900 Theses - Conclusions

1. What is in intelligible terms and infinity, is in intellectuals male and female, in supermundane identity and otherness, similarity and dissimilarity, in the soul the circulation of the same and the circulation of the other.

2. The laws of God, which are conceptual and perfective, are feared by Saturn: by the laws of Jupiter, the God of Saturn. By the Fatal laws all the soul lives intellectually. And all things obey the laws of Adrastia.

3. The appellation of God belongs to one simply absolute, who is the God of gods, not simply absolute to any supersubstantial according to the intellectual essence, to any according to participation in divine souls, according to contact and union with demons, according to resemblance to human souls.

4. Continuity is the property of the middle order of the second trinity, which is said to be circumscribed in the heavenly Phaedrus.

5. In intelligibles there is not number, but multitude, and the cause of numbers is paternal and material; but in intellectuals, number is according to essence and communicatively multitude.

6. It is the same thing that is called otherness in Parmenides, and supercelestia in Phaedrus.

7. By one, several, whole, parts, finite, infinite, of which we have in Parmenides, to understand according to the order of the intelligible intellectual trinity according to the ternary division of that order.

8. What in the Phaedrus is called the back of heaven, in Parmenides it is called one, that there the depth of heaven, here the whole, that there the axis of heaven, this the boundary.

9. Plato expresses the third order of the second trinity by three terms: extreme, perfect, and second form.

10. The intellectuals of God have their unions from the first one, the substantial from the intelligibles, the perfect and continuous generative lives of the divine from the intelligibles and intellectuals, the intellectuals their property from themselves.

11. Just as the intelligibles of God produce all things uniformly, so also the intelligibles and the intellectuals trinally, and the intellectuals weekly.

12. Between the external paternal gods, Saturn and Jupiter, Rhea necessarily mediates through the property of fruitful life.

13. The second trinity of the intellectual week is the trinity of Curetes, which Theology calls the undefiled gods.

14. The properties of the Curetus are to render the work of the paternal Trinity immaculate, the residence of the first, the process of the second, the enlightenment of the third.

15. The seventh unit of Theology is marked by the tragic yielding of the gods, a more discrete intellectual week.

16. The same thing that is called Rhea, as coexisting with Saturn according to its summit, as producing Jupiter and with Jupiter the total and partial orders of the gods, is called Ceres.

17. Although, as Theology reports, they are distinctly in the divine hierarchy, it must nevertheless be understood that everything is in everyone in its own way.

18. Just as the paternal property is only in intelligibles, so it is constitutive, or factine, only in the new Gods both paternal and constitutive, constitutive in intelligible patterns, and paternal in works.

19. Whatever the operations of the gods or of nature are twofold, immanent and transitory, each one contains itself through the immanent, and the reasons which are in it turn to the exterior through the transitory.

20. After the intellectual week, the supermundane Del were immediately ordered, exempt from the parts of the universe, and incoordinable to this world, and according to the cause surrounding it on all sides.

21. It is more proper to assimilate and to give to beings that compassion and undivided communion which they have from the likeness of one to another.

22. Although it is proper to the ducal assimilations, of which the previous conclusion was said, it is nevertheless appropriated to the middle order of its trinity, the first order being directly connected with the intellectual gods according to their substance, and the third being mixed with the second kinds.

23. The Jupiter spoken of in the Gorgias is not he who is the third universal founder among the intellectuals, but the highest and first among the ducals.

24. Of the ducal trinity, Jupiter is substantive, Neptune is divisive, and Pluto is converted.

25. It is a fourfold structure, the first universality of universals pervades the whole, the second universals indeed, but in particular, the third secondly divided according to universality, the fourth parts particularly connected with universals.
while the universality, the fourth part particularly covered the universals.

26. Jupiter, Saturn, and Pluto, dividing the kingdom of Saturn, do not receive the kingdom from Saturn except through the medium of Jupiter, the founder.

27. Under the first ducal trinity is a substantial being, all souls not subject to noble generation, first mobile, fire, and the highest part of the air, which grow above the earth, and the eastern part.

28. Under the second ducal trinity is life and generation, all souls coming under generation, erratic sphere, water, and the infinite part of the air, which under the caves and earthquakes, the middle part of the earth and around the center.

29. Under the third of the same order is the conversion of special divisions, the purification of souls, the sphere of the active and the passive, the earth with the earthlings, which surrounds the tartars, and the western part.

30. And if the whole of the second trinity of supermundane gods is called Proserpina, yet among the Greeks its first unity is called Diana, the second Persephone, the third Minerua, but among the barbarians the first Hecate, the second soul, the third virtue.

31. According to the preceding conclusion, one of the sayings of Zoroaster can be explained from the mind of Proclus, according to which it is read among the Greeks, although among the Chaldeans it is read differently, and it is read from the explanation.

32. The third trinity of supermundane gods is called Apollo, and is appropriated to him by converts.

33. The trinity of Proserpine is accompanied on the side by the custodial and preserving trinity.

34. The Twelve Gods, mentioned in the Phaedrus, are the intermediate gods between the supermundane and the mundane, their bond.

35. The Gods, of whom in Phaedrus, are to be distinguished into four trinities, the Operating, the Custodial, the Vital, and the Conseruative.

36. There are four armies of the young gods. The first dwells from the first heaven to the beginning of the air, the second from there to the middle of the air, the third from there to the earth.

37. To each of these proportionally corresponds a fourfold army of Angels, Demons, and Souls.

38. The trinity of the one being, the one ental, and the unial being appears first in the living in itself.

39. The workman looking at the quaternity of the animal itself, the four parts of the workman are the main parts of the world.

40. Inasmuch as the workman makes the first part of the worldly body to the model of the form of one living in itself.

41. In so far as the workman in the form of one sees one of the essential one, he makes worldly gods of that part, in so far as the being of one essential makes angels in the same part, in so far as he sees one of the unial being he makes demons there, in so far as he is a unial being, he makes animals there.

42. The workman makes other parts in proportion to the models of his forms, as was said of the first, and it is not necessary to explain, because anyone knowing, because you will be able to deduce analogies from himself.

43. Through understanding, love, and faith we ascend to the wise, beautiful, and good Lord.

44. Just as faith, which is credulity, is below science, so faith, which is truly faith, is supersubstantially above science and understanding, uniting us immediately to God.

45. Just as not every body, but a perfect body, so according to its nature and degrees of sublimity, in this order, the animal, the intellect, the life, the being, and the one surpass each other in turn.

