-fifth chapter, God by mere will gives grace with reasonably good interest, and does not give with bad interest , is false, if universally understood, so as to mean that he never gives with bad interest; but if it is understood in a particular way, that is to say, that sometimes he gives bad interest, and sometimes he does not, it is true.
QUESTION 76
[70760] Of the 108 articles, q. 76
But what is stated in the seventy-sixth is that the divine power receives no multiplicity from an external act, but it can receive some multiplicity from an internal act: for as the notional and essential internal acts differ, so the power combined with the notional and essential act differs , excepted in a small way. For it is proposed in the first place that the divine power is only one, if it is considered in its root, which is the divine essence; but if the divine power be considered as united to essential and notional inner acts, it thus has a difference according to the manner in which the absolute and the relative are said to differ in God, either essential or notional. For the power of generation by reason of the act is notional; the power of understanding, essential; but the power of creating and governing, or whatever other effect is added, is essential: and so from what precedes and what follows it is clear that the intention of the writer is without slander.
QUESTION 77
[70761] Of the 108 articles, q. 77
But what is stated in the seventy-seventh, the quantity of power is not the same as the quantity of power, but more universal, because the quantity of power is attended to either in being, or in working, or in enduring, but the quantity of power only in working , it would be well said if the quantity of active power were added; at other times it was said little.
QUESTION 78
[70762] Of the 108 articles, q. 78
But what is said in the seventy-eighth point is that the infinite potentiality is fully attended to, as far as potentiality is concerned, but the infinite essence is not only attended to as being confined to this and not to that, but to being confined in this and in any other being, and even in the infinite if they were infinite , or worse. or it is said defectively; for if he were to say thus: infinite potentials in so far as there is potential, the whole is attended to with respect to potentialities, it could be sustained, because potential implies respect to potentialities. But what is said about the infinity of the essence is not well explained: for the divine essence is not infinite from the fact that God can be in the infinite, but it is infinite in itself.
QUESTION 79
[70763] Of the 108 articles, q. 79
But what is stated in the seventy-ninth chapter, God is truly whatever is to himself, is understood of those things which are to him simply, such as good, wise, and not of those things which are to him according to the mode of understanding, as finite, comprehensible , it must be added according to a certain mode of understanding: that for God is said to be finite or comprehensible to himself, not in the same way as other things are said to be finite and comprehensible, but in a special way, so that what is said is understood more negatively than affirmatively. indeed finite, because it is not unknown to itself or impassable according to the understanding; but good and wise are said affirmatively.
QUESTION 80
[70764] Of the 108 articles, q. 80
But what is placed in the eighth place is that act, that is, generation, of God's substance, and therefore it is essential for him to be infinite; but the production of creatures is not from nothing, and therefore it is essential for it to be finite . it might be said that the operation of the knife is of steel; In the same way, when he says that the production of creatures is something finite, he understands it from the side of the product and not from the side of the action: for God, by infinite action, produces a finite effect.
QUESTION 81
[70765] Of the 108 articles, q. 81
But what is set forth in the eighty-first is not similar to omnipotence and omniscience; because power pertains to action, knowledge to reception: indeed, in a creature there cannot be an infinite active power, but a passive power which can be reduced to act, according as it is united to an infinite agent , it is said obscurely and defectively: for power pertains both to action and to reception. It was added, therefore, that the power of active power was capable of action. Again, not all knowing pertains to reception, but to the knowledge of the possible human intellect; but to know the divine intellect is not through reception. But what is said, that there can be an infinite passive power in a creature, is not slanderous. For as has already been said above, power implies respect to the possible: hence the passive power of a creature is called infinite, according as it relates to the infinite: just as the power of prime matter relates to infinite forms and figures, and the continuous is divisible into infinity. and likewise the possible intellect relates to infinite intelligible species. Nor does it follow from this that something created is simply infinite, but only potentially infinite. But this infinite passive power in natural things is not brought into action all at once, but successively; but the passive power of Christ's soul to understand is brought into action entirely, because it knows all knowable things to which the human intellect is in natural power, which are infinite; and this he has from the union of the word which is an infinite agent.
QUESTION 82
[70766] Of the 108 articles, q. 82
But what is stated in the eightieth second, that a man cannot do whatever he once could, can be in two ways, either because he does not have all the powers he once had, or because what was once possible has become impossible: in this second way God cannot do whatever he could, because he is not whatever was possible to God is possible: for what is actually present or past loses the possibility of possibility , this is not at all slanderous: for God cannot make what is present at the same time as not to be, or what is past not to be past. But it proceeds from the great ignorance of the slanderer that he objects against this, that God is able to make what he gives into nothingness the same number, and that the same flesh will rise again in number, although something of it has given into nothingness; that which is past should not be past. For though God should cause that which is brought to nothing to exist again, yet He would not cause that which had not been brought to nothing.
QUESTION 83
[70767] Of the 108 articles, q. 83
But what is said in the eighty-third place, although the first evil did not precede the merit of the condition, it nevertheless preceded it, of the appropriateness, that is, of not being converted to its creator , is not well said: for the first evil is the first fault; but the first fault is not a punishment, and therefore has no merit. But if he understands the first evil of punishment, then it is necessary that he precedes the actual merit of the condition.
QUESTION 84
[70768] Of the 108 articles, q. 84
But what is stated in the eighty-fourth, that evils are to come in time, was true from eternity by accident, not by itself, that is, by the species of its opposite, and that it is good to be made , was not properly said: for though evil may be known by something else, yet this is not it is to him by accident, but by himself, as was said above. And although evil is not properly speaking opposed to eternal good, yet the created good to which evil is opposed was understood from eternity; and thus evil could be made by the appearance of its opposite understood from eternity. Nor does it follow that there are more things from eternity, as the objector says; but it follows that many things are understood from eternity: for all temporal things are understood from eternity.
QUESTION 85
[70769] Of the 108 articles, q. 85
But what is said in the eighty-fifth verse, that although the future of evils is truth from eternity and eternal truth, yet it was not eternal truth, because it is not truth in itself, but by accident , is badly said: for all truth and from eternity, in so far as it is truth, is truth eternal, although the thing to which it belongs to be truly known from eternity is not eternal as divine truth.
QUESTION 86
[70770] Of the 108 articles, q. 86
But what is stated in the eighty-sixth, that to kill an innocent is not in itself an evil , this is false, if it is meant to be killed by a man, as the words sound; but it is just to be put to death by God, who kills and makes alive all who live and die, both innocent and guilty; unless perhaps it is said that the innocent are not killed by God, because death is the punishment of original sin, as the objector touches: whence there is no instance of the little ones of Sodom.
QUESTION 87
[70771] Of the 108 articles, q. 87
But what is stated in the eighty-seventh verse, that no one is bound to conform to the divine will in action unless he lives in charity , is false: because everyone is bound to have a right heart; which cannot be unless it is conformed to God.
QUESTION 88
[70772] Of the 108 articles, q. 88
But what is placed in the eighty-eighth, he who actually thinks of the articles, is obliged to believe ,
QUESTION 89
[70773] Of the 108 articles, q. 89
and what is placed in the eighty-ninth, that he who actually thinks of divine goodness is bound to love , is false, if it is understood universally: for he who thinks about the articles of faith is not moved by an act of faith, and whosoever thinks of the goodness of God is not moved by an act of charity, because sometimes a person can only speculate to consider, as happens in discussions; and yet it is not moved by any act of the will to what it contemplates.
QUESTION 90
[70774] Of the 108 articles, q. 90
What is stated in the ninetieth place is that we are not bound to conform our will to the divine will in that which is unknown , it is universally true in those things which we can ignore without sin; whence the slander of the objector ceases.
QUESTION 91
[70775] Of the 108 articles, q. 91
But what is stated in the ninetieth first, that the mode of production of something from something is threefold: from its own nature, or from another, or from nothing , is improperly said: because the production of something from no nature is not the production of something from something; unless something is taken very generally, according to which even nothing is called something, and non-being is called being, as the Philosopher says.
QUESTION 92
[70776] Of the 108 articles, q. 92
But what is stated in the ninety-second place is that change is taken strictly and properly, which has two extremes, from one of which it tends to the other while remaining in the same subject, and thus change is taken naturally. , that is, in natural science: for what is said here is common both to natural and to violent change. Nor is there an instance which the objector puts forward, that in generation and corruption there are not two extremes, but that the limits of generation and corruption are privation and form, and not two forms.
QUESTION 93
[70777] Of the 108 articles, q. 93
But what is stated in the ninety-third place, in relations which are according to the understanding, it is not inappropriate to go to infinity , it is absolutely true according to power; but according to the act it does not happen that there are infinite relations in our understanding: for I can understand the relation to the subject, and the relation of the relation itself, and so ad infinitum.
QUESTION 94
[70778] Of the 108 articles, q. 94
But what is said in the ninety-fourth is that passion is made when matter has its subject; but creation is only a relation, and not a passion ; it is true, if becoming and passion are taken as in natural science: for passion is the patient of some subject, and natural becoming from the subject; but creation is said in another way to be done and to pass.
QUESTION 95
[70779] Of the 108 articles, q. 95
But what is stated in the ninety-fifth, creation is a passion in the creature, and is an accident of it, and afterwards it is naturally according to the thing. indeed, this relation, in so far as it has another being in the subject, is a kind of accident and later to the subject; but inasmuch as it is the limit of the divine creative activity, it has a certain priority.