46. ​​Just as according to the scope of causality, so according to nature and degrees of sublimity, these animals, the intellect, the life, the being, and the one exceed in order in order.

47. Every middle order remains stable in the preceding, and in itself establishes the consequent.

48. Just as the first trinity after unity is all intelligibly commensurate and finite, so the second trinity is all vital, true, and infinite. The third is everything according to the property of the mixture, and beautifully.

49. The first trinity remains only, the second trinity remains and proceeds, the third turns after the process.

50. Above the ages, the animal in itself is the second and middle trinity.

51. Just as they are the intelligible cause of all the ancients, so they are the intellectual causes according to common genera, supermundane differences according to species, mundane differences according to individuals.

52. By the supercelestial place we have to understand that of the second trinity that is more intelligible than intellectual, by the subcelestial concavity that is more intellectual than intelligible, by heaven that which participates in both.

53. Whatever is affirmatively said of the supercelestial place in the Phaedrus, they are said of him not as simply the first, but as having before him the superior classes in which he participates. Whatever is said negatively is said to be analogous to the first good, which is the absolute head of all undetermined orders of this or that order.

54. Ambrosia is analogous to limit, and nectar to infinity.

55. Just as the perfect intellect is to be complained of by the intelligibles, so the upward guiding virtue is by the intellectuals, absolute activity and sequestered by matter, winged life by the extramundane, by the mundane expression of the divine, truths and angelic choruses, the recompense of that which is from the gods aspiration, from goods demons

[25] Conclusions according to the mathematics of Pythagoras, number XêV.

1. Oneness, otherness, and that which is, are the cause of numbers. One of the united, the other of the generative, that which is substantial.

2. In shared numbers there are different kinds of numbers, and different kinds of unions.

3. Where the punctual unit goes into the otherness of the binary, there is the first triangle.

4. He who knows the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 12th orders, will providentially hold the distribution exactly.

5. By one, three, and seven we know in Pallas the unifying powers of discretion, the causative and beatifying power of the intellect.

6. The triple proportion, Arithmetic, Geometrical, and Harmonic, indicates to us the three daughters of Themis: existing symbols of judgment, justice, and peace.

7. Through the secret of the straight, reflected, and refracted rays in science, we are reminded of the threefold nature of nature: intellectual, animal, and corporeal.

8. The reason for concupiscence has a tuning fork.

9. The irreducible has a direct proportion to concupiscence.

10. Reason has a diatessaron proportion to anger.

11. The sense of judgment in music is not to be used, but only the understanding.

12. In the forms of counting we must not extend the forty.

13. Any equilateral plane number symbolizes the soul.

14. Every lineal number symbolizes the Gods.

[26] Conclusions according to the opinion of the Chaldean theologians, number 6

1. The principal order of separations is not the first, as the Egyptians think, but above it is the order of the fountain which is singularly superimposed.

2. Fate is not a necessity of the first seminal power, but is intellectually shared by the attitude of animal reasoning, inclining from the superiors, inevitable from the inferiors.

3. The substantial qualities of visible things do not result from a separate particular power, as the Egyptians believe, but from the first receptacle of the source of lights through animal splendor.

4. The partial souls are not immediately, as the Egyptians say, but through the mediation of the whole demonic souls enlightened by intellectual brightness.

5. Intellectual coordination is not in intellectual coordination, as Amos the Egyptian said, but it is above all intellectual hierarchy in the abyss of the first unity, and under the darkness of the first darkness is hidden incomparably.

6. Whatever is above the Moon is pure light, and that is the substance of the worldly worlds.

[27] Conclusions according to the ancient teaching of Mercury Trismegistius of Egypt, number X.

1. Wherever there is life, there is the soul, wherever love, there is the mind.

2. All bodily motion, all incorporeal motion.

3. The soul in the body, the mind in the soul, the word in the mind, and God the father of these.

4. God is about all things, and through all things, mind about soul, soul about air, air about matter.

5. There is nothing in the world without life.

6. Nothing in the universe is possible for death or corruption.

Correlation. Everywhere life, everywhere providence, everywhere immortality.

7. God reveals six future ways to man, through dreams, Portenta, Aues, Intestina, Spirit, and Sybil.

8. It is true that good is not disturbed, not determined, not colored, not shaped, not shaken, naked, transparent, comprehensible by itself, immutable, and completely incorporeal.

9. There are ten avengers within each one: ignorance, sadness, inconstancy, greed, injustice, lust, deception, envy, fraud, anger, recklessness, malice.

10. The ten avengers, about whom he said according to Mercury in the preceding conclusion, a deep contemplator will see that they correspond badly to the coordination of the denarius in the Cabala, and to its prefects, about which I have put nothing in the cabalistic conclusions, because it is a secret.

[28] Conclusions number 47 according to the teaching of the wise Hebrew Cabalists, whose memory should always be for good.

1. Just as man and the lower priest sacrifice to God the souls of irrational animals, so Michaë [Michael] the higher priest sacrifices the souls of rational animals.

2. There are nine in the hierarchy of angels, whose names are Cherubim, Seraphim, Hasmaïm, Haiot, Aralim, Tarsisim, Ophanim, Thepharsim, Isim.

3. Although the property of clemency is an ineffable name, yet it must not be denied that it contains the property of judgment.

4. The sin of Hades was the cutting off of the kingdom from the rest of the plants.

5. With the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, in which the first man sinned, God created the world.

6. The Great North is the source of all souls simply, just as the other Days are for some and not for all.

7. When Solomon said in his speech in the book of Kings, Hear, O heaven, by heaven we must understand the green line which revolves the universe.

8. The soul descends from the third light to the fourth day, and thence to the fifth, leaving thence to enter the night of the body.

9. During the six days of Genesis we have to understand the six ends of the building proceeding from Bresit, as cedars proceed from Lebanon.

10. It is more correctly said that paradise is the whole building, than that it is a tenth, and in the middle of it is placed the great Adam, who is Tipheret.

11. A river is said to go forth from Eden, which is divided into four heads, to signify that from the second number proceeds the third, which is divided into the fourth, fifth, sixth, and tenth.

12. It will be true that everything depends on fate, if by fate we understand the supreme fate.

13. He who knows in Kabbalah the mystery of the gates with intelligence, will know the mystery of the Great Jubilee.

14. He who knows the southern property in dextrous coordination will know why every procession of Abraham always takes place towards the south.

15. Unless the letter ה , that is, ha, had been added to the name of Abraham, he would not have begotten Abraham.

16. All before Moses prophesied through the wax unicorn.

17. Wherever in scripture mention is made of the love of the sea and a woman, the union of Tipheret and Chneseth Israel, or Beth and Tipheret, is symbolized mystically for us.

18. Whoever joins Tipheret at midnight, every generation will be prosperous for him.

19. They are literally the same god as the Cacodemon, who is the ruler of this world and of the name of the God Triagrammaton, and he who knew how to order a transposition would deduce one from the other.

20. When the light of a non-shining mirror becomes like a shining mirror, the night will be like the day, as David says.

21. He who knows the property, which is the secret of darkness, knows why evil demons do more harm in the night than in the day.

22. Although there will be a manifold coordination of the chariots, yet in so far as regards the mystery of the phylacteries, there are two chariots to be ordered: so that from the second, third, fourth, and fifth, one chariot is made, and there are four phylacteries which the vau puts on, and from the sixth the seventh, eighth, and ninth becomes the second chariot, and they are the phylacteries which he puts on , the last ha.

23. The word said is not to be used above the property of penance.

24. When Job said, who made peace in his high places, he understood the water of the south and the fire of the north, and their prefects, of whom there is no more to be said.

25. Bresith is the same, that is, he created in the beginning, as if he had said he created in wisdom.

26. What Angelus the Chaldeus said becadmin, that is, with the eternal or through the eternal, he understood the thirty-two ways of wisdom.

27. As the assembly of the waters is just, so the sea, to which all the rivers tend, is divinity.

28. By the bird, which was created on the fifth day, we must understand the worldly angels who appear to men, not those who do not appear except in the spirit.

29. The name of God of four letters, which is from mem, sade, pe, and sade, must be appropriated to the kingdom of David.

30. No angel having six wings is ever transformed.

31. Circumcision was given for deliverance from the unclean virtues that walk around.

32. The same circumcision takes place on the eighth day, because it is superior to the universalized bride.

33. There are literally none in the whole law which do not manifest the ten secrets of numbering in forms, conjunctions, separations, majority, coronation, closure, opening, and order.

34. He who understands why it is said that Moses hides his face, and that Hezekiah turns his face to the wall, will know that this should be the attitude and disposition of the person praying.

35. No spiritual thing that descends below works without clothing.

36. The sin of Sodom was through the destruction of the last plant.

37. By the secret of antelucane prayer, understand nothing else than the property of piety.

38. As external fear is inferior to love, so internal is superior to love.

39. From the preceding conclusion it is understood why in Genesis Abraham is praised out of fear, although we know that through the characteristic of piety he did everything out of love.

40. Whenever we do not know the property from which there is an influence on the request we ask, we must resort to the house of the nose.

41. Every good soul is a new soul, coming from the east.

42. That is why Joseph was buried with his bones and not with his body, because his bones were the virtues and forces of the higher tree called Sadich flowing to the upper earth.

43. That is why no one knew the grave of Moses, because he was exalted in the previous Jubilee and sent his roots over the Jubilee.

44. When the soul comprehends all that it can comprehend, and is united with the superior soul, it will strip the earthly garment from itself, so that it may be torn from its place, and be united with the divinity.

45. The wise men of Israel, after the cessation of prophecy by the spirit, prophesied by the daughter of the voice.

46. ​​The king of the earth is not punished on earth, because first the heavenly army is humbled in heaven.

47. By saying Amen, order is expressed, how the influx of numbers proceeds.

[5] The conclusions are fifty in number according to one's own opinion, which are divided by the division of a penny into Physical, Theological, Platonic, Mathematical, Dogmatizing Paradoxes, Conciliating Paradoxes, Chaldaic, Orphic, Magical, and Cabalistic Conclusions, in all of which I postulate nothing affirmatively or probabilistically, except to the extent that true or probable, the sacrosanct Roman church judges, and its head is the blessed Supreme Pontiff Innocent VIII, by whose judgment he who does not submit to the judgment of his own mind has no mind.

[29] Conclusions paradoxically number 17 according to his own opinion, said first by Aristotle and Plato, then conciliating other teachers who seem to disagree the most.

1. There is no natural or divine question in which Aristotle and Plato do not agree in sense and matter, however much they seem to disagree in terms.

2. Those who say that infertility is a positive property constituting the father in an incommunicable hypostatic being, do not disagree at all with the opinion of the holy teacher, from which they seem to disagree much according to the words.

3. Thomists and Scotists should not disagree about the sixth notion to be posited, which is inspirability, if they correctly see the foundations of their teachers.

4. On the subject of Theology, Thomas, Scotus, and Egidius agree fundamentally and radically, although, both on the surface of the branches and words, each of them seems to differ greatly from the other.

5. Concerning that question: Whether there is one being in Christ, or that there are many, I say that Scotus and Thomas do not disagree.

6. Thomists and Scotists should not disagree about the distinction from the nature of things, if they fundamentally understand their teachers.

7. Thomas and Scotus do not disagree about the distinction of attributes.

8. In this article he specifies from his appendices: Whether an angel could simply desire divine equality, Thomas and Scotus do not disagree.

9. Thomas and Scotus are more or less universally agreed on the matter, which is discussed first, and they are supposed to be most at variance in that matter, about which I put below three written conclusions from the minds of both.

10. Of a thing nominally conceived, the first concept that is held is the most universal concept.

11. Of a thing defined in definition, the first concept that is held is the proper and convertible concept of the thing.

12. The most universal predicates known to us are the last in the most distinct knowledge.

13. Nothing contradicts the opinion of the Commentator on the dimension of the endless principles and foundations of the doctrine of St. Thomas.

14. In the matter of the object the intellect does not disagree, as is believed, but Thomas and Scotus agree.

15. On the question of contingency in matters of chance and fortune, Avenrois and Avicenna do not fundamentally disagree, although on the surface and in their words the opposite appears.

16. Avenrois and Avicenna cannot fundamentally disagree whether the physicist takes a composite body from the metaphysician, even if they differ in words.

17. Thomas and Scotus do not differ as to the manner in which the angels are in a place.

[30] Philosophical conclusions according to his own opinion number 80, which, although they may disagree with common philosophy, do not deviate much from the common way of philosophizing.

1. A universal species can be immediately abstracted from a species existing in the external sense.

2. Intention is the second being of reason, always having a mode qualitatively in form.

coming from the operation of the understanding consequentially, not effectually.