QUESTION 96
[70780] Of the 108 articles, q. 96
But what is stated in the ninety-sixth, that they can only be made by a generation, except those which have before them a likeness of their species , is not true in every generation, but only in an unequivocal generation.
QUESTION 97
[70781] Of the 108 articles, q. 97
But what is placed in the ninety-seventh place, the opinion of Moses that the world was not eternal , is not said with sufficient reverence, unless perhaps it is said by reference to the opinions of others: as if it were said, Aristotle's opinion was such, but Moses' opinion was such, to indicate his superiority over others .
QUESTION 98
[70782] Of the 108 articles, q. 98
But what is placed in the ninety-eighth place, that the sun, which is a disproportionate agent, produces a common effect on the lower ones , is not true if it is taken simply, but only according to us: as it is said that the earth, by comparison with the first heaven, occupies a place of union, and has no proportion to it, viz. according to our view.
QUESTION 99
[70783] Of the 108 articles, q. 99
But what is said in the ninety-ninth, the creature succeeds in the goodness of the creator not in itself, but in a participatory similitude , is true: for he speaks of the creature as far as being, not as far as the operation, by which the rational creature enjoys God himself; and so the objection ceases.
QUESTION 100
[70784] Of the 108 articles, q. 100
But what is set as a percentage, things are called creatures at the beginning of time which measures the motion of the first mover, not as in measuring creation, but as in the adjacent , it is true if it is understood as in the adjacent, that is, existing at the same time; but not if it is understood, as in adjacent, that is, inhering accidentally.
QUESTION 101
[70785] Of the 108 articles, q. 101
But the one hundredth is placed first, infinity can actually be nothing but God, but infinity can actually be for some condition of infinity. But that infinity is actually in what it is, and not simply , because it is from the side behind, not from the side before. This was said because if it has a succession, then the whole is not in the act; if it has no succession, then it is not infinite, but something simply indefectible.
QUESTION 102
[70786] Of the 108 articles, q. 102
But the fact that the second hundredth is placed, in the age according to itself, neither was nor will be , is true; but the age does not measure the operations of the Angel, which are successive, but only his existence, which is uniform; and thus ceases the objection about God, who does not know what has been or will be, neither according to being nor according to operation, and about the confirmation or fault of the Angel that pertains to operations.
QUESTION 103
[70787] Of the 108 articles, q. 103
But what is put in the third hundredth, that no one being can be in different ones, but some one being in potentiality , is to be understood in this way: no being actually created can be naturally in different ones; for this is not false: a blind man cannot see, although God might miraculously give him sight; and so the objections cease. Now the first matter, existing as one in itself, considered not through the unity of form, but through the lack of all form, has the potential to be in different things, although according to what it is in different things, it is not one, but multiple.
QUESTION 104
[70788] Of the 108 articles, q. 104
But the fact that the fourth hundredth is placed, that matter in its essence is one multiplied in each , has been improperly stated; but properly speaking, matter in its essence is one, but is multiplied in particulars, or rather in particulars.
QUESTION 105
[70789] Of the 108 articles, q. 105
But what is placed in the fifth hundredth, the simple infinite can do many things, the simple finite only one thing , is true if it is well understood, that is to say that one thing is taken in kind or species, according to what simple virtue demands; as if it were said that hearing can only know one thing, namely, sound.
QUESTION 106
[70790] Of the 108 articles, q. 106
But the sixth hundredth is placed, although in the creation of the soul new matter is created according to being; yet through the essence of matter it is united and united to the pre-existing matter, as point to point , and is neither well nor intelligibly said.
QUESTION 107
[70791] Of the 108 articles, q. 107
But what is placed in the seventh hundredth is a twofold power: a certain determinate which acts according to the mode of nature; some indeterminate, which act by way of the will; At first the threefold power of the image is taken; As far as the freedom of the will is concerned, it is not well said: because what pertains to the free will also pertains to the will, which is a part of the image.
QUESTION 108
[70792] Of the 108 articles, q. 108
But what is said in the eighth hundredth, that souls are individuated through individuation and the materials of bodies, although they retain individuation separated from them, like wax in the impression of a seal , can be understood both well and badly. , is false; But if it is understood that bodies are in some way the cause of the individuation of souls, it is true: for each thing has unity and individuation according to its existence. Just as, then, the body is not the whole cause of the soul, but the soul according to its reason has some order to the body, since it is of the reason of the soul that it is unitable to the body, so the body is not the whole cause of the individuation of this soul. but it is of the nature of this soul that it is united to this body, and this remains in the soul even when the body is destroyed.