3. Neither the first intention, nor the second intention, are anywhere subjectively.

4. It is in bodies to arrive at something which so corporeally locates, which is not corporeally located, and that is the last sphere, just as it is in intelligibles to arrive at something which so intelligibly locates, which cannot be located in any way, and that is God.

Correlation. There is no need to complain about how the last ball is placed, but absolutely to admit that it is not placed.

5. Singular is not understood by the intellect, neither according to truth, nor according to the opinion of the commentator Aristotle and Thomas.

6. Although the intellect does not understand singularly, yet it is by it that it is perfectly known singularly.

7. Every thing, whatever it may be, established to be in its purity, is intelligent, intellective, and understood.

8. From the aforesaid conclusion we obtain why matter is the principle of unknowability, and the intellect the agent of knowability.

9. That action is called immanent, which is not subjectively in that which is passively denominated by the cause, and is thereby distinguished from the transcount.

10. Every other way beyond that which the previous conclusion foretold is insufficient to distinguish the immanent action from the passing one.

11. When Auenrois says that there is no other means to prove abstract beyond the eternity of motion, he does not mean anything abstract, but that which is the ultimate degree of abstraction abstracted from the body.

12. Corporeal being does not have a thing from any substantial form, or degree of substantial form.

13. The six transcendences, which the common doctrine posited, were invented by the younger Latins: they and the Peripatetic Greeks, and Aristotle, their leader, does not know them.

14. It is necessary with Aristotle to move the first cause out of necessity.

15. It is impossible, and absolutely irrational, according to Aristotle, that every event be of necessity, that necessity being taken in respect to each cause.

16. Treatises of suppositions do not belong to Logic.

17. The world could not have existed efficiently from God from eternity, true efficiency, which is a reduction from power to act.

18. According to Aristotle and the Commentator, the world could be produced, and was in fact produced from the eternal by God, an efficiency which is a natural flow and an effectual consequence.

19. He who denies that the sky is animated, so that its mover is not its form, not only contradicts Aristotle, but destroys the foundations of all philosophy.

20. In the acts of our intellect, there is not a succession of sensuous powers and disarrays, as the moderns believe, but because it is rational.

21. Knowledge of a new thing is acquired from previous knowledge as from a term from which, and as from a partial, formal, directional effective cause, and as from a material predisposing cause.

22. That habit is practical, which is formally more regular than the habit of some operation.

23. A habit has a practical and speculative nature from the object related to the subject in which it is: but the understanding is said to be practical or speculative from the end which the habit puts forward for itself.

24. A practical attitude is distinguished from a speculative one.

25. Practice is an operation which is not formally knowledge, and it can be right or wrong, rectifiable by habit, and by the partial rectification of effects to which the practitioner is accustomed.

26. The difference between practical and speculative attitudes is accidental.

27. The theology of the traveler as a traveler must be said to be simply practical.

28. We assert that all medicine is practical, and that it is true, and that it is in harmony with the sayings and sentence of Auenrois.

29. Logic is practical.

30. The common sense is not distinct from the sense of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.

31. Not to be given intelligible species abstracted from phantasms, and we assert as true the sentences of both the Commentator and Albertus.

32. In every question it is necessary to know by demonstration what is the subject and the passion, not by understanding by what, what is the name, as the expositors understand, but what is the thing.

33. It is possible to go back from cause to effect without the negotiation that Burleus dreams of.

34. Holding that the minimum natural in the qualities, they do not therefore have to deny that the motion of alteration takes place successively in time.

35. It is necessary to maintain, according to Auenroe, that the form of the genus is really different from the form of the species, and does not stand in opposition to the principles of his doctrine.

36. Aristotle's demonstration in vii. Of the physicists that everything that is moved is moved by another, there is no proof of them, which either Thomas, or Scotus, or Egidius, who is followed by John of Ghent, or Gratiadius, or Burleus, or others whom I have read, intend. But only what the Commentator said very well, was misunderstood by all the expositors of the Latins, and that is, that in every motion, the mover is different from the mover, either according to nature, or according to subject.

37. Demonstration VII. He clearly proves that the heavens are not moved by themselves, given the principles of Auenrois, certainly true and most steadfast.

38. The order of the books of natural philosophy, according to Aristotle, is this: the book of physics, of the heavens and the world, of generation, of meteors, of minerals, of plants, of the kinds of animals, of the parts of animals, of the progress of animals, of the soul, and also the books which are called small natural books .

Correlation. Those who call the book on the soul the sixth of the naturals, completely disagree with Aristotle's mind.

39. Every way saluting the saying of Aristotle, that the east winds are hotter than the west, beyond the way of the animation of the heavens, is frivolous and null.

40. Neither Aristotle's nor the expositors' adduced accounts of the saltiness of the sea are sufficient, nor can anything, especially standing in the Mosaic truth, be more sufficiently assigned than the causality of the same universal providence, which also worked the discooperation on earth.

41. No part of the sky differs from another according to whether it is bright or not bright, but according to whether it is more or less bright.

42. The method given by Aristotle, how the lower parts are heated by the higher ones, does not appear to be correct in any way.

43. Nor do the two stand together, and I believe that both are true at the same time, and that the reasoning of Avenrois, where he concludes with the last comment of the first physicists against Avicenna, and all these arguments of Avicenna's to prove the first principles are good and effective.

44. If, according to Aristotle, intelligences are in general, Thomas will say, he will contradict himself no less than Aristotle.

45. If the unity of the genus is not only on the part of the conceiver, but also on the part of the concept, it is necessary that whatever are in the same logical genus must be in the same physical genus.

46. ​​Science is really relative, and what is known is related to it by accident.

47. Holding to the common method of the teachers, namely that something is formally predicated of God, I say two close conclusions, the first of which is this: That only God is such a substance, that he is in no way a non-substance.

48. Second: God is therefore not in a genus, because he is substantially a substance.

49. To posit differences between simity and whiteness, or similar accidents, through the fact that the latter is separable, the latter inseparable from a certain subject, is fictitious.

50. The difference which appears between the above-mentioned occurrences originates only in the intentional imposition of names.

51. It is necessary to say, according to Auenroe, that substance is about the intrinsic quidiness of the accident, and it is an opinion most consistent with Aristotle and philosophy.

52. In the definition of natural substances there is no matter to be placed, and Auenroi and Albert agree in the sentence.

53. If Thomas says that there is an accident in intelligences according to Aristotle, he contradicts himself, not Aristotle.

54. These propositions are to be granted as absolutely true. The raw material should be donkeys, oxen, and the like.

55. In a material composite there are not two distinct and precise entities, but one entity.

56. Sound is not the movement of air intercepted between two bodies striking each other, as Aristotle and his expositors hold, but I say that such or such a sound is caused by the contact of such or such bodies.

57. The reasons which the Peripatetics adduce to prove that in essentially ordered causes do not go to infinity, they do not necessarily agree with falsity.

58. The sensitive power of the common sense, just as it does not differ from the sensitive powers of the external senses, as stated in Conclusion 30, so neither does the fantastic, or imaginative, thinking, and memorizing powers of the internal senses, differ from the subject, that is, the thing, and as truth, and we affirm the opinion of Aristotle and Plato.

59. I say that all the qualities of the elements are symbols of different species.

60. If the fourth figure of syllogisms is to be posited, it is to be posited that which Gallienus posits, not as Francis Maironis and Peter Mantuan have childishly confined, but it is more correct to posit none.

61. Of matter, as things are made of it by itself, we have to treat metaphysically, but of physics, as things are made of it by accident, according to Aristotle's doctrine.

62. An exclusive expression added to a relative does not exclude the correlative.

63. It must not be allowed that a part in a quantitative whole is in any way actually distinct from its whole.

64. The opinion ascribed to Avicenna, that the one which is converted into being, is the one which is the principal of the number, and so consequently, that each thing is one by intention added to its essence, if it is not necessarily true, is nevertheless probable and will be defended from himself

65. Although intellectual power is an accident in us, it is nevertheless a substance in the angels.

66. Formality is an actuality suitable by itself to complete a possible understanding.

67. If a mixture is formed from the collision of the elements, in whatever way the elements are supposed to remain, the mixture will become a mixture of the elements, as if from matter digested by a hot spiritual vapor eluted in them.

68. In all things below God the matter is the same in essence, but different in being.

69. The properties of physical natures, properly conceived and proper, can be conceived without accidents, whether they are considered metaphysically or physically.

70. The organic body, which is the material of the soul, and is included in Aristotle's definition of it, is a body, and organic through a form essentially distinct from the soul that completes it.

71. According to all the philosophers, it must be said that God necessarily acts whatever he acts.

72. He who doubts that the intelligible and the understanding become one more truly and substantially than from matter and material form, is not a philosopher.

73. Holding the opinion of the intellectual soul, which the commentator holds, it seems to me that it is reasonable to hold that soul is the subject of no accident, and I defend this position as true, although whether he held this, I do not determine.

74. I say, according to Thomas, that our happiness consists in the reflective act of the intellect.

75. The definition of the heavenly nature includes and ly, and is held in conjunction, and not disjunctive.

76. Just as every philosopher has to say that the virtues are sensibly in the heart, so every physician has to say that they are in the brain.

77. What is said by the common school of philosophers of all the Latins about the first operation of the intellect, is an error, because there is no other operation of the rational part than those two, which they posit as the second and third. Composition, of course, and discourse.

78. Accidents must in no way be called essence, but being.

79. There are six principles in absolute form.

80. If there is a first and not accidental language, it is clear to many that it is Hebrew.

[31] Paradoxical conclusions number 71 introducing new dogmas into philosophy according to their own opinion.

1. Just as the existence of properties is preceded by the existence of a quiditate, so the existence of quiditates proceeds from a unitary being.

2. We cannot say that, taken in the most precise way, something is foretold by the preaching properly said.

3. He who touches the thing in definition, touches the thing in otherness.

4. Only he who reaches the thing in the precision of its union, reaches the thing as it is.

5. The more advanced each mode of knowledge is, the more imperfect it is in proportion to the understanding, and the more useless it is to it.

6. Just as knowledge held by demonstration to man as a common state, which we are experiencing here, is the most perfect knowledge, so it is simply the most imperfect knowledge among knowledges.

7. As God is simply the knowledge of all being, so the intellect is the definition of all being, and the soul is the science of all being.

8. If theology is delivered theologically, it will be as if it were about the first subject, about that which is singularly one, and about everything that is according to its unitary being as about a secondary subject.

9. Metaphysical truth, delivered metaphysically, is about everything that is a true form, as about the first subject, and about everything that is according to its formal being as about a secondary object in the way of proceeding, neglecting demonstration.

10. As in a creature, consequence is not valid. There is a being, therefore it is, so it is not valid in God, it is, therefore it is a being.

11. The same thing in a creature is said to be by reason of its actuality, and by reason of its determination it is called essence.

12. As an angel is necessarily composed of essence and being, so the soul is necessarily composed of substance and accident.

13. Contradictions in actual nature sympathize with each other.

14. Although the preceding conclusion is true, it is more properly said that in their intellectual nature they are not contradictory, than that they reconcile themselves.

15. Contradictions coincide in one nature.

16. Aristotle reasonably laid down in his sciences that the first principle is to be said to contradict the second in regard to anything, and in regard to none at the same time.

17. This and that are in the understanding, but this is not outside of that.

18. Therefore, in the soul, the incommensurability of the contradictory appears, because it is the first quantity that places a part in an external part.

19. Each thing in intellectual nature has from its intelligible unity, and that it unites everything to itself, and that it preserves to itself its own property, immaculate and unmixed.

20. The selfhood of each one is then most itself when all things are in it, so that in itself all things are itself.

21. By the aforesaid conclusions it may be understood that it is Anaxagore's omiomeria, which the Worker of the intellect distinguishes.

22. No one should be surprised that Anaxagoras called the intellect mixed, since it is the most mixed, because the most mixture coincides with the greatest simplicity in the intellectual nature.

23. Just as in the second world they are substantial in form by the manner of accidents, so in the first world they are accidental in form by the manner of substances. Correlates. As in the first world there is not white, but whiteness, so in the second world there is not fire, but fiery.

24. It cannot be said that in the understanding therefore, for example, fire, water, and air, are three ideas, but it must be said that they are ternary.

25. Unless we destroy the intellectual nature, we cannot understand that ideas are numbered, except through the intention of the idea of ​​number through the rest, as it is of each through all.

26. From the foregoing conclusions it may be understood what is the formal number, which Pythagoras said was the beginning of all things.

27. The first five predicaments must be established: One, Substance, Quantity, Quality, and to something.

28. The diversity of beings is more directly reduced to the five above-mentioned, than to ten, which Architas first put, then Aristotle, or to five, which Plotinus puts, or to four, which the Stoics put forward.

29. The reason for the predicament of one is absolute precision from every stranger.

30. The ratio of the predicament to the substance is the united perfection of the impartial substance.

31. The reason for the predicament of quantity is the extrapolation of part to part.

32. The reason for the predicament of quality is the truth of denomination through inherent participation.

33. The predicament of something is that it is imaginary.

34. There is no formally unparticipated predicate that cannot be partially predicated of intelligence.

35. Just as it is truly said of the intellect alone, that which is fire, and that which is water, that which is motion, and that which is state, so it is truly said of the soul alone, that it cools, that it heats, that it stands, that it moves.

36. As the intellect of God multiplies the unity, so the soul of the intellect quantifies and extends the multitude.

37. The first intelligible coincides with the first understanding, and the first mobile coincides with the first knowing.

38. In inferior souls reason is known by way of sense, in more sublime souls sense is by way of reason.

39. That wonderful saying of that barbarian consort of Nymphs and Demons concerning the 1834 worlds in a triangular shape with three angular units and one middle being established, will be most correctly understood, if from the intelligible unity the intellectual, animal, and seminal trinity, and the principal parts of the world through the first spherical number we will understand the calculation.

40. It is possible for the soul, through the path of purgatory, without any other study or research, to acquire a perfect knowledge of all things that can be learned, not only among the Platonic philosophers, but also among the Peripatetics, of whom it seems less, the followers of Avenrois they have to concede.

41. Just as common sense is in the knowledge of accidental qualities and material quality, so is reason in the knowledge of substantial qualities and formal quantity, maintained in the proportion that one acts sensually and the other rationally.

42. The infinity of God can be proved by supersurgence to intellectual being and the mystical way of Theology, and to prove it all other ways are ineffective.

43. The act which the angelic and rational nature is blessed with ultimate happiness, is not an act of the intellect, nor of the will, but is a union of unity, which is in the otherness of the soul with the unity, which is without otherness.

44. In the book Metaphysics, Aristotle does not treat of God except in the last chapter of the twelfth, which begins: It must be considered also that the universe has good in the way it has.

45. The metaphysical order of the books after the natural ones in the manner in which Aristotle ordered them, according to no process, whether compositional or resolutive, can be correct.

46. ​​Given any practicable object, the operation which practices it is more noble than that which contemplates it, if the other things be equal.

47. Aristotle's text, which says that every soul is immortal, can be better defended than that which says that every soul is mortal.

48. Besides the three kinds of demonstration: because, because of what, and simply, which Aristotle and the Commentator posit, there is given a fourth kind of demonstration, which may be called the demonstration of reversibility stronger than all the aforesaid.

49. It is more improperly said of God that he is the intellect or intelligent, than of the rational soul that he is an angel.

50. Matter alone suffices to save that, thanks to which Aristotle and other philosophers have placed prejudice among the principles of nature.

Correlation. Prejudice is not to be placed among natural principles.

51. There are three principles of natural things, matter, motion, and form.

52. The knowledge of God, man, and the first matter is the same, and he who has knowledge of one, will also have knowledge of the rest in the proportion of the extreme to the extreme, of the middle to the extremes, and of the extremes to the middle.

53. He who denies first matter, neither contradicts sense, nor denies physical reason.

54. In order to prove that matter is the first, either the way of numbers, or the way of Catholic philosophy, is more reliable than any physical system in which sense has an entrance.

55. He who has deeply and radically grasped the order of the Hebrew language, and knows how to keep it proportionately in the sciences, will have a norm and a rule for the perfect discovery of whatever he knows.

56. Furthermore, the distinction between matter and reason must be placed under a third distinction, which I call inadequacy.

57. The kinds of enmity which multiply from the wolf to the esteemed hounds are not of any accident, but of substance.

58. Formality is the adequate object of the understanding.

59. Wherever a nature is given which is composed of several natures actually remaining in it, it is always nobler in it substantially, others accidentally.

60. Nothing understands actually and distinctly the soul except itself.

61. The whole substance of the rational soul is the intellectual part.

62. The soul always understands itself, and by understanding itself it somehow understands all things.

63. Although in the soul there is actually an intellectual nature, by which it meets with the angel, just as there is a rational nature, by which it is distinguished from him. However, there is nothing intrinsic in it by which it can understand something distinct from itself without its proper form.

64. The intellectual nature which is in the rational soul, above the rational nature, precisely differs from the pure intellectual nature, just as a part differs from the whole.

65. Because the animal intellect differs from the intellectual intellect, as a middle part, not as a part only, therefore the intellectual totality is more pacified.

66. The soul can arrive at this through intrinsic information, that is, it understands everything through its substantial form indivisible.

67. To each series of souls there corresponds one pure intellect.

68. All heavenly souls are one in their first understanding.

69. It is reasonable, according to philosophy, that every animal series should be beatified in its proper understanding, which, however, has not been said affirmatively, but probably.

70. When there were three who said that all is one, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, whoever carefully examines their statements will say that Zenophanes is that one, which is simply one. One of Parmenides is not one absolutely, as is believed, but one being. one Melissi being one having an extreme correspondence to one Zenophani.

71. Empedocles, by suit and friendship in the soul, understands nothing else than the upward guiding power and the guiding power of the gods, in which I believe that in the science of the Sephiroth eternity and beauty are provided.

[32] Conclusions in Theology number 29 according to his own opinion quite different from the common way of speaking of the theologians.

1. He who says that an accident cannot exist unless it does not exist, will be able to hold the sacrament of the Eucharist.

2. If the common way be held concerning the possibility of supposition with regard to the quantity of the creature, I say that it can be done without the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ or the annihilation of the breadness, for the body of Christ is on the altar according to the truth of the sacrament of the Eucharist, which was said when speaking of the possible, not of to be so

3. We hold with theological truth that the ideal and formal aspects of things were formally first discovered by God in the first created mind.

Correlation. where they are ideally, there they are not formally, where they are formally, they are not ideally there.

4. If we suppose that God knows creatures, that is, the secondary object of his intuition, as is commonly held, I say that the Father produces the word before the creature knows it.

5. The attributive perfections taken neither in God nor according to themselves, they say different reasons in the right, and are principally definable or describable.

6. The gaze of the divine knowledge is not formally limited to creatures as to primary or secondary objects, as the common school of theologians says, but looks only to itself, and nothing else from itself, either primarily or secondarily.

Correlation. There is not any multitude of intellects in God or in creatures, as they place the intellect in the number with the divine essence as understood, but there is altogether one very simple intellect.

7. The three transcendences in which the image consists, do not say that they are different aspects in the right, and that they are principally definable or describable.

8. Christ did not truly, and as regards his real presence, descend into hell, as Thomas also states in the common way, but only in regard to effect.

9. Although this seems to me probable, it is not to be stubbornly asserted that the soul of Christ could not have descended into hell by some other means unknown to us.

10. Those words, This is the body, etc., which are said in the consecration, are held materially and not meaningfully.

11. If the common way is held, that God is reached by the act of the intellect, I say the following two conclusions, of which this is the first, that those who see the word by the act by which they reach the divine essence, do not reach creatures except in an eminently equivalent manner to formal knowledge, equivalence not of the act, but of the object .

12. The blessed have a twofold knowledge of creatures that formally touches them, the first of which is inferred from that by which they touch the word, the second according to how they contemplate the created creature in reality.

13. I do not agree with the common opinion of theologians who say that God can assume any nature, but I grant this only as regards the rational.

14. Neither the cross of Christ, nor any image, is to be worshiped with the adoration of the brick, even in the manner that Thomas states.

15. If Adam had not sinned, God would have been incarnate, but not crucified.

16. In the light in which John saw the Apocalypse, he did not understand the Apocalypse in that light.

17. The first sin of the angel was the sin of omission, the second sin of lust, the third sin of pride.

18. I say probably, and if it were not the common way of speaking among theologians, I would firmly affirm the opposite: nevertheless I affirm that this statement is in itself probable, that is to say, that just as no one thinks that something is so precise because he wants to think so, so no one believes that something is true precisely, who wants to believe that it is true.

Correlation. It is not in the free power of man to believe that an article of faith is true when he pleases, and to believe it to be false when he pleases.

19. If it were not for the sayings of the saints, who seem to say the opposite in the manifest of their speech, I would firmly assert this and the following conclusion, that they are nevertheless probable and can be reasonably defended, the first of which is that mortal sin is in itself a finite evil.

20. The second is that for a mortal sin of finite time a penalty is not due which is infinite according to time, but only finite.

21. Not every will of God's good pleasure is effective.

22. The saying of the apostle, saying, God wills all men to be saved, is to be understood positively from the preceding will of good pleasure.

23. Antecedent will may be thus described. The antecedent will of God is that which God gives to someone natural or antecedents, by which he can achieve something, whom God is ready to compel if another wishes, and will not manifest the contrary to himself by executing a precept or plan, allowing him to act freely for the attainment of his own salvation.

24. Holding the common way of the theologians, that happiness is in the understanding or in the will, I state two conclusions, the first of which is this: That the understanding would not arrive at happiness unless it were an act of the will, which in this act itself is more abundant than the understanding.

25. The second conclusion is this. Although the act of the intellect that makes the person happy formally reaches the essence of the object, yet the fact that his act about it is an act of happiness, he has formally from the act of the will.

26. Persons are distinguished in the divine number.

27. The personalities in the divine are first of all different.

28. Speaking theologically, I say that in the age there is not formally an intrinsically continuous succession, but rather a terminating one, according to the philosophers I would say otherwise.

29. It is more reasonable to believe that Origen was saved than to believe that he himself was damned.

[33] Conclusions according to own opinion number 62 into the doctrine of Plato, of which a few are brought here, because the first paradoxical conclusion assumes the whole of Plato's doctrine to be discussed.

1. By the triple numbers, which are placed by Plato in the Timaeus in a triangle signifying the soul, we are reminded how far in counting the forms we must proceed by the nature of that which is the first forming form. But we are reminded by the twofold numbers placed there, in so far as the means are coordinated by their nature, which is the means in the universe, when they are placed at the two extremes.

2. When Plato complains, whether the world was made according to a begotten or inborn model, he complains of nothing else, but either of animal reasons or of intellectual ideas.

3. He who knows the mode of illumination of the superiors above the medium, should understand that the Platonics by the assembly of souls on Mount Ida, and the Hebrews by the assembly on Mount Sinai at the hearing of the law, signify the same thing.

4. Whoever knows that reason presupposes the reason of the perfect, will understand, according to Platonic doctrine, why Pherecydes says that Jove did not make the world before he was transformed into love.

5. Empedocles, by the intelligible sphere contained by Venus, understands nothing else than the archetypal world contained by the order remaining within it by the first providence.

6. That is why love is said by Orpheus to be without eyes, because it is beyond understanding.

7. When Plato says in the Timaeus, the soul placed in the middle of the world, whatever other Platonists say, I understand by the middle of the Moon.

8. Below the attitude of a finite being, the five of Plato are rightly set forth as transcendent: Being, Same, Other, State, and Motion.

9. Speaking platonically of the soul, I mean that the soul lives a contemplative life with Saturn, political and practical with Jupiter, irascible and ambitious with Mars, concupiscible and voluptuous with Venus, vegetal with a stupid sense.

10. From the previous conclusion we conclude that the rod of Mercury is soporific.

11. The first septenary of the human life is under Mercury, the second under Venus, the third under Mars, the fourth under Jupiter, the fifth under Saturn, and the rest of the septenaries according to him who was predominated in the previous ones.

12. The Sun and the Moon co-operate with the aforesaid vine, as universal causes, and by appropriation, the Moon with Mercury and Saturn, the Sun with Friday and Mars, together with both Jupiter.

13. If we follow the theology of the Syrians, it is reasonable that priests in the ecclesiastical hierarchy are provided with anagogic virtues in the heavenly hierarchy.

14. When we hear Plato calling Pallas and love philosophers gods, let us understand that love is a philosopher by way of reason, Pallas by reason of boundaries.

15. By the reasoning of the extremes and the middle, we may know that the degrees of the universe may be conveniently divided into five. Besides being, really being, not really not being, really not being.

16. By himself such, truly such, always such, in Plato's doctrine we must understand the property of the intellect, the soul, and the first bodies.

17. If we follow the teaching of the Syrians, it is fitting that, through the unity of the total, the intellectual, which is divided into three parts, into the substantial, the potential, and the operative, we should posit the trinity of the intellect, that is, the partial participative and imaginary.

18. Whatever the rest of the Platonists say about the rational soul's distinction, I maintain that if the rational part is a noun , let us divide it into dianoian and aisJhsin , the same part that is connected with imagination to be called doxasticon , as for the understanding logisticon , as for itself.

19. It is possible that the rational part of our soul, which according to the Peripatetics I call the possible understanding, reaches this point, so that it runs and works without connection to phantasms.

20. Abundance is found more perfectly and truly in the intelligible than in the senses.

21. When Plato says that the love born from the meeting of Pan and Porus in the rising of Jou, in the birth of the gods Venus, he understands nothing else than that in the mind of the angel at that time the first love, that is the desire for abundance, was born, when in it the splendor of ideas still shone more imperfectly .

22. The love of which Plato speaks in the Symposium cannot exist in God in any way.

23. By the double Venus, of which Plato speaks in the Symposium, we must understand nothing else than the double beauty, sensible and intellectual.

24. Beauty is in God by cause, in the total understanding truly essentially totally, in the particular understanding truly partially essentially, in the rational soul truly partially, in the visible accidentals of the heavens imaginary partially essentially, in the visible substantial qualities imaginary partially essentially, in quantities imaginary partially.

27. When Plato says, Everything that is done is done by a cause, it is to be referred to per se to per se, and per accidens to per accidens.

28. When Plato said in the Timaeus, "The soul is fused out of individual and divided substance," he signified by the individual substance the animal intellect, by the divided animal reason.

29. It is not to be believed in the doctrine of Plato that the soul can understand anything by inspection of ideas, except when it has arrived at that state which is the highest degree of contemplative perfection.

Correlation. They are mistaken who believe, according to Plato, that the things which we know and understand every day, we know in the light of ideas.

30. The method of knowing through ideas is that of which Plato said in the Timmeus that few men share, but all the gods do.

31. It is entirely inappropriate to explain in the Fable Cricie through five births, five forms of the body.

32. By another life in Epinomides we must understand the connection of a part with its whole, and I believe that it is the same as what is said among the Cabalists about the age to come.

33. How true it is that what is said in Epinomides, that among all speculations the science of arithmetic is the most important for happiness, can be understood by our conclusions about mathematics.

34. By the sky in Epinomides, which Plato says is the cause of all good things for us, not the idea of ​​the sky, but the sky itself, which we must understand as the celestial animal.

35. By the kingdom of necessity in Plato's Symposium, we must understand nothing else than the superabundance of the nature of another over the nature of the same, and of the infinite over the limit.

36. By the demonstration of Plato in Phaedrus concerning the immortality of the soul, neither of our own souls, as Proclus, Hermias, and Syrianus believe, nor of every soul, as Plotinus and Numenius, nor of the soul of the world only, as Poseidonius, but of the heavenly every soul is proved , and immortality is concluded.

37. Time is essentially in the incorporeal, participation in the corporeal.

38. Time, when it has an essential existence, has an existence entirely outside the soul.

39. Time has its being shared by the soul, indeed by the first soul by the mode of effectual causality, and by the latter by the mode of objective consequence.

40. The motion of the first heaven, and universally, every local motion of it, or alteration, is measured by secondary and accidental time.

41. Although the intellectual nature understands all things at the same time, yet this is not through virtual and unitary continence, but through the mutual penetration of forms, and the indissociable concatenation of the whole being participated, that is, formal.

42. By Plato's demonstration in the Phaedrus of the immortality of the soul, the eternity of the world is more firmly demonstrated than by any account of Aristotle in viii. Physicists.

43. Why cannot a man not be seen if he is present, by a rightly disposed in his visual power, but a demon can only then be seen when he wants to be seen, from the way in which each of them is seen can be considered.

44. Just as man is seen and heard by man, through the motion of the senses outward, so the demon is seen and heard by man and the demon through the motion of the senses inward.

45. The sense of nature, which Alcindus, Bacon, William of Paris, and indeed others, and especially all the Magi, posit, is nothing else than the sense of the vehicle, which the Platonists posit.

46. ​​When Plato says that no one sins unless he is inclined to do so, he means nothing else than what Thomas holds, namely, that there cannot be sin in the will unless there is a defect in reason.

47. Providence is statutory in God, orderly in the intelligence, executive in the soul, denunciation in heaven, terminating in the whole universe.

48. Not only by Plato's sayings in Epimenides and Philebus, in which dialogues Plato expressly places happiness in contemplation, but by sayings in Phaedrus about amorous fury, it is clear that according to Plato there is no happiness in the act of love, because fury is not happiness, but an impulse and the estrus exciting, urging and pushing to happiness.

49. From the name which the gods call love, it is clear to a careful observer that there is no happiness in the act of love.

50. This statement in Phaedrus. All that the soul has more quickly than the inanimate has to be understood simply about whatever the soul really is.

51. From that saying of Plato in the Phaedrus, that unless the soul of man, which they really are, had been perceived, this animal would not have come, if it is rightly understood that the opinion of Plotinus, placing the transmigration of souls in brutes, is not to Plato's mind.

52. From the speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus to Pana, we have the complete opinion of Plato on happiness.

53. According to Cratilius' opinion of names, this is to be understood, not that names are such, but that they must be such, if they are correct.

54. That is why Socrates said in Cratilo that he dreams about ideas, because we do not use ideas in this state, but their immediate or secondary images.

55. By one in the Sophist understand one in otherness.

56. That saying in the Sophist, He who does not say one thing, says nothing, that which is said by Aristotle, He who does not understand one thing, understands nothing.

57. That saying of Plato in the Sophist concerning simulacra, which he says is made by demonic machination, and if it can be verified in many other ways: it is nevertheless convenient to explain by this that as they hold the middle degree in the entity, they are proportionate to the demonic order.

58. That hunting of Socrates, of which Protagoras speaks, may conveniently be divided into six degrees, so that the first is to be external to matter, the second to be particular immaterial, the third to be universal, the fourth to be rational, the fifth to be particular intellectual, the sixth to be total intellectual. On the seventh, as on the Sabbath, hunting must be stopped.

59. When it is said in Euthydemus, that happiness consists not in habit, but in act, I understand the reflected act.

60. By what is said in Lachete, "Whosoever is science, that there is not one of them as past, another as present, or another as future," can be understood as trite among the Peripatetics, that there is no science but of universals.

61. That saying of Plato in the Gorgias, If the speaker knows what is just, he is just, I say not absolute in itself, so that it can be applied to man only if we understand that one is from another, not formally, but inferentially.

62. Although Plato's argument in the Phaedo does not absolutely conclude by way of opposites, yet when it is explained by Cebetus to man, it concludes something.

[34] Conclusions according to his own opinion in the doctrine of Albucaten Auenan, who is said to be the author of De Causis, number X.